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People have been interested in sports for a very long time. Predominantly, because it is an enjoyable 
leisure activity. Both, in an active way as a participant and more passive as a spectator. Scholars from 
the domain of economics are no exception in that respect. However, economists have become 
increasingly interested in sports from a professional point of view during the past few decades. First, 
because it has proven to be an interesting industry to study in itself. Second, because sports provide 
unique possibilities to study phenomena of interest to various domains, such as labour markets (Kahn, 
2000).  
This dissertation contains four chapters, all with a different topic that is of interest from a sports 
economic perspective. More specifically, from the economic perspective of professional football. 
Football is the most popular sport within Europe and the data that is used in the analyses stems from 
English and Dutch professional football. The topics also relate to elements outside of the sports 
domain. For example, the effectiveness of in-season coach changes shows resemblance to managerial 
changes within organisations (Chapter 2). Stadium attendance demand relates to the entertainment 
industry and describes consumer preferences in uncertain situations (Chapter 3). Furthermore, the 
selection system for talent in youth professional football is comparable to other selections system, 
such as in school grades. Both have to deal with relative age differences between peers (Chapter 4). 
Finally, the effects of team heterogeneity on performance relate to organisational structures and, 
specifically, the formation of teams (Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 2 the analysis deals with performance effects of in-season manager changes within the 
English Premier League football during the seasons 2000/01 – 2014/15. It follows that some 
managerial changes are successful, while others are counterproductive. On average, performance 
does not improve following a managerial replacement. The development of performance around the 
time of the change in manager is subject to regression to the mean. Case studies illustrate that the 
successfulness of managerial turnover depends on specific highly unpredictable circumstances. 
Chapter 3 investigates the determinants of stadium attendance in the highest level of Dutch 
professional football for the seasons 2000/01 – 2015/16. Since attendance rates are high in the Dutch 
Eredivise, with about 40 percent of the matches that can be considered as sold out, a Tobit model is 
used for the within-season variation in attendance rates. On average, attendants, i.e. the consumers in 
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this setting, have reference-dependent preferences with loss aversion that dominate their preference 
for uncertain outcomes. This contradicts with the well-known uncertainty of outcome hypothesis 
(UOH). However, in general, team characteristics seem more important for the determination of 
stadium attendance than behavioural economic explanations regarding the outcome of the match. For 
seasonal uncertainty, many results are in line with the UOH. Moreover, the introduction of play-offs 
in the season 2005/06 has had a positive effect on stadium attendance during regular league matches. 
Although these results are statistically significant, the economic impact in terms of additional 
attendance is small. As to the between-season variation, we find a high positive correlation between 
stadium attendance and stadium capacity, suggesting excess demand for tickets. 
In Chapter 4, I look at the selection of talent in relation to the presence of a relative age effect (RAE). 
Many selection systems suffer from a bias with respect to the selection of players who are born just 
posterior to the cut-off date. The skewed birth-date distribution that results, with an 
overrepresentation of early-born and age-advantaged players, is known as the RAE. Under the 
assumption that talent is uniformly distributed across birth dates, this suggests that talent is lost. With 
data from PSV Eindhoven (PSV), it follows that an RAE is persistent within their youth academy. 
Furthermore, I show that this results from external selection, i.e. the recruitment of players from 
outside of the academy. Internal selection, i.e. the annual decision whether players may stay or have 
to leave, reduces the severity of the RAE. Finally, most of the players who eventually become a 
professional football player, are early-born. However, at the age of 19, late-born players have a higher 
probability to become a professional. This suggests that only the highly talented late-born players are 
selected. The underlying assumptions as well as the generalizability of the results are extensively 
discussed. 
The final Chapter 5 provides a study on the relationship between team heterogeneity and performance 
with data from the highest tier of Dutch professional football in the season 2014/15. Performance is 
measured by a unique Success Ratio of individual player actions. This measure is used in both, an 
individual player analysis as well as in a team level analysis. The results reveal that heterogeneity 
concerning nationality influences performance positively, whereas heterogeneity with respect to 
experience affects performance negatively. Although these results are statistically significant, their 
economic impact in terms of performance differences is small. Furthermore, heterogeneity related to 
ability and heterogeneity related to height are insignificant. For team performance, it follows that a 
continuous measure of performance, based on a team average of individual Success Ratio’s, might 
better reveal certain relationships than a discrete measure that is based on match outcomes.  
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Football is very popular worldwide. In Europe and Latin-America, football has entertained crowds 
for more than one century. In other continents, interest has increased in the past decades. Top players 
now move to the football leagues of Australia, Japan and the United States, and, more recently, also 
to the league of the People’s Republic of China. Both clubs and national associations employ top-
class managers from all around the globe to coach their squads. Furthermore, top clubs have an 
enormous global fan base.  
The great interest in football is not restricted to fans seeking entertainment. Professional sports, in 
general, and professional football, in particular, have proven to be a fruitful soil for scientific research. 
Kahn (2000) and Szymanski (2003), for example, argue that professional sports offer interesting data 
to analyse labour market phenomena. In this respect, the high frequency of data obtained from 
controlled events is of particular interest. Results of football matches, for example, provide a 
straightforward and objective measure of performance (Ter Weel, 2011). An element in football that 
has clear analogies both with business and economics is the ongoing debate about the effects of 
management on the performance of firms. Kuper and Szymanski (2010) question the influence of 
managers on the performance of professional football teams. In contrast, Anderson and Sally (2013) 
argue that this influence is non-negligible, as leadership appears to matter for history, in general, and 
for business, in particular. Pieper, Nüesch and Franck (2014) argue, that football managers closely 
resemble managers in other branches of the economy with respect to personal characteristics, such as 
age and the capabilities to cope with stress, media attention and a large group of stakeholders. 
Assuming that ‘management matters’, or, at least, that decision-makers, such as the supervisory 
board, suppose that ‘management matters’, one of the key decisions is the hiring and firing of 
managers (Ward et al., 2011). This holds in particular, if the decision to sack a manager is 
implemented prior to the expiration of her/his contract. Summary dismissals tend to be rather costly, 
so that one aims for improved performances in return. Both Pieper, Nüesch and Franck (2014) and 
Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) show that the decision to replace a manager is related to the difference 
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between actual performance and expectations. Both studies use bookmaker odds to derive these 
expectations. The authors find an increased probability of replacement, if actual performances fall 
short of expectations. Thus, a sequence of (rather) bad results triggers clubs to replace the manager, 
hoping for better performances afterwards (Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel, 2003). 
Much research has already been done on the effects of manager turnover in business. These studies 
mainly use stock prices, or data derived from financial statements that are only published with a lag, 
viz. on a quarterly or annual basis. These outcomes point at a statistically significant but small positive 
effect (Ter Weel, 2011). Studies on the effectiveness of managerial changes in professional football 
have been done for a variety of European countries, for example, Belgium, England, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Spain (see for a recent overview Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016)).  
Two Belgian studies, Balduck et al. (2010a) and Balduck et al. (2010b), find no performance effects 
of a coach replacement. Studying English football, Poulsen (2000) finds no effects of a managerial 
change while Dobson and Goddard (2011) find a negative effect, just after the replacement of a 
manager. Analyzing data from German football, Salomo and Teichmann (2000) find negative effects 
of a trainer-coach dismissal, while Hentschel et al. (2012) conclude that a coach change may have a 
positive effect on homogeneous teams but no effect for heterogeneous teams. De Paola and Scoppa 
(2011) find similar conclusions for Italian football, just like Tena and Forrest (2007) for Spanish 
football. Koning (2003), Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel (2003), Ter Weel (2011), Van Ours and Van 
Tuijl (2016) study the effects of the replacement of head-coaches in the highest professional football 
league of the Netherlands. They all find that this does not lead to better performance of the teams 
involved. 
We study the effects of managerial changes using data of the English Premier League. We apply the 
method initially used by Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016). Studying Dutch professional football, they 
account for potential selectivity of managerial changes by, first, correcting for the strength of the 
opponent and, second, by defining a counterfactual case with a similar development of performances 
prior to the hypothetical change, but without the managerial change actually taking place. The authors 
use the so-called cumulative surprise as an indicator of the difference between performance and 
expectations. The cumulative surprise is the sum of the differences between the actual number of 
points and the expected number of points, as based on bookmaker odds. Then, they use this 
cumulative surprise to match actual coach changes to counterfactual observations. In line with most 
previous studies, Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) conclude that the development of performances 
around the time of the change in trainer-coach is subject to regression to the mean. 
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Our main finding is that, on average, an in-season replacement of the manager has no effect on in-
season performances. In addition to the replication of the method of Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) 
for the English Premier League, we also investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the effects and 
find that some changes have positive effects, while other changes are counterproductive, i.e. the 
effects of a managerial replacement on team performance are negative. To find out whether there is 
a pattern in this heterogeneity of the effects of a managerial change, we also study subsamples. These 
subsamples are based on the origin of the manager (British versus non-British), his age, whether or 
not the manager ever played for a national team, whether the team was recently promoted to the 
Premier League and whether the team finished top-10 or bottom-10 in the preceding season. Our main 
finding, i.e. managerial replacements are ineffective, stands up to the scrutiny of these subsamples. 
To explore potential differences between successful and unsuccessful managerial changes we present 
three case-studies, from which we conclude that the efficacy of managerial turnover depends on 
specific highly unpredictable circumstances. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we present our data and our research method. 
Subsequently, we discuss our results in section 2.3. Next, we present three case-studies in section 2.4. 
Finally, section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Data and set-up of the analysis 
We use data from English Premier League (EPL) football for 15 seasons, from 2000/01 to 2014/15. 
Every season contains 20 clubs that compete according to a double round-robin format, resulting in 
380 matches per season (5,700 matches in total). For every match, the date, the home team, the away 
team and the final score are recorded. Furthermore, the dataset contains match-specific bookmaker 
data concerning the final result, as well as the managers in charge of the two teams per match.1 Thus, 
information on in-season changes is included.2 In case of a managerial change, we distinguish 
between forced ‘sackings’ and voluntary ‘resignations’.3 Finally, the dataset contains information on 
the final ranks of all clubs within the EPL in the preceding season.  
In our analysis, we consider the first managerial change of a club within a particular season. Thus we 
ignore, for example, a caretaker who is replaced after some matches by a newly hired manager. 
                                                 
1 The bookmaker data stem from William Hill (98 per cent) and from Ladbrokes (two per cent), in case WH data were 
lacking. 
2 The data on managers has mainly been collected from www.soccerbase.com. In case of missing or ambiguous 
information, we have examined newspaper archives and other internet sources. 
3 We only consider the first managerial change of a particular club within a particular season. We have collected 
information on sackings and resignations from newspaper archives and BBC Sport. 
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Consequently, the sample period contains 84 in-season managerial changes. We follow Van Ours and 
Van Tuijl (2016) in their method of analyses. They discuss coach changes in two steps. First, they 
show that the probability of a coach change depends on the in-season performance of the team. The 
in-season performance is measured by the number of points in the last four matches as well as the 
cumulative surprise, i.e. the cumulative difference between the expected number of points and the 
actual number of points obtained. Expectations are based on bookmaker odds. The second step, which 
is replicated in the present study, is to test the performance effects of the coach changes. The 
development of performances before and after the change is compared with the development of 
performances in case the change would not have happened. Since the latter cannot be observed, there 
is a need to construct a control group. In order to be a valid counterfactual, an observation needs to 
fulfil the following five requirements: 
 
1. The observation concerns the same club, but stems from a different season that does not 
contain an in-season change in manager. This excludes two types of changes. First, we ignore 
changes that occurred at clubs that only played in the EPL during just one season in the sample 
period. Second, we do not take changes into account at clubs that changed their manager in 
all of their EPL-seasons in the sample period. 
2. The observation should exhibit a cumulative surprise that does not differ more than 0.5 from 
the cumulative surprise at the time of the actual managerial change. This leads to the exclusion 
of cases that exhibit a rather large (positive or negative) cumulative surprise at the time of the 
change, compared to all other observations. Applying such a maximum value potentially 
results in the exclusion of both rather successful cases and rather unsuccessful cases.4  
3. Consistency with the actual managerial changes requires that we exclude matching with an 
observation prior to the fifth match and posterior to match 34. 
4. For observations that fulfil the first three requirements, we look for the smallest difference 
between the rank number of the last match of the replaced manager and the rank number of 
the match attached to the potential counterfactual. By doing so, we assure that matching is 
also based on the time during the season at which a change takes place. The closer the rank 
numbers of the matches, the higher the likelihood that the pattern towards the change is similar 
as compared to the counterfactual. Furthermore, it makes sure that the performances of the 
                                                 
4 Obviously, this value of 0.5 is fairly arbitrary. Yet, an extensive sensitivity analysis has made clear that different values 
only lead to a small change in the number of cases to be considered, without altering the main conclusions. 
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treatment group and the control group have a more or less similar period (i.e. in terms of the 
number of matches or observations) to develop, after the treatment has taken place. 
5. In case multiple observations meet all previous requirements, we take as the counterfactual 
observation the one with the smallest difference in cumulative surprise as compared to the 
actual observation. 
 
The idea is to find a situation (i.e. season) without coach change that is comparable to the one in 
which the coach has been changed. Since club-specific elements might matter for the hiring and firing 
of coaches, such as the sentiment of fans, we want the counterfactual to come from the same club. 
Independence between observations requires that the counterfactual does not contain a coach change 
itself. Resemblance of the counterfactual observation with the actual coach change is primarily 
obtained through resemblance of the cumulative surprise. Thus, the in-season performance of the 
control group should correspond with the in-season performance at the time of a coach change. 
Furthermore, since the cumulative surprise includes expectations that capture and control for season-
specific quality etc., it is safe to compare performances between seasons. Then, since we compare 
performances before and after the (hypothetical) change, we want the number of matches before 
(after) the actual change to be close to the number of matches before (after) the counterfactual change. 
This allows for rather equal opportunities in the development of performances and, thus, a comparable 
situation. 
In our sample, ten of the managerial changes occurred, either prior to the fifth match or posterior to 
the 34th match. These 10 changes will be left out of our analysis. Thus, 74 managerial changes remain, 
of which 13 do not meet the criteria for matching with a valid counterfactual case to be used in the 
difference-in-differences approach. Our final sample thus consists of 61 managerial changes. Table 
2.1 presents descriptive statistics of this sample. It shows, per season and in total, the number of 
changes to be considered in our analysis for the complete sample, dismissals only and the subsamples 
that are based on managerial characteristics. We define ‘British’ managers as managers from the 
United Kingdom and from the Republic of Ireland, thus making a sharp distinction between these two 
countries and the rest of the world. For age, we distinguish between managers aged over 50 and 
managers aged under 50 at the time of replacement. The age of 50 is the overall average and splits 
the sample in two more or less equal subsamples. Table 2.1 further shows that managerial 
replacements, on average, take place around the middle of the season (column ‘W’) with the 
cumulative surprise then being negative (column ‘CS’). Column ‘FS’ shows the average cumulative 
surprise at the end of the season, indicating that, for some seasons we find improvements, while for 
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others the cumulative surprise decreases. The last three columns show the average values for our 
counterfactual observations. By definition, the values for the rank number of the match and for 
cumulative surprise are rather similar for the treatment and control group. However, the improvement 
in cumulative surprise is larger for the control group than for the treatment group, given the values 
for MFS and FS. Table A1 in the appendix presents a detailed overview including all single 
managerial changes. 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptives 
Season Changes D B A Age C W CS FS MW MCS MFS 
00/01 4 3 3 1 45.0 4 19.7 -2.1 -1.1 24.2 -1.8 -2.3 
01/02 5 3 5 2 50.6 2 15.0 -2.2 -4.0 15.0 -2.3 -1.7 
02/03 2 2 1 0 47.1 2 21.0 -2.6 -9.7 21.5 -2.8 -1.0 
03/04 3 2 3 0 46.8 3 14.3 -3.3 -5.0 15.3 -3.1 4.4 
04/05 6 2 5 5 55.4 3 11.8 -2.3 -3.4 12.5 -2.3 0.0 
05/06 2 2 1 1 50.9 1 18.0 -4.5 1.3 24.5 -4.3 -2.2 
06/07 2 2 2 0 41.1 1 25.0 -5.1 -4.6 25.0 -5.2 -1.0 
07/08 7 4 6 2 47.9 2 13.1 -4.4 -5.2 13.9 -4.3 0.4 
08/09 4 2 3 2 50.1 2 16.2 -2.3 -3.5 13.2 -2.4 -4.7 
09/10 4 4 4 3 51.0 1 20.2 -3.2 -3.7 22.5 -3.4 -1.5 
10/11 5 4 4 3 52.4 2 16.6 -2.3 -0.8 18.6 -2.5 -5.1 
11/12 2 2 1 1 42.7 0 20.0 -6.0 -4.8 21.5 -5.9 -5.0 
12/13 4 4 3 2 50.8 2 23.5 -2.0 -1.9 18.7 -2.3 -0.2 
13/14 7 6 4 5 49.5 3 17.9 -3.4 -1.5 15.0 -3.6 -2.4 
14/15 4 3 3 2 50.7 2 23.0 -2.0 -2.1 23.0 -2.0 -1.6 
Total 61 45 48 29 49.6 30 17.5 -3.0 -3.1 17.7 -3.0 -1.5 
Note: ‘Changes’ indicate the number of changes (all changes included in the analyses) while ‘D’ is the number of dismissals, ‘B’ the 
number of British managers, ‘A’ the number of managers aged above 50, ‘Age’ is the average age at the time of replacement, ‘C’ the 
number of capped managers, ‘W’ the average number of the last match of the manager, ‘CS’ the cumulative surprise at the time of 
replacement, ‘FS’ is the average final surprise (at the end of the season) for teams that replaced their manager. The ‘M’ in the last three 
columns indicate that these values belong to the matched observations. 
 
We estimate the parameters of the following linear model using OLS: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝜂𝑖𝑘 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘
′ 𝛽 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜆𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝑖𝑗𝑘,      (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the performance indicator, 𝑖 denotes the club, 𝑗 indicates the match and 𝑘 refers to the 
season. We use the number of points as performance indicator.5 Note that we investigate in-season 
replacements and performances. Therefore, we include club-season fixed-effects 𝜂𝑖𝑘, which account 
for unobserved elements such as the quality of a team in a particular season. Home advantage is 
highly relevant for the performance (see for example Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016)). Consequently, 
a dummy is included that has value one for matches played at home. Evidently, the quality of the 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, we used victory (whether a team has won the match) and goal difference as performance indicators. Then, 
our main findings are identical.  
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opponent is also important. This strength is proxied by the final rank in the previous season.6 The 
latter two variables are both included in the vector  𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘
′ , while 𝛽 represents the vector of parameter 
estimates and 𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the error term.  The focus of our analysis is on two variables. First, 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a 
dummy for the treatment group, with value one if a manager has been replaced and 𝛿 measuring the 
effect of the managerial change on the performance. Second, 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a dummy for the control group, 
with value one if the ‘hypothetical’ change has taken place and with 𝜆 measuring the counterfactual 
effect on the performance. An F-test for the equality of 𝛿 and 𝜆 reveals whether the managerial change 
exerts influence on the in-season performance. First, we estimate the parameters of equation (1) using 
our complete sample. Then, we estimate the relevant parameters for dismissals only.  
Figure 2.1 shows kernel densities for the cumulative surprises at the end of the season for the subsets 
of dismissals, resignations, as well as for the majority of the cases, in which no managerial change 
has taken place. The distribution of the cumulative surprise for the dismissals is somewhat different 
from the distribution of the cumulative surprise for quits. Nevertheless, they look fairly similar. 
However, there is a clear difference between the seasons with a managerial change compared to the 
seasons without a managerial change. At the end of the latter seasons there is a more positive 
cumulative surprise. In other words, seasons with managerial changes are seasons with worse 
performance than seasons without a managerial change. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Cumulative Surprise for types of managerial changes; final match of 
the season 
                                                 
6 Promoted teams are all assigned rank 20. 
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2.3 Parameter estimates 
In analysing the effectiveness of in-season manager replacements, we first use all 61 changes for 
which we have found a valid counterfactual. Then, we focus on the subset of dismissals. The 
parameter estimates for all managerial changes are presented in the first columns of Table 2.2. ‘Rank 
Opponent’ is a measure of the strength of the opponent, while ‘Home’ represents home advantage. 
The variable ‘Manager change’ measures the difference in performance before and after a managerial 
change. Without taking a control group into account, we can interpret the coefficients of this variable 
as treatment effects. A significant positive value indicates that performances improved, suggesting 
that changes were effective. However, interpreting this result as causal would be wrong, since one 
does not take into account the situation in which the manager would not have been replaced. 
Therefore, we include a dummy variable for the control group reflecting managerial replacement that 
did not take place. Significant and positive values for the related parameter indicate that performances 
went up after the ‘counterfactual’ change, i.e. the matched observation. The F-test for equality 
between the two managerial-change parameter shows whether there is indeed a causal effect, i.e. if 
the two parameters are not significantly different from each other there is no treatment effect. Table 
2.2 also shows the number of observations in the treatment and control groups, both separately and 
combined. Differences in the number of observations between the treatment and control groups arise 
because some club-season combinations are a control group for multiple treatment groups. 
 
Table 2.2: Parameter estimates determinants team performance 
 All changes Dismissals 
   
Rank Opponent 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Home 0.56*** 0.55*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Manager change 0.21*** 0.28*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Counterfactual  0.21*** 0.26*** 
manager change (0.06) (0.06) 
   
F-test for equality 0.00 0.03 
   
Observations 4,028 3,002 
n-Seasons 106 79 
n-Treatment-Group 61 45 
n-Control-Group 45 34 
Note: Team performance is measured by the number of points per match. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. All estimates include club-season fixed effects. ‘Rank opponent’ refers to the rank of the opponent in the preceding season. 
‘Home’ indicates whether a match was played at home. 
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Interpreting Table 2.2, while focusing on the results for all changes, we observe that both the strength 
of the opponent as well as the home advantage are highly significant. They both have the expected 
sign. The weaker the opponent, the better the outcome, while home matches also result in better 
results. Furthermore, we find a highly significant and positive coefficient for a managerial change. 
Our naïve conclusion would be that a change in manager is successful on average. However, we find 
similar results and comparable values for the counterfactual managerial change. The F-test indeed 
shows that there is no significant difference between the treatment and control group. The results thus 
show that the improvement in performance after the change in manager (i.e. the treatment group) 
would also have occurred if the manager would have kept his position (i.e. the control group). On 
average, we do not find a causal relation between performances and the managerial changes. This 
finding is in line with the results of previous studies and in particular comparable to the results found 
by Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016). 
The findings for dismissals are fairly similar. These results are presented in the second column of 
Table 2.2. Leaving out the 16 resignations, thus analysing 45 dismissals, results in comparable values, 
significance and conclusions. In general, thus, we may conclude that there is no point in firing a 
manager after a sequence of bad results, since performances would have improved irrespective of the 
manager in charge.7 Again, these results are in line with previous studies. 
Table 2.3 shows the results for multiple subsamples which are based on the characteristics of the 
replaced manager.8 In the first and second column, we distinguish between British (n=48) and non-
British (n=13) coaches.9 Column three and four contain the results for subsamples of coaches aged 
over 50 (n=29) and aged under 50 (n=32), at the time they were replaced. Finally, the last two 
columns, five and six, report the results for those coaches who were capped as an active player (n=30) 
and those who did not play for their country (n=31). Without going into detail, the general result is 
that we find significant improvements in performance after a managerial change, which is also the 
case for the counterfactual managerial change. However, we do not find any significant differences 
                                                 
7 It would be more accurate to formulate ‘after a sequence of results below expectations’, which emphasizes that clubs 
(probably) take into account the heterogeneity of opponents and the order of play in their decision to fire a manager. From 
Table A1 in the appendix it becomes clear that the cumulative surprise at the moment of the managerial replacement is 
negative for most cases. 
8 Note that for each group of two subsamples (i.e. British, Age and Capped) the total number of treatment groups is 61 
and equal to the number for all changes in Table 2.2. However, the total number control groups might be different and in 
particular higher than the number of 45 in Table 2.2, since a club-season that is a counterfactual for multiple treatment 
groups is counted only once in Table 2.2, but twice if it belongs to both subsamples per group in Table 2.3. 
9 As mentioned above, we define ‘British’ managers as managers from either the United Kingdom or from the Republic 
of Ireland. 
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between treatment group and control group. This leads us to conclude that on average, for none of 
the subsamples, performances improve after a managerial change. 
 
Table 2.3: Parameter estimates for subsamples of managerial changes 
 British Age Capped 
 Yes No >=50 <50 Yes No 
       
Rank Opponent 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Home 0.59*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Manager change 0.17*** 0.37*** 0.21** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.18** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
Counterfactual 0.25*** 0.17* 0.21** 0.23*** 0.15** 0.24*** 
manager change (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
       
F-test for equality 0.87 2.22 0.00 0.09 0.57 0.29 
       
Observations 3,268 950 2,052 2,242 2,052 2,128 
n-Seasons 86 25 54 59 54 56 
n-Treatment-Group 48 13 29 32 30 31 
n-Control-Group 38 12 25 27 24 25 
Note: Team performance is measured by the number of points per match. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. All estimates include club-season fixed effects. ‘Rank opponent’ is the rank of the opponent in the preceding season. ‘Home’ 
indicates whether a match was played at home. 
 
Finally, Table 2.4 presents the results for three subsamples that are based on the rank of the team in 
preceding year. The latter functions as a crude indicator of the quality and status of a club.10 In 
columns one and two, we distinguish between clubs that were promoted in the previous season from 
the second tier of English football, the Championship, to the Premier League. Three teams were 
promoted in each season during the sample period, resulting in eight treatment groups to be 
considered, compared to 53 non-promoted teams. Extending the definition of promotion to one of the 
two preceding seasons, the number of treatment cases increases to 13, while 48 then belong to the 
non-promoted category. The results for these subsamples are presented in the third and fourth column. 
The last two columns provide results for subsamples where we distinguish between clubs that finished 
in the top half (n=23) and in the bottom half (n=38) of the Premier League table in the preceding 
season, treating promoted teams as part of the bottom. In contrast to the results in the Tables 2.2 and 
2.3, we now find some insignificant values. The coefficient for the treatment group of the promoted 
teams in the preceding season (column 1) is positive, but insignificant, meaning that, for this 
subsample of cases, performances did not improve after the change in manager.  
                                                 
10 The same remark about the number of treatment groups and the number of control groups made for Table 2.3 (footnote 
8) applies to Table 2.4. 
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Interestingly, the coefficient for the control group is positive and significant, but the F-test for equality 
reveals that there is no significant difference between the treatment and control groups, which might 
have to do with the small number of observations in this subsample. The other insignificant results 
are found for the top half of the league table (column 5). Here, both coefficients for the treatment and 
control group are positive, but insignificant, strengthening the idea that, for this subset of club-season 
combinations, performances develop irrespective of the manager in charge. The F-test reveals no 
significant difference, which is also the case for all other subsamples that do contain positive and 
significant results. 
 
Table 2.4: Results for subsamples of teams using all changes 
 Promoted-1 Promoted-1-2 Rank-1 
 Yes No Yes No Top-10 Bottom-10 
       
Rank Opponent 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Home 0.64*** 0.56*** 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Manager change 0.19 0.21*** 0.19* 0.21*** 0.14 0.25*** 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) 
Counterfactual 0.27** 0.19*** 0.21** 0.20*** 0.12 0.24*** 
managerial change (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
       
F-test for equality 0.20 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 
       
Observations 608 3,572 988 3,306 1,672 2,508 
n-Seasons 16 94 26 87 44 66 
n-Treatment-Group 8 53 13 48 23 38 
n-Control-Group 8 41 13 39 21 28 
Note: Team performance is measured by the number of points per match. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. All estimates include club-season fixed effects. ‘Rank opponent’ is the rank of the opponent in the preceding season. ‘Home’ 
indicates whether a match was played at home. ‘Promoted-1’ indicates a subsample of clubs that were promoted in the preceding 
season. ‘Promoted-1-2’ refers to a subsample of clubs that were promoted in one of the preceding two seasons. ‘Rank-1’ indicates a 
subsample of clubs that finished in the top half or bottom half in the preceding season, treating promoted clubs as bottom. 
 
2.4 Case studies of managerial replacements 
Our results in the previous section reveal that, on average, performances improve after the 
replacement of a manager, but the improvement is not causally related to the change. This is in line 
with previous studies. Nevertheless, there is a clear heterogeneity in the effects of a managerial 
change when we look at individual managerial changes. Figure 2.2 presents a scatterplot of all 61 
changes included in our sample. The horizontal axis refers to the change in cumulative surprise after 
the managerial replacement. The vertical axis indicates the change in cumulative surprise for the 
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control group.11 For the sake of clarity, we added a diagonal that indicates equality of equal change 
in cumulative surprise for the treatment group and the control group. Observations above the line 
represent cases in which the control group did better than the treatment group, suggesting that the 
change was ineffective or even counterproductive. Observations below the line represent cases in 
which the managerial change was effective. Furthermore, the closer the observations are to the line, 
the more equal the development of the two groups is. Many observations are fairly close to the 
diagonal, which suggests that the managerial change was ineffective, thus supporting our average 
result. However, a substantial number of observations are at a fairly large distance from the diagonal, 
suggesting that some changes are quite effective, while others are counterproductive.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Development of Cumulative Surprise for all individual treatments and matched 
counterfactuals 
 
To investigate whether there are particular reasons for effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a managerial 
change, we selected three managerial replacements to discuss in more detail. First, we look at Chelsea 
FC, with treatment season 2011/12 and counterfactual 2010/11. This observation is indicated as a 
‘diamond’ in Figure 2.2. The close proximity of the ‘diamond’ towards the diagonal line suggests 
hardly any effect at all. Second, we discuss Leeds United FC, with treatment season 2003/04 and 
counterfactual 2000/01. This observation is indicated as a ‘triangle’ in Figure 2.2. The position of the 
                                                 
11 Since the cumulative surprise at the managerial change and the cumulative surprise at the counterfactual event does not 
exceed 0.5, we compare the change in cumulative surprise for both events. The values are calculated from Table A1 by 
taking FS-CS for the treatment group and MFS-MCS for the control group.  
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‘triangle’ suggests a strongly negative effect. Third, we examine Newcastle United FC, with treatment 
season 2005/06 and counterfactual 2012/13. This observation is indicated as a ‘circle’ in Figure 2.2. 
The position of the ‘circle’ suggests a substantially positive effect. All three cases concern the 
dismissal of the manager. 
 
a: Chelsea FC, treatment season 11/12, control season 10/11 
 
 




 c: Newcastle United FC, treatment season 05/06, control season 12/13 
Figure 2.3: Case studies 
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2.5 Chelsea FC12 
André Villas-Boas moved from FC Porto to Chelsea FC in the summer of 2011. The Portuguese 
manager, only 33 years old at the time, had just guided the ‘Dragões’ (Dragons) to victory in the 
UEFA Europa League. Rumour has it that the London club paid a transfer fee of approximately 15 
million euro. Villas-Boas soon presented a three-year plan to take the London club to the top of 
Europe. Yet, Chelsea-owner Roman Abramovich had already run out of patience after little more than 
eight months. The Russian club-owner held the manager responsible for the disappointing results. 
Thus, on 4 March, 2012, Chelsea FC sacked their Portuguese manager. Former Italian midfielder 
Roberto Di Matteo, previously an assistant to Villas-Boas, took over, initially only as a caretaker. At 
the end of the season, Chelsea were sixth in the table. However, Di Matteo guided them to their first 
ever victory in the UEFA Champions League (UCL). Moreover, Chelsea also won the FA Cup under 
his supervision.13 
Carlo Ancelotti became the Chelsea FC manager in the summer of 2009. The former Italian 
midfielder had guided AC Milan to two UCL-victories (2003, 2007). In the 2009/10 season, he led 
Chelsea to the double, viz. both the EPL and the FA Cup. However, Chelsea lost both prizes in the 
next season. Abramovich sacked Ancelotti immediately posterior to the last match of the 2010/11 
season. One month earlier, rivals Manchester United FC had eliminated Chelsea FC in the quarter 
finals of the UCL, a trophy then still absent in the club’s boardroom. This has probably been a crucial 
element underlying this post-season sacking. 
Figure 2.2 immediately makes clear that the difference between the control season (2010/11) and the 
treatment season (2011/12) is negligible. Moreover, the decline in cumulative surprise after the 
(hypothetical) change in manager is about equal for both seasons (see Figure 2.3a). The efforts that 
resulted in winning two trophies probably explain the disappointing results in the EPL in the treatment 
season, despite replacing the manager, who apparently was a mismatch. After all, the importance of 
the FA Cup may have decreased in the 21th century, but the UCL is, no doubt, the biggest prize in 
European club football. 
 
2.6 Leeds United FC (LUFC)14 
In the 2003/04 season, the debts of Leeds United FC were assessed as astronomically high, at around 
100 million pound sterling. Consequently, LUFC had to go on selling quality players, weakening 
                                                 
12 The information in this subsection stems from the articles concerning Chelsea FC seasons in Wikipedia. 
13 Chelsea FC sacked Roberto di Matteo on 21 November 2012, after Italian champions Juventus FC had eliminated them 
from the 2012/13 UCL. 
14 The information in this subsection stems from the articles concerning Leeds United FC seasons in Wikipedia. 
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their squad. The board sacked manager Peter Reid, a former England international midfielder, on 10 
November 2003, a few months after his arrival at Elland Road. At that time, LUFC had gained no 
more than eight points from a dozen EPL matches. Eddy Gray, an all-time club-hero, took over as a 
caretaker. Initially, the results got better under his supervision: LUFC even moved out of the danger 
zone at the end of 2003. However, they subsequently lost seven matches in a row. Yet, the ‘Whites’ 
succeeded in bouncing back a little, one more time. However, in the end, relegation was inevitable. 
David O’Leary was in charge at Elland Road from 1 October 1998, when he succeeded his former 
boss George Graham, until the summer of 2002. At that time, the board sacked him. O’Leary had 
been allowed to spend more than 100 million pound sterling in the transfer market, without winning 
any trophy. O’Leary’s team seriously dipped during the 2000/01 season, but they recovered. These 
plunges may be ascribed to the lagged fatigue effects and leading anticipation effects of UCL matches, 
at least partly. In April 2001, LUFC reached the semi-finals of the UCL/European Champions’ Cup 
for the first time since 1975. 
Figure 2.2 makes clear that the difference between the control season (2000/01) and the treatment 
season (2003/04) is positive. Moreover, Figure 2.3b demonstrates that the cumulative surprise 
developed unfavourably after the managerial change in the 2003/04 season as compared to the same 
period in the control season.  
 
2.7 Newcastle United FC (NUFC)15 
Newcastle United FC experienced a turbulent summer in 2005. Rumours concerning the club- 
ownership, the departure of some star-players and the failure to qualify for Europe via the UEFA 
Intertoto cup (UIC) all contributed to the turmoil. Meanwhile, the Scottish manager Graeme Souness, 
a former Liverpool FC-hero, bought some first-class players, including England striker Michael 
Owen, who returned to England for 17 million pound sterling, after one season at Real Madrid. 
Initially, Owen nicely co-operated with Alan Shearer, the latter in his final season as an active player. 
However, Owen got seriously injured on New Year’s Eve. After that, the form of the team decreased 
severely. One month later, the NUFC board sacked Souness. A stiff battle against relegation then 
seemed to lie ahead for the ‘Magpies’. The 2005/06 season then seemed to lack any prospect for the 
‘Magpies’. Glenn Roeder, director of the youth academy, took over as caretaker. He guided the team 
from the fifteenth place to the seventh place, thus even capturing an UIC spot. The team won no less 
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than nine matches out of the remaining 14 matches in the EPL. Irish national goalkeeper Given and 
Shearer uttered afterwards that Souness had never been a fans’ favourite and that his preference for 
certain players had been devastating for the team spirit. However, injuries had also been a crucial 
element in their dipping form. 
In the 2012/13 season Alan Pardew guided NUFC to the 16th place. Thus, they avoided relegation. 
In the FA Cup and in the Football League Cup, they only lasted one round. However, NUFC did 
reach the quarter finals of the UEFA Europa League, which might explain their disappointing 
performance in the EPL and the domestic cup competitions, at least partly. 
The chemistry between Souness and part of the team had apparently gone during the treatment season 
(2005/06). Moreover, the mighty fans of the ‘Magpies’ did not appreciate his work. Under such 
circumstances, the replacement of a manager may be an inevitable measure. During the control season 
(2012/13), NUFC were mediocre in all three domestic competitions. This may be explained from 
huge European efforts. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the difference between the treatment season 
(2005/06) and the control season (2012/13) is positive, as Figure 2.2 makes clear. Furthermore, Figure 
2.3c demonstrates the cumulative surprise developed favourably after the managerial change in the 
2005/06 season as compared to the same period in the control season.  
 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
In English premier league football managers are replaced for various reasons, but predominantly 
because of poor performance (Audas, Dobson and Goddard (1999), Dobson and Goddard (2011) 
Bachan, Reilly and Witt (2008), d’Addona and Kind (2014)).16 In our paper, we investigate the 
effectiveness of in-season manager replacements, using data of 15 seasons from English Premier 
League football. When we compare the change in performance after managerial replacements with 
the change in performance of counterfactual replacements we find no difference. Although we find 
heterogeneity in the effects of managerial changes, the successfulness seems to be related to specific 
and highly unpredictable circumstances. This raises the question why coaches are dismissed anyway. 
There are several potential reasons for this. The first possible reason is that some club-owners are 
good in recognizing that a managerial replacement might be effective, while other club-owners are 
not. The second possible reason is misperception. As performance after a managerial change is often 
better than before, the perception is that this change was successful. True or not, club-owners are 
probably not interested in counterfactuals. A before-after comparison without considering a 
                                                 
16 See Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) for determinants of coach replacement in other European football leagues. 
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counterfactual is misleading from a researchers’ point of view, but not in the perception of club-
owners, fans and mass-media. The third possible reason is asymmetry in the perception of the 
relationship between decision and result. Deciding for a replacement and not have an improvement 
in results is better than deciding not to act and not have an improvement in results. In the first case, 
club-owners have at least tried to improve the performance, in the second case they failed to act. The 
fourth possible reason is that dismissal is simply the destiny of a manager. The position of a manager 
has once been invented such that a manager gets the blame for disappointing results and not the club-
owner (Carter (2006, 2007)). 
Thus, managers seem to be sacked due to reasons outside of their influence, functioning as 
scapegoats. In management literature this is found to be the case after bad performances (e.g. Khanna 
and Poulsen, 1995) and might be an optimal strategy, together with the appointment of an outside 
successor, in the aftermath of wrongdoing (Gangloff, Connelly and Shook, 2016). In sports, 
scapegoating of managers is found as well (e.g. Bruinshoofd and Ter Weel, 2003). Consequently, 
their jobs are highly uncertain. The saying “you’re only as good as your last match” seems to be 
typically true for professional football managers. Therefore, they will ask for some compensation in 
return for this uncertainty. However, many qualified managers are available, who are all willing to 
work in the EPL. This makes it rather easy for clubs to find a suitable replacement. Therefore, one 
might expect marginal demands from their side. Although CEO-compensation is based on multiple 
factors, such as ability (Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary, 2010), the opposite seems to be true, as salaries 
seem to be sky-high, probably including a scapegoat premium as found by Ward et al. (2011) for the 
CEO of listed companies as well as for college American football coaches. We have found that 
performances develop irrespective of the manager in charge, which is in line with the doubts of Kuper 
and Szymanski (2010) about the influence of football manager. Apparently, extremely high salaries 
reflect the compensation for job uncertainty rather than the compensation for superior quality.
   
 








Appendix A: Details on the data 
 
 
Table A1 provides an overview of the 61 valid matched observations. Besides information on the 
seasons, match rank-numbers and managers, the columns CS and MCS report the matched values of 
cumulative surprise which, by definition, do not differ more than 0.5. Interestingly, we do observe 
some (large) differences when comparing the final two columns that report the cumulative surprises 
at the end of the season. A difference between these two values might indicate a positive (or negative) 
development of performances after the replacement of the manager compared to the counterfactual. 
We would like to note that we compare surprises based on expectations obtained from bookmaker 
odds. If these odds are heavily based on recent in-season results, badly (well) performing teams are 
likely to face low (high) expectations, which would overestimate (underestimate) their performance 
in terms of surprise. Then, the cumulative surprise is probably not a good performance measure to 
evaluate the effectiveness of in-season coach changes, since clubs are only interested in the actual 
number of points obtained. We indeed use this as the main performance measure in our analyses. 
However, we question the focus on recent in-season performances by bookmakers, given the broad 
range of cumulative surprises. The cumulative surprise is a useful measure to compare performances 
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Table A1: Overview of manager changes and matched observations 
Club S W Manager T N A C MS MW MManager CS MCS FS MFS 
Aston Villa 01/02 23 Gregory, J. Q B 47 6 13/14 23 Lambert, P. 1.60 1.67 -2.50 -3.45 
Aston Villa 10/11 5 MacDonald, K. D B 49 0 02/03 5 Taylor, G. -0.81 -0.68 -1.59 -2.40 
Aston Villa 14/15 25 Lambert, P. D B 45 40 06/07 26 O’Neill, M. -2.39 -2.42 -1.56 0.44 
Birmingham City 07/08 13 Bruce, S. Q B 46 0 10/11 13 McLeish, A. -2.60 -2.70 -7.17 -3.45 
Blackburn Rovers 04/05 4 Souness, G. Q B 51 54 09/10 5 Allardyce, S. -2.31 -2.45 -1.48 5.97 
Blackburn Rovers 08/09 17 Ince, P. D B 41 53 11/12 16 Kean, S. -6.98 -6.85 -5.64 -8.45 
Blackburn Rovers 10/11 17 Allardyce, S. D B 56 0 07/08 18 Hughes, M. 1.60 1.29 -0.95 5.36 
Bolton Wanderers 07/08 9 Lee, S. D B 48 14 11/12 17 Coyle, O. -6.11 -5.84 -7.26 -4.39 
Bolton Wanderers 09/10 18 Megson, G. D B 50 0 02/03 19 Allardyce, S. -2.71 -2.81 -2.65 1.75 
Chelsea 00/01 5 Vialli, G. D C 36 59 01/02 16 Ranieri, C. -2.52 -2.04 -2.59 1.32 
Chelsea 07/08 6 Mourinho, J. Q C 44 0 13/14 4 Mourinho, J. -1.01 -0.66 9.43 6.47 
Chelsea 08/09 25 Scolari, F. D S 60 0 10/11 15 Ancelotti, C. -3.78 -4.03 4.22 -8.48 
Chelsea 11/12 27 Villas-Boas, A. D C 34 0 10/11 29 Ancelotti, C. -7.13 -7.14 -8.81 -8.48 
Chelsea 12/13 12 Di Matteo, R. D C 42 34 06/07 12 Mourinho, J. 1.89 1.73 4.63 3.07 
Crystal Palace 13/14 8 Holloway, I. Q B 50 0 04/05 9 Dowie, I. -4.06 -4.07 9.86 -7.32 
Derby County 01/02 7 Smith, J. Q B 60 0 00/01 7 Smith, J. -2.75 -3.18 -8.88 -0.13 
Derby County 07/08 14 Davies, B. Q B 43 0 00/01 12 Smith, J. -6.89 -6.69 -19.13 -0.13 
Everton 01/02 29 Smith, W. D B 54 0 00/01 30 Smith, W. -4.57 -4.76 -2.51 -4.04 
Fulham 02/03 33 Tigana, J. D C 47 52 04/05 34 Coleman, C. -4.40 -4.30 0.62 -0.45 
Fulham 06/07 33 Coleman, C. D B 36 32 04/05 31 Coleman, C. -3.39 -3.48 -4.72 -0.45 
Fulham 07/08 17 Sanchez, L. D B 48 3 10/11 18 Hughes, M. -6.16 -6.59 -5.52 1.94 
Fulham 13/14 13 Jol, M. D C 57 3 10/11 15 Hughes, M. -3.78 -3.82 -5.98 1.94 
Hull City 09/10 33 Brown, P. D B 50 0 14/15 28 Bruce, S. -3.48 -3.94 -5.58 -5.94 
Leeds United 03/04 12 Reid, P. D B 47 13 00/01 19 O’Leary, D. -5.46 -5.26 -9.22 7.20 
Leicester City 01/02 8 Taylor, P. D B 48 4 03/04 9 Adams, M. -3.90 -3.90 -7.91 -6.28 
Liverpool 10/11 20 Hodgson, R. Q B 63 0 11/12 29 Dalglish, K. -8.82 -8.53 -4.54 -15.17 
Manchester City 04/05 29 Keegan, K. Q B 54 63 06/07 34 Pearce, S. -0.64 -0.59 3.09 -3.85 
Manchester City 09/10 17 Hughes, M. D B 46 72 06/07 16 Pearce, S. -0.26 -0.34 1.14 -3.85 
Manchester United 13/14 34 Moyes, D. D B 51 0 01/02 18 Ferguson, A. -5.08 -5.39 -6.19 0.35 
Middlesbrough 00/01 16 Robson, Bryan D B 43 90 08/09 31 Southgate, G. -9.19 -8.92 -5.47 -12.05 
Newcastle United 04/05 4 Robson, Bobby D B 71 20 03/04 4 Robson, Bobby -4.46 -4.10 -11.18 -3.90 
Newcastle United 05/06 23 Souness, G. D B 52 54 12/13 25 Pardew, A. -4.31 -3.97 6.30 -6.25 
Newcastle United 07/08 21 Allardyce, S. D B 53 0 03/04 20 Robson, Bobby -3.57 -3.17 -6.01 -3.90 
Newcastle United 10/11 16 Hughton, C. D B 52 53 03/04 16 Robson, Bobby -0.67 -1.12 0.48 -3.90 
Newcastle United 14/15 19 Pardew, A. Q B 53 0 02/03 17 Robson, Bobby 3.85 3.82 -5.57 8.74 
Norwich City 13/14 33 Hughton, C. D B 55 53 04/05 18 Worthington, N. -3.32 -3.73 -5.80 -6.82 
Portsmouth 04/05 13 Redknapp, H. Q B 57 0 03/04 14 Redknapp, H. -1.69 -1.65 -4.66 1.84 
Portsmouth 05/06 13 Perrin, A. D C 49 0 03/04 24 Redknapp, H. -4.61 -4.71 -3.62 1.84 
Portsmouth 08/09 8 Redknapp, H. Q B 61 0 07/08 8 Redknapp, H. 3.48 3.34 -5.24 6.96 
Portsmouth 09/10 13 Hart, P. D B 56 0 03/04 27 Redknapp, H. -6.20 -6.58 -7.90 1.84 
Reading 12/13 29 McDermott, B. D B 51 0 07/08 28 Coppell, S. -5.62 -5.81 -7.77 -7.66 
Southampton 00/01 29 Hoddle, G. Q B 43 53 02/03 25 Strachan, G. 8.78 8.83 7.61 5.35 
Southampton 01/02 8 Gray, S. D B 41 0 02/03 6 Strachan, G. -1.61 -1.53 2.04 5.35 
Southampton 03/04 25 Strachan, G. Q B 47 50 13/14 20 Pochettino, M. -0.92 -0.45 -1.16 2.08 
Southampton 12/13 22 Adkins, N. D B 47 0 02/03 6 Strachan, G. -1.21 -1.53 -1.91 5.35 
Sunderland 02/03 9 Reid, P. D B 46 13 07/08 9 Keane, R. -0.93 -1.23 -19.96 -1.45 
Sunderland 08/09 15 Keane, R. Q B 37 68 01/02 14 Reid, P. -1.88 -2.25 -7.25 -8.94 
Sunderland 11/12 13 Bruce, S. D B 50 0 07/08 14 Keane, R. -4.84 -4.62 -0.76 -1.45 
Sunderland 12/13 31 O'Neill, M. D B 61 64 07/08 29 Keane, R. -3.21 -3.61 -2.41 -1.45 
Sunderland 13/14 5 Di Canio, P. D C 45 0 07/08 14 Keane, R. -4.40 -4.62 -1.86 -1.45 
Sunderland 14/15 29 Poyet, G. D S 47 26 01/02 30 Reid, P. -5.01 -4.93 -1.73 -8.94 
Tottenham Hotspur 00/01 29 Graham, G. D B 56 12 01/02 25 Hoddle, G. -5.39 -4.92 -4.10 -3.89 
Tottenham Hotspur 03/04 6 Hoddle, G. D B 45 53 06/07 7 Jol, M. -3.64 -3.49 -4.68 3.89 
Tottenham Hotspur 04/05 11 Santini, J. Q C 52 0 12/13 11 Villas-Boas, A. -1.42 -1.23 -0.27 9.74 
Tottenham Hotspur 13/14 16 Villas-Boas, A. D C 36 0 09/10 16 Redknapp, H. 0.19 0.31 7.25 6.13 
West Bromwich Albion 04/05 10 Megson, G. D B 45 0 05/06 7 Robson, Bryan -3.56 -3.51 -6.08 -9.54 
West Bromwich Albion 10/11 25 Di Matteo, R. D C 40 34 02/03 25 Megson, G. -2.91 -3.29 2.43 -9.66 
West Bromwich Albion 13/14 16 Clarke, S. D B 50 6 05/06 15 Robson, Bryan -3.62 -3.70 -7.96 -9.54 
West Bromwich Albion 14/15 19 Irvine, A. D B 56 0 08/09 19 Mowbray, T. -4.27 -4.24 0.41 -6.67 
West Ham United 06/07 17 Pardew, A. D B 45 0 13/14 19 Allardyce, S. -6.91 -6.89 -4.52 -1.45 
Wigan Athletic 07/08 12 Hutchings, C. D B 50 0 11/12 13 Martinez, R. -4.37 -4.66 -0.48 6.07 
Note: S indicates ‘Season’, W denotes the last match of the coach, T refers to the type of change with Q being a quit and D being a 
dismissal, N points at nationality with B for British, C for Continental (Europe) and S for South-America, C indicates the number of 
caps as a player, A refers to the age in years, CS points at cumulative surprise, FS indicates the final surprise (at the end of the season). 
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Table A1 also provides information on some characteristics of the replaced manager, i.e. his 
nationality (column N), in particular, whether he has a British nationality, his age (column A) at the 
moment of replacement and the number of caps as a player (column C). We define ‘British’ managers 
as managers from the United Kingdom and from the Republic of Ireland, thus making a sharp 
distinction between these two countries and the rest of the world. Finally, column T reports whether 
the change was a dismissal or a quit. 
Table A2 shows the 23 managerial changes that we have excluded from the analysis. 
 
Table A2: Overview of manager changes not included in the analysis 
Club S W Coach T N A C CS FS 
Bolton Wanderers 06/07 36 Allardyce, S. Q B 52 0 6.11 4.25 
Bradford City 00/01 12 Hutchings, C. D B 43 0 -4.29 -9.04 
Burnley 09/10 20 Coyle, O. Q B 43 1 0.67 -5.27 
Cardiff City 13/14 18 Mackay, M. D B 41 5 -0.98 -7.47 
Charlton Athletic 06/07 12 Dowie, I. D B 41 59 -4.50 -6.40 
Crystal Palace 14/15 2 Millen, K. D B 47 0 -1.82 6.28 
Leeds United 02/03 30 Venables, T. Q B 60 2 -9.16 -6.36 
Manchester City 12/13 36 Mancini, R. D C 48 36 3.06 1.73 
Newcastle United 06/07 37 Roeder, G. Q B 51 0 -4.03 -4.39 
Newcastle United 08/09 3 Keegan, K. Q B 57 63 1.13 -10.69 
Queens Park Rangers 11/12 20 Warnock, N. D B 63 0 -4.03 -3.55 
Queens Park Rangers 12/13 12 Hughes, M. D B 49 72 -9.75 -16.31 
Queens Park Rangers 14/15 23 Redknapp, H. Q B 67 0 -3.82 -6.13 
Southampton 04/05 2 Sturrock, P. D B 47 20 0.52 -10.01 
Sunderland 05/06 28 McCarthy, M. D B 47 57 -14.86 -17.26 
Swansea City 13/14 24 Laudrup, M. D C 49 104 -7.04 -7.77 
Tottenham Hotspur 07/08 10 Jol, M. D C 51 3 -6.89 -10.98 
Tottenham Hotspur 08/09 8 Ramos, J. D C 54 0 -10.60 -4.09 
West Ham United 00/01 37 Redknapp, H. Q B 54 0 -7.97 -8.99 
West Ham United 02/03 35 Roeder, G. D B 47 0 -7.34 -4.49 
West Ham United 08/09 3 Curbishley, A. Q B 50 0 1.64 5.67 
West Ham United 10/11 37 Grant, A. D C 56 0 -6,94 -8,58 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 11/12 25 McCarthy, M. D B 53 57 -6,13 -12,76 
Note: S indicates season, W refers to the last match of the coach, T denotes the type of change with Q being a quit and D being a 
dismissal, N points at nationality with B for British, C for Continental (Europe) and S for South-America (no observations), C indicates 
the number of caps as a player, A denotes the age in years, CS refers to cumulative surprise, FS points at the final surprise (at the end 
of the season).
    
  
    
 






Outcome uncertainty, team quality and stadium attendance in 
Dutch professional football 




Attendances at professional (team) sport events are a popular research area. A central topic is the 
relation between the uncertainty of the outcome of a contest and consumer demand. Rottenberg 
(1956) and Neale (1964) were the first to formulate the well-known uncertainty of outcome 
hypothesis (henceforth UOH). They suggest that attending a match is more attractive if the outcome 
is uncertain. This concept has been introduced for single matches, referred to as match uncertainty. 
However, two other types of outcome uncertainty are recognized in competitive sports as well (e.g., 
Cairns, Jennett and Sloane, 1986; Borland and Macdonald, 2003). First, seasonal uncertainty is the 
uncertainty related to some end-of-season outcome, such as winning a league, promotion or 
relegation. Second, long-run uncertainty, which refers to the (lack of) dominance of certain teams 
during a considerable number of seasons. The UOH is often related to the concept of competitive 
balance, as proposed by Rottenberg (1956). No universally accepted definition of this concept exists. 
Consequently, competitive balance is measured in different ways (Owen, 2013). This concept 
generally relates to the degree in which competitors (such as sports teams) are balanced in terms of 
resources, quality, and talent etc. The ex-ante outcome of a match or competition between fairly equal 
competitors is more uncertain than the outcome of a contest between rather unequal competitors. If 
consumers, i.e. sports fans, derive utility from outcome uncertainty, a more balanced competition will 
attract more attendants. Therefore, sports bodies have an incentive to increase competitive balance, 
as they want to attract attendants in order to serve their members. Rules and regulations, such as 
salary-caps/wag-bill caps and talent allocation schemes (drafts), which are fairly common for team 
sports in the US, may be used to achieve this goal. In Europe, sports bodies are more reluctant to 
apply such restrictive regulations, since they are frequently bound by both domestic and European 
labour legislation.1 
                                                 
1 At least in European football, the national football associations may punish clubs for financial disorder, e.g. by deducting 
points. Not too long ago, the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), the governing body in European football 
that organizes the lucrative European Champions League and Europa League, has introduced the Financial Fair Play 
system. In short, this system sets limits to the financial losses of clubs, constraining the spending on salaries and transfer 
fees, by threatening with exclusion from UEFA competitions. Although one could doubt the efficacy of this system, as 
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Despite a large body of research (see Section 3.2), it is still not clear whether outcome uncertainty 
matters for attendance in professional football. Pawlowski (2013) provides an overview of studies 
concerning football attendance that shows mixed evidence with respect to the UOH. His review is 
dominated by studies that focus on match uncertainty and seasonal uncertainty. Schreyer, Schmidt 
and Torgler (2016) give an overview of studies on match uncertainty only. Few studies cover long-
run uncertainty. Studies generally use match-level data from a limited number of seasons in a single 
country, and investigate whether stadium attendance depends on the uncertainty of outcomes.2 
Several indicators of uncertainty have been used and have found to be statistically significant 
(Borland and Macdonald, 2003; Pawlowski, 2013; Schreyer, Schmidt and Torgler, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the debate with regard to the UOH is still going on. 
Recently, scholars interested in attendance demand looked for theoretical foundations for the 
hypothesis that are based on behavioural economic principles and decision making under uncertainty. 
Budzinski and Pawlowski (2017) provide a review on this recent stream of literature. The first to 
include behavioural economic theory are Coates and Humphreys (2012), who discuss the role of loss 
aversion as follows from prospect theory (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979) for attendance demand in 
the context of the National Hockey League (NHL). Furthermore, Coates, Humphreys and Zhou 
(2014) develop a model of attendance demand that includes loss aversion combined with reference-
depended preferences as described by Koszegi and Rabin (2006). They find that attendance is a 
function of the home win probability and its squared value. In their model, a concave relation between 
the home win probability and attendance suggests the classical UOH. It emerges as a special case 
within the model, where fans prefer tighter matches above certain home wins. For this to happen, the 
marginal utility of attending an unexpected win has to be at least as big as the marginal utility of an 
unexpected loss. A convex relation suggests that fans are loss averse. In that case, fans value home 
wins and the potential to attend an upset, i.e. a home win in case the home team is expected to lose. 
Fans attend such upsets if the expected utility of this unlikely event outweighs the utility of attending 
a home loss in a relative uncertain match. With controls for several match and team characteristics, 
such as team quality, an empirical test with data from the Major League Baseball (MLB) suggests a 
convex relation and, thus, the rejection of the UOH (Coates, Humphreys and Zhou, 2014). Humphreys 
and Zhou (2015) extend this model with a league standing effect, i.e. with seasonal uncertainty. 
                                                 
big clubs still spend large amounts of money, it can be seen as a form of regulation intending to increase competitive 
balance. 
2 Over time, an increased number of studies looked at the demand for TV audience (e.g. Forrest, Simmons and Buraimo, 
2005; Buraimo and Simmons, 2015; Cox, 2015). In general, such data is not publicly available and, therefore, rather 
difficult to obtain. In the present study, we focus on stadium attendance. 
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Furthermore, they argue that a convex relation between the home win probability and attendance does 
not rule out the existence of fan preferences for uncertain matches. It only means that loss aversion 
dominates the preference for uncertainty.3 They use data from the MLB to test their model. Since it 
does not prescribe how the league standing effect should be measured, a proxy is used. 
In our study, we follow a similar approach and investigate the UOH in multiple ways with data from 
the highest level of Dutch professional football, covering the seasons 2000/01 - 2015/16. We use 
both, a measure of match uncertainty and one concerning seasonal uncertainty. For match uncertainty, 
we use the Theil-index and a measure initially proposed by Forrest, Simmons and Buraimo (2005), 
which consists of a points-per-game spread corrected for home advantage. These measures are 
traditionally used in attendance demand studies. Furthermore, we also empirically test the consumer 
choice models by Coates, Humphreys and Zhou (2014) and of Humphreys and Zhou (2015) with the 
home win probability and its squared value. As an alternative for the home win probability, we 
introduce the expected number of points for the home team. This the expected number of points is 
based on bookmaker odds and takes into account the possibility for a draw, which is the result in 
about one out of four matches in Dutch football.4 We do not formally write down a model, but simply 
include it in the econometric specification, where it turns out be an effective indicator. Seasonal 
uncertainty is measured following Jennett (1984), who uses the significance of a match in relation to 
some end-of-season outcome. We adapt Jennett’s significance measure to use it for winning a league 
as well as for other end-of-season outcomes, including qualifications for - the end-of-season play-
offs for - European football competitions or relegation matches.5 
In general, our results provide evidence for the rejection of the UOH related to match uncertainty. 
We find a convex specification for both the home win probability as well as our match-expectation 
variable. This suggests that fans exhibit reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion. 
Furthermore, it follows that team performance and team quality are important for the determination 
of stadium attendance. In general, the marginal effects are small. However, when measured in relation 
to the variable part of attendance, some effects tend to be quite substantial. For seasonal uncertainty, 
                                                 
3 Humphreys and Zhou (2015) show that the structural model contains three parameters of interest. One concerns the 
home win preference, one regards the preference for outcome uncertainty and regards loss aversion. However, the reduced 
form of the model only contains two parameters that can be estimated. The first coefficient regards the home win 
probability, while the second is the squared value of the home win probability. Combined, these two parameters allow 
for the identification of the home win preference, which one finds if the sum of the coefficients is more than zero. 
However, it is impossible to identify the preference for outcome uncertainty and loss aversion separately. One can only 
observe which of these effects dominates.  
4 Measuring the expected number of points in this way has been used as an expectations-based reference point in football 
(Bartling, Brandes and Schunk, 2015) but, as to the best of our knowledge, it has never been used before in attendance 
demand studies. 
5 Section 3.4 and Appendix B include a detailed description of all measures. 
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many results are in line with the UOH. In particular, this holds true for significance related to 
relegation and the qualification for European football. We also investigate whether the introduction 
of a large play-off scheme in Dutch professional football in the season 2005/06 has had an effect on 
attendance demand during regular league matches.6 In line with the UOH, one would expect a positive 
effect on attendance demand (see Bojke, 2007). We find a significant, though fairly small effect. 
When evaluating the overall effectiveness of the play-offs, we discuss whether this positive effect 
offsets some potential drawbacks of the system. Finally, we investigate between-season variation in 
attendance, focusing on the relation between changes in stadium capacity and average attendance. 
Our paper adds to the existing literature in multiple ways. First, we use data from a large sample of 
seasons, that allows us to test the UOH for within-season variation in attendance using different 
indicators over a longer period. This seems important, as some seasons appear to be more uncertain 
than other seasons. Furthermore, certain seasons might contain more uncertain matches than other 
seasons, which partly results from the random order of play. Second, we introduce the expected 
number of points as a new measure for match uncertainty. This measure includes the probability of a 
draw, which is important in football, and appears to outperform other measures. It also follows that 
the model specification is important with regard to the optimum of the convex relation. Furthermore, 
we use a new way to measure the quality of teams. Bookmaker odds are used to calculate the expected 
number of points in the previous 34 matches. This measure of quality contains expectations and 
outperforms measures that combine pre-match rankings. In general, our results reveal that team 
characteristics are more important for the determination of stadium attendance than behavioural 
economic explanations regarding the outcome of the match. This contradicts wit previous findings. 
Finally, with respect to stadium attendance, we evaluate the introduction of the play-off scheme in 
the season 2005/06 empirically, contributing to the discussion on how competitions in professional 
football ought to be organized. 
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of the literature concerning 
outcome uncertainty and attendance demand, distinguishing between match uncertainty and seasonal 
uncertainty. Next, section 3.3 provides some background information on Dutch professional football. 
Subsequently, section 3.4 deals with the data used and the research methods applied. Next, section 
3.5 discusses our parameter estimates. Finally, section 3.6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6 These end-of-season play-offs typically involve four clubs. The ‘winner’ qualifies, while without play-offs, the best-
ranked team would have qualified. 
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3.2 Review of literature 
In this section, we discuss previous studies on the relation between outcome uncertainty in sports and 
attendance demand, with a focus on stadium attendance in professional football. Thereby, we ignore 
long-run uncertainty; we separately discuss match uncertainty and seasonal uncertainty in two 
subsections (Appendix C provides a summary overview). 
 
3.2.1 Match uncertainty 
The UOH was initially formulated with respect to match-specific outcome uncertainty. In theory, the 
concept is rather straightforward. However, empirical research has turned out to take many different 
shapes, due to the lack of a clear measure of match uncertainty. Initially, the focus was on the within-
season (difference in the) league rankings of the opponents just prior to a match (e.g., Hart, Hutton 
and Sharot, 1975; Baimbridge, Cameron and Dawson, 1996; Garcia and Rodriguez, 2002). 
Alternatively, a measure was obtained from in-season performance, such as the difference in 
(average) points (e.g., Wilson and Sim, 1995) or goals (e.g., Falter and Perignon 2000). Notably, the 
importance of home advantage in football triggered Forrest, Simmons and Buraimo (2005) to come 
up with a measure that combines home advantage and the difference concerning the in-season number 
of points per game of the home team and the away team. Their reasoning is that the home advantage 
implies, that the home team is expected to win a match between teams of equal strength. Uncertainty 
of outcome increases with the relative strength (weakness) of the away (home) team. This point-per-
game measure is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑘 = |𝐻𝐴𝑘 + 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑘| ,     (1) 
 
in which 𝑖 denotes the home team, 𝑗 indicates the away team and 𝑘 refers to the season. The points-
per-game match uncertainty measure 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the absolute value of the home advantage (𝐻𝐴𝑘) plus 
the number of points per game of the home team (𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑘), minus the number of point per game of the 
away team (𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑘). The home advantage is measured as the difference between the number of points 
per game won at home and away in the previous season. Match outcomes of the current season are 
used to calculate points per game values of the home team and the away team. 
Suppose that football fans decide to attend a match based on the uncertainty of the outcome. 
Moreover, let us assume that they use league tables to determine this uncertainty. In that case, these 
measures capture relevant match uncertainty, at least partly. However, these proxy variables have 
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drawbacks. First, they might measure other aspects as well, such as the quality of teams.7 Second, 
they do not capture forward-looking factors that influence perceived match uncertainty, such as 
injuries or suspensions of (key) players. 
Peel and Thomas (1988) have introduced the posted fixed betting odds as input for measures of match 
uncertainty. The odds set by bookmakers, reflecting probabilities of a home win, of a draw and of an 
away win, provide easy to use information with regard to the evenness of a match. The more equal 
these probabilities are, the more uncertain the outcome of a match is. If the betting market is efficient, 
the bookmaker odds include all relevant information for the formation of expectations regarding the 
final result. Therefore, the uncorrected posted odds are generally acknowledged to be a useful input 
for match uncertainty.8 
Again, numerous ways have been proposed and tested. At first, Peel and Thomas (1988) only use the 
home win probability. Peel and Thomas (1992, 1996) use the Theil-index, incorporating all three 
odds, responding to criticism that they ignored two possible outcomes.9 This Theil-index has become 
the dominant measure of match uncertainty when using bookmaker data. It is calculated as follows: 
 





),       (2) 
 
with 𝑝𝑖 being either the probability of a home win, a draw, or an away win. With a high probability 
for one of the outcomes, the index takes on a value close to zero. In case of equal probabilities, the 
index is equal to ln(3). In general, the more uncertain the outcome of a match is, the higher the value 
of this index. 
Recently, and in particular after the publications of Coates and Humphreys (2012), Coates, 
Humphreys and Zhou (2014) and Humphreys and Zhou (2015), scholars focus on the home win 
probability and its squared value in attendance demand studies. As explained in the introduction, the 
use of these values follows from a model with reference-dependent preferences and allows for loss 
                                                 
7 Pawlowski (2013), for example, argues that this is the case for separate measures of pre-match league ranks. 
8 One should note that Forrest and Simmons (2002) present evidence of systemic biases in the bookmaker odds. They 
show that these biases matter when the odds are used for match uncertainty measures in an attendance demand model. 
Internet betting has probably increased competition between betting agencies and it has improved the transparency of the 
betting market. Both aspects may have had a positive influence on the efficiency of the market and a corresponding 
reduction of biases. Improved efficiency is also reflected in reduced bookmaker margins. Our in-sample average margin 
gradually declined from more than 16 percent in the beginning of the 21st century down to about eight percent in recent 
seasons. Thus, we assume that the bookmaker odds are set efficiently and reflect useable probabilities for the formation 
of match expectations. 
9 Some alternatives are considered in the literature.  For example, Forrest, Beaumont, Goddard and Simmons (2005) use 
the ratio of the home-win probability over the away-win probability. 
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aversion. Within this model, a concave relation between the home win probability and attendance 
demand suggest support for the UOH. Alternatively, a convex relation suggests that loss aversion 
dominates the preference for uncertain outcomes. A home win preference is found if the sum of the 
coefficient for the home win probability and the coefficient for the squared value is positive 
(Humphreys and Zhou, 2015). 
Most previous studies on match uncertainty use data from a single country and a limited number of 
seasons. The dependent variable is the logarithm of match-day attendance (stadium or televised). 
Furthermore, many studies test for a set of match uncertainty measures. They also frequently include 
some form of seasonal uncertainty. In general, the findings with respect to the UOH are mixed. Table 
C1 in the appendix provides more detailed information on these previous studies. We briefly discuss 
these studies here. 
Falter and Perignon (2000) find support for the UOH, using the goal-average differential between 
opponents. Forrest and Simmons (2002) also find support for the hypothesis, using the ratio of the 
home win and the away win probabilities and the squared value of this ratio. Furthermore, Forrest, 
Simmons and Buraimo (2005) find support, for television audience, using the PPG indicator. Forrest 
et al. (2005) find some support for the UOH, using the ratio of the home win and away win 
probabilities, but not when applying separate point-per-game measures for the home team and the 
away team. Bojke (2007) finds the Theil-index to be significant, suggesting support for the UOH. 
Benz, Brandes and Franck (2009) use five different indicators of match-uncertainty. They find 
support for the UOH, using the difference in league rankings, the PPG indicator and the home team 
win probability, but only for high demand matches. They find no support using the Theil-index or a 
relative win-probability that does not incorporate the probability of a draw. Serrano et al. (2015) also 
only find support for high-demand matches, using both the Theil-index and its squared value. 
Buraimo and Simmons (2015) find support, only for the first two seasons of their sample that covers 
the period 2000/01 – 2007/08 for television-audience, using the difference in a teams’ win-
probabilities and the Theil-index. They do not find support for a measure of combined values for the 
in-season points-per-game of both teams. Based on a totally different approach, using survey data, 
Pawlowski (2013) finds that outcome uncertainty matters for fans, but increasing competitive balance 
would not result in increased demand for stadium attendance. Finally, Schreyer, Schmidt and Torgler 
(2016) find support for the UOH for the Theil-index and several other measures, but not for the home 
win probability. Results for this latter variable are more in line with reference-dependent preferences 
and loss aversion. 
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Notable studies that do not find support for the UOH include Wilson and Sim (1995), using the 
absolute point-difference (also squared) and Baimbridge, Cameron and Dawson (1996), using the 
difference in league rank (also squared). Moreover, Peel and Thomas (1996) do not find support, 
using repeat fixtures in the Scottish football league, for the difference in team rank and the difference 
in the Theil-index. They find partial support for the difference in the level of home win probability 
and this squared value. Furthermore, Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) use the home team win 
probability, for which they do not find support. Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) use the difference in 
rank (also squared) and a dummy that indicates if the home team and the away team are close in the 
league table (with a maximum of three positions above or five positions below in the league table 
prior to the match). For both variables, no support in favour of the UOH is found. Furthermore, using 
the PPG indicator, Forrest and Simmons (2006), for stadium attendance, and Buraimo (2008), for 
both stadium attendance and television audience, do not find support. Using the home-win-probability 
(also squared) and the Theil-index, Buraimo and Simmons (2008) do not find support for the UOH. 
Madalozzo and Villar (2009) use the difference in positions in the league table, without finding any 
support. Pawlowski and Anders (2012) do not find support for the UOH, using the Theil-index as 
well as a home-favourite dummy that indicates whether the home win probability is higher than the 
away win probability. Cox (2015) uses the home win probability in multiple ways and does not find 
support for the UOH for stadium attendance, but results indicated a preference for loss aversion. 
However, he finds some support for the UOH for TV spectators. Martins and Cró (2016) use the 
home win probability, for which they find results in favour of loss aversion and home win preferences. 
Furthermore, the Theil-index is negative and a home favourite dummy positive. Thus, not supporting 
the UOH. Finally, Pawlowski, Nalbantis and Coates (2017) use survey data and conclude that fans’ 
perceived match uncertainty coincides with the way economists measure it, but also find that loss 
aversion dominates their preference for such match uncertainty. 
 
3.2.2 Seasonal uncertainty 
Seasonal uncertainty is conceptually similar to match uncertainty, as both deal with expectations of 
some final performance. This can be a match outcome or some end-of-season achievement. However, 
as Cairns, Jennett and Sloane (1986) point out, empirical investigation of the UOH related to seasonal 
uncertainty does not specifically focus on the uncertainty surrounding this end-of-season goal, but it 
measures the probability of achieving this goal. The question then arises, whether attendance reacts 
to the probability that a team is still able to become champions, to qualify for UEFA competitions, or 
to avoid relegation. 
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Jennett (1984) was the first to come up with a measure that captures this type of seasonal 
uncertainty.10 He uses the term ‘significance’ to indicate the importance of a match for an end-of-
season result. Moreover, Jennett (op. cit.)  assumes that the number of points needed to obtain this 
result is known in advance, i.e. the final table of a season is fully known. Significance is then 
calculated as the reciprocal of the number of matches to be won in order to achieve this result. If a 
team drops out of contention, because it has become mathematically impossible to gain the necessary 
minimum number of points, significance is set to zero for all remaining matches. Significance is also 
zero after a team has reached the minimum number of points needed to obtain the desired result. This 
would be the case if, for example, a team still needs to play two matches after obtaining a sufficient 





 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑝𝑡𝑘 > 𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘,     (3) 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 < 𝑝𝑡𝑘, 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑝𝑡𝑘, 
 
in which 𝑖 denotes the match, 𝑗 indicates the club and 𝑘 refers to the season. Thus, the significance 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 is equal to the reciprocal of the total number of matches in the season (𝑚𝑗𝑘) minus the number 
of matches already played (𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑘) prior to match 𝑖. This only holds if the potential number of points 
for a specific team (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘) is larger than or equal to the total number of points needed to obtain the 
desired result. This total is constant throughout the season and represented by 𝑝𝑡𝑘, which should be 
larger than the current number of points (𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘) prior to a match. If the potential number of points is 
smaller than the total number of points, then significance becomes zero. Initially, Jennett used this 
measure to indicate ‘championship significance’ as well as significance related to relegation. 
Interestingly, it can also be used to calculate significance for other types of end-of-season 
achievements, such as the qualification for (the end-of-season play-offs for) UEFA competitions. One 
simply needs to change the value for total points (𝑝𝑡𝑘), which is simplified by the assumption that the 
final league table is known in advance. This knowledge, in turn, is probably the main point of criticism 
on Jennett’s significance measure (e.g., Cairns 1987). As shown in appendix B, the value of 𝑝𝑡𝑘 is 
rather constant for Dutch football throughout the sample period. Therefore, it seems to be a close 
approximation for expectations that are based on the results in previous seasons. 
                                                 
10 Although he describes it as an alternative measure of match uncertainty. 
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After Jennett’s publication, other measures have been proposed. Most of these contributions use some 
kind of time-dimension, with increased uncertainty towards the end of the season. Janssens and 
Késenne (1987) suggest a small change to Jennett’s measure, also assuming the final table is known. 
Cairns (1987) uses dummy variables that indicate whether teams are still in contention. Thereby, 
contention follows from some (arbitrary) rules that suggest that a team is still in contention if it wins 
a certain number of matches, while the current leader only wins a smaller number of matches. 
Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004) propose a similar method, which Buraimo and Simmons (2015) 
use in an attendance demand function. Baimbridge, Cameron and Dawson (1996) use dummies in 
case the competing teams are both in contention for championship victory (both teams are ranked in 
the top four) or involved in a relegation battle (both teams are ranked in the bottom four). Kuypers 
(1997) suggests three similar measures that use some relation between the number of points that a 
team is currently behind the leader and the number of remaining matches in the season. Bojke (2007) 
uses a different approach, when investigating the impact on regular league match-attendance of the 
end-of-season play-off games for promotion in the English First Division (now known as the 
Championship) during the 2000/01 season. Seasonal uncertainty is measured by the probability of 
promotion. This probability is calculated with match-specific bookmaker odds and simulations to 
obtain match-by-match values for seasonal uncertainty. 
Thus, in previous studies, seasonal uncertainty is measured by match-significance related to − the 
probability to reach − some end-of-season target. Table C2 in the appendix provides more detailed 
information on these studies. Here we only briefly discussed them. Jennett (1984), using his 
significance indicator, finds support for the significance related to ‘championship victory’ of both the 
home and away team, but not for relegation. Slightly modifying this indicator, Janssens and Késenne 
(1987) only find support for ‘championship victory’ of the home team. Cairns (1987) finds support 
using championship contention dummies, based on a set of (arbitrary) rules. Furthermore, Dobson 
and Goddard (1992) using a modified version of Jennett’s indicator, just like Wilson and Sim (1995) 
using Jennett’s indicator, find support for the UOH related to ‘championship victory’ of the home 
team, but not for the away team. Baimbridge, Cameron and Dawson (1996) do not find any support, 
using dummies that indicate whether opponents are both in the top or both in the bottom of the league 
table. A match day trend results in partial support, though only a crude indicator of seasonal 
uncertainty. Baimbridge (1997) investigates the UOH during EURO 1996. He measures match 
significance by the mean of winning probabilities and finds support for the UOH, while a matchday 
trend only partially supports the hypothesis. Kuypers (1997) finds support for the hypothesis for 
championship significance, but not for relegation. He measures both by using his own indicators. 
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Falter and Perignon (2000) use dummies for the different seasons of the year, which they find to be 
in line with the UOH. Using the indicator of Janssens and Késenne, Czarnitzki and Stadtmann (2002) 
do not find support for the hypothesis. However, Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) do find support, using 
one of Kuypers’ indicators. Forrest, Simmons and Buraimo (2005) find, with a set of dummies, 
support for the UOH using data on television audience. Bojke (2007) uses his own way of measuring 
promotion probabilities. He finds that an increase in promotion probabilities results in increased 
attendance during regular league matches. This is in line with the UOH. Madalozzo and Villar (2009) 
find support for the UOH, using dummies when a team has either the chance to become the league 
leader, or the chance to leave the relegation zone. Furthermore, the result for the match number during 
the season supports the UOH, but the chance to qualify for the Copa Libertadores de América does 
not. Pawlowski and Anders (2012), who measure significance by the indicator of Janssens and 
Késsene, find support for the UOH related to championship significance for both the home and the 
away team. However, they do not find support for UEFA Champions League significance for the 
home team, whereas they only find partial support for the away team. In their study on television 
audience, Buraimo and Simmons (2015) do not find support for the UOH using several contention 
dummies. Martins and Cró (2016) use the uncertainty measure proposed by Janssens and Késenne 
(1987) for both championship victory and the qualification for the Champions League. For both 
variables, they find support for the home team, but not for the away team. Furthermore, they use rank 
order changes, which are insignificant. Finally, similar to his results for match uncertainty, Pawlowski 
(2013) finds, in his study on survey data, that seasonal uncertainty matters for fans. However, he also 
finds that increasing competitive balance does not result in increased demand for stadium attendance. 
 
3.3 Dutch professional football 
In November 1954, Dutch football, as organized by the KNVB (Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbal 
Bond, Royal Dutch Football Association), turned from amateurism into (semi-)professionalism, with 
56 clubs in total. At the start of the 1955/56 season, only 36 clubs were still active at the highest level, 
distributed over two divisions. The uniform nation-wide first tier, the so-called Eredivisie, started in 
the 1956/57 season, with 18 clubs. Only Ajax (Amsterdam), Feyenoord (Rotterdam) and PSV (Philips 
Sport Vereniging, Philips Sports Club, Eindhoven) have always been operating at the highest level 
of Dutch professional football ever since.11 During these six decades, Ajax have won the Dutch title 
                                                 
11 One should note that DOS (Door Oefening Sterk, Strong By Training) from Utrecht were active at the highest level 
between 1956 and 1970. FC Utrecht, which resulted from a merger between DOS and two other professional football 
clubs from the city of Utrecht, viz. Elinkwijk and Velox, has been active in the Eredivisie ever since. 
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25 times, PSV 20 times and Feyenoord ten times. Thus, the only three Dutch clubs to win UEFA 
silverware have captured no less than 90 percent of the title victories. This points at their long-term 
dominance in Dutch professional football. Feyenoord seems to perform the role of sleeping giant 
every now and then, but over the past few decades, Ajax and PSV have only rarely dropped out of 
the top-three.  
The format of the Eredivisie is a so-called double round-robin system. Thus, every club plays all of 
the 17 adversaries twice, once at home and once away. Clubs obtain three points for a victory, a single 
point for a draw, but nil points for a loss. Direct relegation into the second tier, the so-called Eerste 
Divisie, is the consequence of the bottom position. The clubs ranked 16th and 17th have to play 
promotion/relegation play-offs with six clubs from this Eerste Divisie. These play-offs were 
introduced in the season 1989/90, although in a format quite different from the current one. The play-
off scheme for qualification for European football was introduced in the 2005/06 season, amongst 
others to attract extra attendance. After the introduction, many final rankings made a club qualify for 
some (end-of-season) competition. The champion always directly qualified for the UEFA Champions 
League. The effects of finishing at one of the positions between 2nd and 13th changed multiple times. 
These changes are partly the result of changes in the number of Dutch teams that were allowed to 
participate in European competitions, partly because of changes in the set-up of these European 
competitions (e.g. the UEFA Intertoto Cup was abandoned after the 2006/07 season) and partly as a 
result of the introduction of, and changes in the design of, play-offs by the KNVB. 
Although Dutch football is not known for its hooliganism, there have been some issues with violent 
fans. Therefore, the authorities sometimes simply forbid the presence of fans of the away team. 
Notable examples include the classical matches between Ajax and archrivals Feyenoord. Combined 
with some other safety measures, such as improved gate controls and increased presence of the police, 
these restrictions have resulted in a less violent atmosphere in the stadiums during matches. This, in 
turn, has been a key factor in attracting more attendance ever since the beginning of the 1990’s. In 
general, safety, security, accessibility and facilities during matches have improved substantially in 
the past few decades. Numerous clubs have renovated their stadium or have built a new one in which 
these things are easier to realize. 
The stadiums are generally quite crowded during matches. As we shall see in the next section, 
occupancy rates are approximately 80-90 percent throughout the sample period. The majority of 
attendants consist of season tickets holders. For example, data reported by magazine Voetbal 
International for the seasons 2011/12 and 2012/13 suggests that about 70 percent of the available 
seats within the Eredivisie is sold to season ticket holders. Furthermore, a yearly survey among fans, 
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conducted by the KNVB in the seasons 2013/14 – 2016/17, reveals that about 90 percent of the season 
ticket holders plans to renew their season ticket for the upcoming year. Although this information is 
not sufficient to draw any conclusions regarding the whole sample period, it indicates that season 
ticket holders are loyal and an important part of the fan base and stadium attendants. They generally 
buy their season ticket before the start of the competition for a pre-announced fee. Single-match 
tickets are generally sold in the weeks prior to a match. Although the prices for these tickets are not 
necessarily fixed during the season, they have to be announced some period (i.e. weeks) in advance 
of the match. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the public knows what pricing 
strategies are used by clubs and that these strategies are rather constant throughout a season, making 
the prices for entrance tickets predictable. In general, the majority of stadium attendance consists of 
season ticket holders and the single ticket attendants. However, two other groups of attendants can be 
identified. These are business club members (sponsors) and attendants with free tickets, mostly 
children from local amateur clubs and primary schools. Although these two groups contain different 
types of consumers than the season ticket holders and single ticket attendants, our dataset does not 
allow to make such a distinction. As long as this group is not too big, that should not be a problem. 
Probably the closest alternative for attending a match in a stadium, is to watch the match live on 
television. As of the start of the 1996/97 season, Sport 7 provides this option. However, already after 
several unsuccessful months, the channel decides to quite with live broadcasting football matches. 
Next, Canal Plus provides live matches during the seasons 1997/98 – 2004/05. As one of the few 
broadcasting canals for which someone in the Netherlands had to pay an additional fee, next to their 
basic monthly fee for a subscription for television, this was not a profitable project. Canal Plus 
decides to quit and Versatel/Tele2 buys the broadcasting rights for the next three seasons. The 
company wants to earn money via separate subscriptions, but again, without any profit. After these 
three unsuccessful attempts, no organization is willing to buy the broadcasting rights. Therefore, the 
clubs in the Eredivisie decide to start their own television channel. As of the start of the 2008/09 
season, Eredivisie Live broadcasts the live Dutch football matches. Besides monthly subscriptions, 
they also offer pay-per-view options. With an outside investment by media tycoon Rupert Murdoch, 
amongst others owner of Fox, the broadcasting rights were sold again. As of the season 2013/14 Fox 
Sports Eredivisie broadcasts live football. In general, someone can watch all matches for a monthly 
fee of 10-20 euros. However, with an average of approximately 263.000 spectators per match during 
the seasons 2010/11 – 2015/16, the interest of the public remains only modest.12 In contrast, stadium 
                                                 
12 We thank Ruud Koning for the provision of the data on the number of spectators. 
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attendance rates are high, which happens to be the case for the big teams as well as the small clubs. 
Thus, although live broadcasting of football has become easily available for most people, we suggest 
that it did not serve as a substitute for attending the stadium. Instead, we suspect that it works as a 
complement, i.e. people watch football on television, become enthusiastic about the atmosphere and 
decide they want to attend the stadium themselves. However, this is a bit of a speculation and could 
be a topic for future research. Additional information about Dutch professional football is provided 
in Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Average match attendance rate (left hand scale), average match attendance and 
average stadium capacity (right hand scale); seasons 2000/01 – 2015/16 
 
3.4 Data and set-up of the analysis 
We use match data from the highest tier of Dutch professional football for the seasons 2000/01 – 
2015/16. For each match we have information on the attendance, general weather conditions during 
the day of the match, the competing teams, including the location (stadium and stadium capacity), 
city, province, as well as fixed betting odds (see Appendix B for details). In every season, at least 
one, but maybe two or even three teams are relegated, depending on the results of the end-of-season 
promotion/relegation play-offs, while a similar number of teams are promoted. In total, 28 different 
teams were active in the Eredivisie during the sample period.  
Figure 3.1 shows the development of the average attendance rate, average match attendance and 
average stadium capacity during the sample period. Averages are calculated per season for all 18 
clubs within the Eredivisie. It follows that the attendance rate is quite high in all seasons and moves 
around 0.88. Average attendance increased from approximately 15,500 in 2000/01 to 19,500 in 
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2015/16. In the same period, average stadium capacity increased from approximately 19,500 to 
almost 22,000. In general, these graphs develop in a similar way. Any difference in development is 
reflected in the attendance rate. Although the changes in this rate seem quite large, one should note 
that the scale only covers the range from 0.84 to 0.92. Furthermore, one should note that season-by-
season changes in stadium capacity might result from actual changes in the capacity, because of 
renovations/expansions or the move to a new stadium, which generally happens in between seasons. 
Also, these changes may arise because of changes in the composition of clubs due to promotion and 
relegation. Certain clubs have bigger (smaller) stadiums than others. Correspondingly, these clubs 
might also have a bigger (smaller) fan base, which is reflected in the average attendance figures. In 
general, Figure 3.1 suggests that the interest in stadium attendance increased during the sample 
period, while the attendance rate remains high and stable. 
We deal with the between-season variation in the second part of this study. The first and main part is 
focused on the within-season variation in attendance. We estimate a Tobit model with the attendance 
rate as the dependent variable. This rate has a maximum value of unity in the case that all seats are 
taken. However, our dataset may contain some measurement errors in attendance numbers. 
Furthermore, the formal stadium capacity may slightly differ, on a match-by-match basis, from the 
reported number as included in our dataset. In particular, because of specific policies and regulations 
regarding the fans of the away team. For example, in some matches, some seats might not be 
available, because club officials and local authorities want to have a clear separation of the away team 
fans from the home team fans. Both aspects may result in an under-identification of sell outs if we 
would use a value of one as upper limit. To correct for this, we assume the stadium to be full at 95 
percent of the official capacity, i.e. we use an upper limit of 0.95 in our estimations. This results in 
about 40 percent of the observations being censored. The model is described as follows:13 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑐𝑚𝑠 =  𝛽𝑋𝑐𝑚𝑠 + 𝜂𝑐𝑠 + 𝑐𝑚𝑠,      (4) 
 
where 𝐴𝑅 refers to the attendance rate, 𝑐 denotes the club, 𝑚 indicates the match, while 𝑠 refers to 
the season. Furthermore, 𝑋𝑐𝑚𝑠 represents a vector of club and match characteristics, 𝛽 denotes a 
vector of parameter estimates, 𝜂𝑐𝑠 refer to club-season fixed effects that control for unobserved club-
season factors, while 𝑐𝑚𝑠 denotes the error term. Club-season fixed effects are included to control 
                                                 
13 We have also performed Tobit tests with the natural logarithm of the attendance rate as the dependent variable, taking 
into account a comparable upper limit, but the results do not differ much. Since the model with the attendance rate as 
dependent variable is easier to interpret, we decide to use that in the rest of the paper. 
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for changes in unobserved factors with respect to different clubs over time. These include, amongst 
others, the number of season ticket holders, the pricing of tickets as well as changes over time in club-
specific price-setting strategies, player transfers, club-specific penalties imposed by the UEFA or 
KNVB, season-specific European or domestic cup efforts, and changes in the fan base. Separate club 
and season fixed effects would capture only some of these unobserved elements. Such an approach 
would treat all clubs in a similar way with respect to seasonal circumstances, such as income and 
inflation figures, and treat all seasons in a similar way with respect to club-specific factors, such as 
price-setting strategies. Club-season fixed effects take account of the heterogeneity of fans of 
different clubs with respect to intra-season differences. 
Note that, with club-season fixed effects, we explain club-specific within-season changes in the 
attendance rate. Since the attendance rate is the ratio of actual attendance and stadium capacity, any 
change in the attendance rate may result from changes in this capacity. Then, the within-season 
variation in the attendance rate would not reflect changes in attendance demand, while that is what 
we want to observe. However, stadium capacity is generally stable during the season. In only five out 
of 270 club-season combinations that are considered, we observe a substantial in-season change in 
capacity. Therefore, we think it is safe to assume that in-season changes in the attendance rate reflect 
changes in attendance demand.14 
The vector 𝑋𝑐𝑚𝑠 consists of a variety of explanatory variables. We include dummies for derbies, 
capturing within-province rivalry, which are expected to attract more attendance. Previous studies 
use various methods to include information on the timing and conditions of a match day, such as 
month-dummies and the rank-number of the match in the season. We decide to control for matches 
that are played on weekdays, excluding national holidays, while considering Friday as part of the 
weekend. Furthermore, we control for the weather conditions on match day. The weekday-dummy 
captures short-term opportunity costs, as it is likely that it is more difficult to attend a match after a 
working-day. Weather conditions are measured by the average temperature during match day as well 
as the amount of precipitation. Temperature is typically high during the start of the season in August, 
then drops during the winter period, after which it rises again until the end of the season in May. 
Given this pattern, this variable not only captures short-term opportunity costs, but also some seasonal 
element. Although there is less precipitation in the final months of the season compared to the rest of 
                                                 
14 The five cases with an in-season change in capacity are: RBC Roosendaal, who moved to a new stadium during the 
2000/01 season; FC Groningen, who moved to a new stadium during the 2005/06 season; SC Heerenveen, who renovated 
the stadium and expanded the capacity during the seasons 2003/04 and 2004/05; Vitesse, who reduced the official stadium 
capacity during the 2009/10 season. 
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the year, the pattern is less evident, which suggests that this variable mainly captures short-term 
opportunity costs. 
Most previous studies that use a measure of current performance or quality of a team, use the pre-
match rank or the cumulative number of in-season points of both the home team and the away team. 
These measures are crude, since they do not account for club-specific and season-specific elements. 
For example, a difference in pre-match rank between the number three and the number six of the table 
is treated the same as the difference between the numbers twelve and fifteen. Furthermore, the 
measures do not incorporate expectations. However, it seems reasonable that fans take these 
expectations into account, since a certain total number of points might be experienced as good for 
some clubs, while not for others. Therefore, we prefer to use the cumulative surprise as a measure of 
performance (Odd-Surprise). This variable is equal to the in-season sum of the differences between 
the actual number of points obtained and the expected number of points based on bookmaker odds. 
Since expectations are considered, it allows for an easy comparison of performances between clubs 
and seasons.15 
For team quality, we introduce a new measure, defined as the sum of the expected number of points 
in the previous 34 matches. Again, expectations are based on bookmaker odds. These odds reflect the 
relative strength or quality of the competing teams. They also include match-specific aspects such as 
home advantage, current form and player injuries that may influence the expected match result. 
Therefore, inference of the quality of a team, based on the expectations of a single match (or a small 
number of matches) would be wrong. For example, given home advantage, the quality of the home 
team would be biased upwards, while the quality of the away team would be biased downwards. To 
correct for these match specific factors that may bias the inferred quality, we consider the previous 
34 matches of a team for the construction of the quality indicator.16 In that way, the measure includes 
expectations that are based on all sorts of matches, such that match specific element cancel out against 
each other. For example, the number of home matches will be about equal to the number of away 
matches. Furthermore, the variable contains matches against strong teams as well as weak opponents. 
Although not all the impact of the match specific elements may disappear, the descriptive statistics 
                                                 
15 A potential drawback of this measure is that it starts at zero prior to the first match of the season and then starts to 
develop. Match-by-match development can only take place with values that are theoretically bound by minus three (i.e. 
zero points while three were expected) and three (i.e. three points while zero were expected), while the cumulative value 
can be quite different. However, some robustness checks showed that leaving out a subset of matches, either at the start 
or at the end of the season, does not have an impact on the result for this variable. Furthermore, since this measure should 
capture the reaction of attendance on in-season performance, it can be argued that at the start of the season, there simply 
is not much to react upon, which is reflected in the value of the cumulative surprise. 
16 Note that a season contains 34 matches and, therefore seems to be a logical number. We also tested with the previous 
17 matches, but results were very much the same. 
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suggest that the proposed indicator measures quality in line with what someone would expect based 
on league tables. For example, the average quality corresponds with an average number of points for 
an average league rank (see also Appendix B). Furthermore, the variable contains an arbitrary 
element, since we use the 34 previous matches without any weight factors, but it seems to work quite 
well in our attendance demand model. As with the cumulative surprise, it allows for a continuum of 
match-by-match differences and an easy comparison between clubs and seasons. A potential 
drawback might be that no previous seasons’ bookmaker odds are available for promoted teams. We 
solve this problem by using the expected number of point of the team that relegated and was replaced 
by the promoted team. Furthermore, because of the Quality Team variable, we lose the 2000/01 
season in our analyses, since we lack odds prior to this season. 
In line with previous studies, we hypothesize that fans’ decision to attend a match might depend on 
the opponents’ quality, the opponents’ performance or any other characteristics of the opponent.  
Therefore, we also construct Odd-surprise Opponent and Quality Opponent. Furthermore, we test our 
model with opponent fixed effects that capture any unobserved elements, such as reputation and brand 
strength (e.g. Czarnitzki and Stadtmann, 2002; Pawlowski and Anders, 2012).17 
Our main focus will be on the outcome uncertainty variables. For match uncertainty, we use the Theil-
index and the points-per-game (PPG) measure, as proposed by Forrest, Simmons and Buraimo 
(2005). Furthermore, we test the consumer choice models as proposed by Coates, Humphreys and 
Zhou (2014) and Humphreys and Zhou (2015) with the Home win probability and its squared value. 
As an alternative, we introduce a new measure of match uncertainty, i.e. the expected number of 
points for the home team, which we refer to as Match-Expectation. We also use the squared value. 
With this, we attempt to include, in an easy and straightforward way, the probability of a draw. Since 
approximately 25 percent of the matches in football ends in a draw, this seems important. We did not 
derive the Match-Expectation variable from a structural model as Coates, Humphreys and Zhou 
(2014) and Humphreys and Zhou (2015) did. In comparison to the Home win probability, Match-
Expectation adds the probability of a draw, which is weighted by 1/3 of the probability for a home 
win, because teams earn three points for a victory and one for a draw. Note that the pairwise 
correlations between Home win probability and Match-Expectation are almost equal to unity (see 
                                                 
17 Each league contains a few teams that are traditionally seen as the top teams. For example, because they generally have 
the best players and won the most trophies. In the Netherlands, these clubs are Ajax, Feyenoord and PSV. Matches with 
one of these top teams as opponent, may attract attendance irrespective of their recent performance or quality. Therefore, 
many previous studies use dummy variables to control for such teams. We do so as well with opponent fixed effects. In 
that way, we account for all unobserved characteristics of all the opponents. This approach assumes that these elements 
are constant throughout the sample period and are the same for fans of the different clubs. 
 
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY, TEAM QUALITY AND STADIUM ATTENDANCE IN DUTCH PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL 43 
   
      
Appendix B). Based on intuition and the fact that it is conceptually similar to the use of the home win 
probability, we suggest that it can be used to empirically test the predictions of the attendance demand 
models. We also test how results change in case both variables are included in one model. 
With respect to seasonal uncertainty, we use Jennett’s (1984) measure of significance. We test for 
seasonal significance related to championship victory, the qualification for the Champions League, 
the qualification for the UEFA Europa League and relegation. As argued before, the main drawback 
of this measure is the assumption that the final table is known in advance. In particular, it is assumed 
that the minimum number of points needed to achieve a certain end-of-season target, i.e. 𝑝𝑡𝑘 in 
equation 3, is known. This does obviously not hold true. However, this number of points is rather 
constant across seasons. This means that clubs and fans might form a fairly precise expectation of the 
value of 𝑝𝑡𝑘 based on previous results. Therefore, this assumption might not be problematic for our 
purpose.18 
 
3.5 Parameter estimates 
3.5.1 Baseline results 
Our baseline parameter estimates are shown in Table 3.1, with match uncertainty measured by the 
Home win probability and Match-Expectation. Table D1 in Appendix D provides the results of similar 
models with Theil and PPG. In general, the findings are very much the same. The positive and 
significant coefficient for Derby suggests that matches against local rivals attract more attendance. 
Furthermore, people are less likely go to a stadium if the match is played on a weekday and if 
precipitation is higher. This suggests that opportunity costs play a role in people’s decision to attend 
a match. The result for Temperature is less clear. The negative coefficient means that attendance is 
lower if the temperature is higher, which might reflect a seasonal element. The temperature reaches 
its highest value at the start of the season, drops towards the winter, but it goes up again in the final 
months, though it does not reach the level of August. None of these results are influenced by the 
inclusion of opponent fixed effects (models (3) and (6)). However, these fixed effects have an impact 
on the significance of the in-season performance measure for the opponent. Odd-Surprise Opponent 
is insignificant in models (2) and (5), but significant in models (3) and (6). This suggest that, after 
controlling for unobserved elements, such as the brand strength and the reputation of the away team, 
people seem to appreciate good performances of the opponent, with a positive effect on stadium 
attendance. We also find a positive effect for the in-season performance of the home team. Odd-
Surprise Team is positive and highly significant in all the specifications. The effect for Quality Team 
                                                 
18 Figure B1 in the appendix shows the relevant values of 𝑝𝑡𝑘 for all 16 seasons. 
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is also positive and generally significant in all specifications in Table 3.1, with comparable values for 
the coefficients. Significance levels are somewhat lower for the specifications in Table D1 in the 
appendix. The positive effect for Quality Team suggests that stadium attendance increases with the 
quality of the team. The club-season fixed effects already account for constant elements of team 
quality within a season, such as a seasonal budget and the composition of the squad. In addition, this 
result suggests that within-season changes in the inferred quality, positively effect within-season 
changes in the attendance rates. Note that this effect adds to a positive effect of in-season 
performances. Results are similar for the inferred quality of the opponent (Quality Opponent), i.e. 
better opponents attract more attendance. Not surprising, the coefficient drops after controlling for 
opponent fixed effects that capture certain quality related aspects. 
Concerning the findings for the match uncertainty variables, the results for the Theil-index contradict 
with the UOH. For PPG we find some results in line with the hypothesis, but the coefficients are 
small and the difference in results for the three specifications is puzzling. In line with the recent 
stream of literature, we focus on the results for Home win probability and Match-Expectation. These 
results are shown in Table 3.1. In general, the results contradict with the UOH. For both the Home 
win probability and Match-Expectation, the relation with the attendance rate is convex, meaning that 
loss aversion dominates the preference for uncertain matches. The bottom rows of Table 3.1 give the 
home win probabilities at the minimum of the convex relation, where we assumed the probability of 
a draw to be 0.25 (about equal to the in-sample mean value) in order to translate the minimum for 
Match-Expectation into a home win probability. The minimum value for the HWP in model (1) is 
0.80, while in model (4) 0.81 respectively. This is about equal to maximum value for the home win 
probability within the sample (i.e. 0.88). Thus, this suggests that almost all observations lie within 
the downward sloping part of the convex curve, meaning that an increase in the home win probability 
results in a decreased interest in stadium attendance. A result that seems to contradict with the concept 
of loss aversion, since that would predict fans to favour high home win probabilities and observations 
within the upward sloping part of the convex curve. Furthermore, Humphreys and Zhou (2015) show 
that one can identify the presence of a home win preference by the sum of the coefficients for the 
home win probability and its squared value (see also footnote 3). If this sum is positive, a home win 
preference exists. The results in models (1) and (4) reveal that this is not the case. Thus, we find a 
convex relation that fits within the attendance demand model with reference-dependent preferences 
and loss aversion, but without observing loss aversion or a home win preference. In their model, 
Coates, Humphreys and Zhou (2014) provide an alternative explanation, i.e. fans’ interest in upsets. 
Fans may want to attend live matches, because they enjoy the possibility of an unexpected win. These 
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cases are characterized by relatively low home win probabilities. Otherwise a home win is not 
unexpected. The interest in upsets may account for a downward sloping part of the convex curve. 
However, it cannot explain why the minimum value lies at around 0.80. 
 
Table 3.1: Baseline parameter estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Derby 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Weekday -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Temperature -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Precipitation -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Odd-Surprise Team/100 0.408*** 0.273*** 0.239*** 0.410*** 0.280*** 0.241*** 
 (0.076) (0.079) (0.078) (0.076) (0.079) (0.078) 
Odd-Surprise Opponent/100  0.045 0.092***  0.042 0.092** 
  (0.038) (0.036)  (0.038) (0.036) 
Quality Team/100 0.316** 0.288** 0.242* 0.319** 0.290** 0.243* 
 (0.146) (0.139) (0.135) (0.146) (0.139) (0.135) 
Quality Opponent/100  0.238*** 0.092**  0.229*** 0.089** 
  (0.036) (0.036)  (0.037) (0.036) 
Home win probability -0.568*** -0.298*** -0.038    
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.061)    
Home win probability^2 0.357*** 0.290*** 0.078    
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.052)    
Match-Expectation    -0.203*** -0.127*** -0.028 
    (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 
Match-Expectation^2    0.038*** 0.035*** 0.012* 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Championship 0.004 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.008 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
UEFA Champions League 0.050 0.052 0.068* 0.050 0.052 0.067* 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) 
UEFA Europa League 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) 
Relegation 0.182*** 0.174*** 0.163*** 0.183*** 0.175*** 0.164*** 
 (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) 
       
Opponent FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Minimum HWP 0.80 0.51 0.24    
Minimum Exp. Points    2.67 1.80 1.13 
HWP with Draw Prob.=0.25    0.81 0.52 0.31 
Note: Tobit regression with attendance rate as dependent variable and with the upper limit set at 0.95. All estimates contain 4,586 
observations (1,890 censored) and 270 club-season fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by club-season. Odd-
Surprise Team, Odd-Surprise Opponent, Quality Team and Quality Opponent are divided by 100; HWP means home win probability, 
Exp. Points is the expected number of points. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
From the results in models (2) and (5) it follows that the inclusion of the opponent related variables 
Odd-Surprise Opponent and Quality Opponent reduce the minimum value for the HWP, without 
altering the sign and significance of the match uncertainty variables. The value of approximately 0.51 
is close to the sample mean value for the home win probability (i.e. 0.46). Furthermore, it means that 
approximately half of the observations lies within the upward sloping part of the convex relation 
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between the home win probability and the attendance rate. This seems to be more in line with the 
concept of loss aversion as proposed by Coates, Humphreys and Zhou (2014). However, the sum of 
the coefficients still suggest the absence of a home win preference. With opponent fixed effects 
(models (3) and (6) in Table 3.1), the minimum value for the HWP drops even further. However, 
most coefficients become insignificant. Only the coefficient for Match-Expectation^2 is significant 
at a 10 percent level. Therefore, we conclude that the results for the match uncertainty measures are 
highly dependent on the inclusion of the opponent related controls. It seems that Home win 
probability and Match-Expectation, together with their squared values, captured all the opponent 
elements in models (1) and (4). Based on the results of models (3) and (6), we conclude that team 
characteristics are more important in the determination of stadium attendance, than behavioural 
economic explanations regarding the outcome of the match (i.e. a preference for outcome uncertainty, 
loss aversion and a home win preference). At least within our sample. 
 
Table 3.2: Sensitivity analysis match expectation parameters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Odd-Surprise Team/100 0.428*** 0.300*** 0.257*** 0.360*** 0.218** 0.185** 
 (0.077) (0.082) (0.080) (0.094) (0.086) (0.084) 
Odd-Surprise Opponent/100  0.033 0.084**  0.093** 0.144*** 
  (0.039) (0.036)  (0.038) (0.039) 
Quality Team/100 0.324** 0.295** 0.247* 0.627*** 0.421*** 0.370** 
 (0.146) (0.139) (0.135) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Quality Opponent/100  0.211*** 0.076**  0.306*** 0.154*** 
  (0.039) (0.038)  (0.043) (0.038) 
Home win probability 1.578*** 0.741 0.626    
 (0.563) (0.574) (0.519)    
Home win probability^2 -1.370*** -0.806** -0.586    
 (0.383) (0.392) (0.367)    
Match-Expectation -0.795*** -0.435** -0.274 -0.190*** -0.086** 0.007 
 (0.187) (0.195) (0.178) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) 
Match-Expectation^2 0.188*** 0.130*** 0.078* 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.009 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
       
Opponent FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Club-Season FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Club FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Season FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Tobit regression with attendance rate as dependent variable and with the upper limit set at 0.95. All estimates contain 4,586 
observations (1,890 censored). Models contain all other variables included in our baseline models (not reported). Models (1)-(3) contain 
270 club-season fixed effects; models (4)-(6) contain separate club (28) and season (15) fixed effects. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered by club-season (models (1)-(3)) and clustered by club (models (4)-(6)). Odd-Surprise Team, Odd-Surprise 
Opponent, Quality Team and Quality Opponent are divided by 100; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.2 presents the results of a sensitivity analysis focusing on the relevant parameter estimates. 
We re-estimate our baseline models, but combine the Home win probability and Match-expectation 
variables, to test whether one of them is preferred. The results are shown in models (1)-(3). First, note 
that none of the results for the team or opponent variables changes. Furthermore, the results for the 
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Match-Expectation variable are comparable to those in Table 3.1. However, for Home win probability 
the sign as well as the significance of the coefficients changed. Therefore, we conclude that Match-
Expectation is preferred and is used in the rest of this study. Although the results in Table 3.1 are very 
much the same, it, thus, seems important to account for the possibility of a draw within attendance 
demand for football. 
Another sensitivity analysis is based on the use of separate club and season fixed effects instead of 
club-season effects. Models (4)-(6) in Table 3.2 show the results with these separate effects. In 
general, not much changes compared to the results for models (4)-(6) in Table 3.1. As argued in the 
previous section, we think that club-season effects are preferred, since these take account of the 
heterogeneity of fans of different clubs with respect to intra-season differences, while separate effect 
do not. However, for the results, it does not seem to matter.19 
Before we continue with a discussion on the interpretation of several results, we briefly discuss the 
results for seasonal uncertainty. In all specifications in Table 3.1, the size of the coefficients as well 
as the significance levels are much the same. Seasonal uncertainty related to the championship victory 
is never significant, while the uncertainty related to the qualification for the Champions League 
(UEFA Champions League) is only significant at a 10 percent level in models (3) and (6).  Uncertainty 
related to the UEFA Europa League and Relegation is highly significant in all models. These latter 
results support the UOH. We further discuss the results on seasonal uncertainty, and in particular the 
impact of the introduction of the end-of-season play-offs, in the following section. 
 
3.5.2 Simulations 
Our baseline results showed that several variables have a statistically significant impact on the 
attendance rate. However, this does not tell us anything about the economic impact in terms of 
additional attendance. Therefore, we use the results of model (6) of Table 3.1 to get an impression of 
the magnitude of the effects. Since we use a linear model, the coefficients can be interpreted as 
marginal effects, i.e. the marginal effect measured in percentage points attendance rate. We look at 
the effects for a selection of variables as listed in the first column of Table 3.3. The second column 
gives the marginal effects. We obtain an interpretation of the effect by multiplying the coefficients 
with the standard deviation as given in the third column. The results are shown in column four. The 
ΔAR gives the percentage point change in the attendance rate that results from an additional SD. The 
                                                 
19 We also performed sensitivity analyses with the use of pre-match ranks instead of the quality indicator we proposed. 
However, in all cases, this quality indicator outperformed the use of rankings. Furthermore, we tested with the sum and 
difference in quality and found some significant results, but think that the use of separate variables for the home team and 
the away team are more insightful. 
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Quality Team variable has the biggest impact. An additional SD results in 2.9 additional percentage 
points of attendance rate. The effect size for Odd-Surprise Opponent is the smallest, with an 
additional 0.4 percentage points of attendance rate. In general, the effects are quite small. This might 
have to do with the fact that attendance rates are generally quite high, with only little variation. 
Therefore, an alternative way to measure the effect size, is to relate the marginal effect of an additional 
SD to the variable part of attendance. We calculate this variable part, by taking the SD in the 
attendance rate for each of the 270 club-season combinations included in our analysis. Then, we take 
the average of these values to obtain the average standard deviation of the attendance rate (AvSDAR), 
which is 0.057. Column five gives the values for ΔAR/AvSDAR, i.e. the marginal effect of an 
additional SD, measured in terms of the average variation in the attendance rate. It follows that several 
effects now turn out to be rather substantial. For example, the value 0.501 for Quality Team means 
that an additional SD results in an increase of about half of the average variable part in attendance. 
 
Table 3.3: Marginal effects and the impact on the attendance rate 
Variable Marginal effect SD ΔAR ΔAR / AvSDAR 
Odd-Surprise Team 0.241/100 4.80 0.012 0.203 
Odd-Surprise Opponent 0.092/100 4.82 0.004 0.078 
Quality Team 0.243/100 11.76 0.029 0.501 
Quality Opponent 0.089/100 11.80 0.011 0.184 
Match-Expectation -0.028 0.50 
0.006 0.098 
Match-Expectation^2 0.012 1.63 
UEFA Europa League 0.089 0.08 0.007 0.125 
Relegation 0.164 0.09 0.015 0.259 
Note: SD means standard deviation; ΔAR gives the percentage point change in the attendance rate that results from an additional SD; 
AvSDAR is the average standard deviation of the attendance rate; the coefficients for the performance variables and quality variables 
are divided by 100, since these variables were divided by 100 within the models. 
 
Next, we continue with the evaluation of additional regular league match attendance as a result of the 
introduction of the play-offs. Since we compare the period before and after the introduction, and given 
that club-specific factors might matter, captured by the club-season fixed effects, we prefer to work 
with a balanced panel of nine clubs that were active in the Eredivisie throughout the sample period. 
In that way, we can estimate club-specific time trends. The clubs in the balanced panel are Ajax, AZ, 
FC Groningen, FC Twente, FC Utrecht, Feyenoord, PSV, SC Heerenveen and Vitesse. Appendix B 
provides some separate details on the data for this set of clubs. 
The impact of the play-offs is empirically tested by the inclusion of an interaction term for the 
variables UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League. The UEFA Champions League 
variable interacts with a dummy that takes on the value of one for the three seasons 2005/06 – 
2007/08. During these seasons, play-offs for an UEFA Champions League ticket were organized. The 
 
OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY, TEAM QUALITY AND STADIUM ATTENDANCE IN DUTCH PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL 49 
   
      
UEFA Europa League variable interacts with a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for all 
seasons after the introduction of the play-offs in 2005/06.  
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the results of this approach. Model (1) reports the results for seasonal 
uncertainty of our baseline model, i.e. model (6) in Table 3.1, with data from the balanced panel. It 
follows that, for this set of teams, Championship is significant at a 10 percent level, while Relegation 
is not significant. This probably has to do with the fact that the balanced panel consist of teams that 
perform rather well. They are generally ranked at the upper half of the league table, competing for 
the championship victory or European football, and not at the bottom of the table, where teams must 
avoid relegation. Furthermore, both the UEFA Champions League (at 5 percent) and UEFA Europa 
League (at 1 percent) are statistically significant and positive. We separate the effect of the play-offs 
in model (2) with the inclusion of the interaction terms D*UEFA Champions League and D*UEFA 
Europa League. For the UEFA Champions League, the coefficient is insignificant, suggesting that 
these play-offs did not matter for regular-league match-attendance. For the UEFA Europa League, 
the interaction term is highly significant, meaning that these end-of-season play-offs lead to more 
attendance during regular league matches. These results are robust, if we consider a subset of eight 
seasons in model (3), i.e. four seasons prior the introduction of the play-offs and four seasons after 
the introduction. 
Thus far, we implicitly assumed that fans experience the qualification for the end-of-season play-offs 
in a similar way as a certain qualification for an European competition.20 In the latter situation, the 
qualification is based on the final ranking without play-offs. In other words, the interest shifts from 
the qualification for UEFA competitions, to an interest in the qualification for the end-of-season play-
offs. This seems reasonable, if clubs and fans experience these two types of qualification as 
comparable rewards for the performance during the regular league. Then, the play-offs become a sort 
of separate competition with its own reward, i.e. the qualification for European football. Given that 
many club officials and coaches nowadays state that their goal for the season is to qualify for the 
play-offs, the assumption, at least partly, seems to make sense. Seasonal uncertainty is modelled in 
line with this reasoning. 
                                                 
20 It would be more precise to say, “the qualification for the end-of-season play-offs, with a possibility to qualify for a 
European competition”, since there is always a possibility that a club earns the entry ticket to Europe after the qualification 
for the play-offs. However, we prefer to discuss it as the qualification for end-of-season play-off. First, because it is 
shorter and easier to distinguish from the other case, i.e. a direct or certain qualification for Europe. Second, and more 
important, because we want to stress that it has to do with the interest in the play-offs and not in particular the fact that 
this provides the possibility to qualify for an UEFA league. 
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However, if it is the qualification for European football that matters, and the end-of-season play-offs 
are not a separate reward at all, then seasonal uncertainty related to the introduction of the play-offs 
should be modelled in a differ way. As discussed by Bojke (2007) and Koning (2007), two opposing 
effects will emerge by the introduction of end-of-season play-offs. First, the number significant 
matches increases, since more final rankings provide the possibility to qualify for European football. 
Second, the significance per match decreases, since the number of available tickets for UEFA 
competitions remains unchanged. Below, we discuss how these two aspects might relate to our data. 
For the full sample of 18 clubs over 15 seasons, and in the situation with play-offs, there are 2,857 
matches with a non-zero significance for the Champions League variable. If we assume that there 
would not have been pay-offs and the runner-up always qualified for the Champions League, all else 
equal, the number of significant matches would have been 2,689. Similarly, the number of matches 
with a non-zero significance for the UEFA Europa League is 3,741. Without play-offs, and assuming 
that all teams up to and including rank six would have qualified up until the 2008/09 season, and after 
that, all teams up to and including rank number five, the number of significant matches would have 
been 3,578. Thus, for both variables, the introduction of the play-offs indeed increased the number of 
matches with a non-zero significance related to the qualification for European football. For the 
balanced panel of nine teams, the result is similar for the Champions League. The number of 
significant matches amounts 1,670 with play-offs and 1,615 without play-offs. However, for the 
UEFA Europa League, the number of matches is somewhat lower in the situation with play-offs 
(1,863), compared to the situation without play-offs (1,942). This might result from the fact that this 
subset of stronger teams quite easily obtains the necessary number of points to qualify for this end-
of-season competition. With this exception in mind, we, in general, observe an increase of the number 
of significant matches in our data. As is suggested by Bojke (2007) and Koning (2007). However, the 
largest increase, of about 7 percent, is found for the Champions League variable with data from the 
full sample. This seems quite small, also compared to the results of Bojke (2007) who finds an 
increase of about 21 percent for the English Championship, and Koning (2007) with a predicted 
increase of about 50 percent, depending on the model, for the Dutch Eredivisie. 
The opposing effect suggests that the significance per match decreases in the situation with the end-
of-season play-offs. Unfortunately, Jennett’s significance indicator does not contain any element that 
takes account of such a decrease. However, we may assume that each team in the end-of-season 
competition has a probability of one fourth to win. Then, we could argue that seasonal significance 
related to the qualification for the European competitions is only one fourth of the significance in the 
situation without play-offs. Obviously, the use of equal probabilities for the four teams might not be 
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realistic, but for the sake simplicity we proceed with that assumption. We divide the variables UEFA 
Champions League and UEFA Europa League by four for the relevant seasons, i.e. the seasons with 
play-offs. Correspondingly, the interaction terms also change. We use these new variables and again 
test the impact of the play-offs. The results are presented in panel B of Table 3.4. Model (4) shows 
that none of the seasonal uncertainty variables is significant. The p-value for UEFA Europa League 
is 0.15, while the p-value for UEFA Champions League 0.18. In general, if we compare the results 
from models (1) and (4), we conclude that seasonal uncertainty seems to be less important for 
attendance demand, after the reduction in values for the variables that are influenced by the play-offs. 
However, the results for the interaction terms (models (5) and (6)) suggest that the play-offs have a 
positive impact on the attendance rate. Note that the coefficients for the interaction term for the UEFA 
Europa League, after dividing by four, are about equal to the values in panel A. The coefficient for 
the interaction term for the UEFA Champions League, again after dividing by four, is larger and 
significant in panel B compared to panel A. This seems a bit puzzling, since the values for the variable 
are smaller in panel B during the period with play-offs. Our general interpretation of the results in 
panel B is, that seasonal uncertainty does not seem to matter much, but, the play-offs had a positive 
effect on the attendance demand. 
 
Table 3.4: Impact of play-offs for European football 
Panel A (1) (2) (3)  Panel B (4) (5) (6) 
         
Championship 0.065* 0.069 0.028  Championship 0.048 0.069 0.028 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.038)   (0.041) (0.042) (0.038) 
UEFA Champions League 0.088** 0.077 0.128**  UEFA Champions League/4 0.077 0.077 0.128** 
 (0.041) (0.058) (0.055)   (0.057) (0.058) (0.055) 
D*Champions League  0.044 0.002  D*Champions League/4  0.408** 0.394** 
  (0.074) (0.072)    (0.187) (0.189) 
UEFA Europa League 0.097*** -0.015 -0.013  UEFA Europa League/4 0.053 -0.015 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.018)   (0.037) (0.020) (0.018) 
D*UEFA Europa League  0.169*** 0.194***  D*UEFA Europa League/4  0.631*** 0.736*** 
  (0.044) (0.047)    (0.157) (0.172) 
Relegation 0.044 0.043 0.048  Relegation 0.027 0.043 0.048 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.034)   (0.038) (0.036) (0.034) 
         
Observations 2,294 2,294 1,223  Observations 2,294 2,294 1,223 
Censored 975 975 554  Censored 975 975 554 
Club-Season FE 135 135 72  Club-Season FE 135 135 72 
Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes  Opponent FE Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Tobit regression with attendance rate as dependent variable and with the upper limit set at 0.95. Estimates are based on a balanced 
panel of nine teams. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by club-season. Models contain all other variables included in 
models (6) of our baseline results (not reported). Panel B contains the results with an adjustment for the probability to qualify for 
European football after the introduction of the play-offs. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
We continue with an evaluation of the overall impact of the play-offs. From the discussion above, it 
follows that we could use several models, all with certain (implicit) assumptions. We suggest that it 
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is unlikely within Dutch professional football, that clubs and fans do not value the qualification for 
end-of-season play-offs. Also, we do not think that all clubs and fans will value the qualification for 
end-of-season play-offs always and exactly the same as a certain qualification for European football 
(i.e. the situation without play-offs). Thus, a better understanding on this aspect is needed and 
something to deal with in future research. For now, we suggest that the former assumption fits better 
with the current situation in Dutch football, i.e. the qualification for the play-offs is valued by fans. 
Therefore, we proceed with the results of model (2) of Table 3.4. These results are used to obtain 
model predictions. For each observation, we obtain a fitted value, taking into account the upper limit 
of 0.95. Then, we also calculate a value without taking account of the interaction terms, as if there 
would have never been play-offs. The results are shown in Figure 3.2, where we plot the mean 
predicted values by season for both situations with and without play-offs. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Model predictions of mean attendance rate with and without play-offs.  
The reference line indicates the introduction of play-offs in the season 2005/06. 
 
Obviously, for the first four seasons the graphs coincide. From the seasons 2005/06 onwards, after 
the introduction of the play-offs, we observe very small differences. This suggests that the play-offs 
have made a rather stable contribution to the within-season variation of the stadium attendance rate 
during regular league matches. It also suggests that between-season variation, and in particular the 
increase in the average attendance over time (as observed in Figure 3.1), cannot be attributed to the 
play-offs. 
Of course, the end-of-season play-off matches themselves also attract attendance. This additional 
attendance should be considered in an evaluation of the effectiveness of the play-offs on stadium 
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attendance. In Figure 3.3, we plot the attendance rate during the play-off matches against the 
attendance rate during the same match in the regular league. The special cases for FC Groningen and 
FC Twente are indicated, because these play-off matches were played in a different stadium than the 
regular league match. Dots above the 45° line indicate that attendance was higher during the regular 
league match. Although we observe a lot of dots rather close to the line, the majority lies within the 
upper left part of the figure. While match uncertainty, the quality of the competing teams as well as 
seasonal uncertainty should be relatively high for the play-off matches, fans seem to be less likely to 
attend them, compared to regular league matches. This might have to do with the fact that season 
tickets holders, in general, have to pay extra for these play-offs. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Scatterplot of attendance during the play-offs and regular league matches. 
 
Besides this modest interest in the play-off matches by fans, there are some other drawbacks of the 
system. The play-off matches are generally seen as an unwanted extension of the season by clubs, 
managers and players. This holds especially in the seasons when there is a UEFA European 
Championship or FIFA World Cup coming up, for which preparations start immediately after the 
season. Furthermore, it can be argued that it is not always the strongest team that wins the play-offs 
and, thus earns a ticket for European football in next season. Koning (2007) found that this probably 
is the case. For Dutch football in general, it would be better if the best teams represent the Netherlands 
in European competitions. They have the best perspective to survive the group stage and maybe a few 
rounds in these competitions, earning points for the UEFA rankings for club competitions. 
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Furthermore, such international matches are valuable for the development of young and talented 
players who might be selected for national teams. In general, these players play for the better teams.  
 
3.5.3 Changes in attendance over time 
The focus so far has been on within-season variation in attendance demand. Between-season – 
between-club variation is picked by club-season fixed effects. The question we address in this 
subsection is to what extent the between-season variation of attendance for a particular club is 
influenced by stadium capacity. Figure 3.4 shows that, on a club level, there is a strong correlation 
between stadium capacity and stadium attendance.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Stadium capacity and attendance, nine clubs; 2000/01-2015/16 
 
This correlation is especially high in situations where the expansion of capacity was relatively large. 
AZ expanded their stadium capacity from 9,000 up to 17,000 in 2006, while FC Groningen enlarged 
their stadium capacity, in two major steps, from 12,500 up to 22,000. The first expansion took place 
during the season 2005/06, when they moved to a new stadium. The stadium of FC Twente was also 
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scaled-up substantially in two steps, from 13,000 via 24,000 up to 30,000. FC Utrecht expanded their 
stadium capacity in a few steps from 14,000 up to 24,000, while SC Heerenveen enlarged their 
stadium capacity from 14,500 up to 26,000. Relatively minor expansions took place in the stadiums 
of Ajax and PSV. The capacity of the Feyenoord stadium remained unchanged during the sample 
period, while the stadium capacity of Vitesse decreased from 30,000 down to 25,000. 
It follows that a strong expansion of stadium capacity almost immediately led to a substantial increase 
in attendance. Furthermore, in their study on novelty effects of German football stadiums, Feddersen, 
Maenning and Borcherding (2006) discuss the possibility for capacity effects, i.e. expansions because 
of excess demand. They suggest that a capacity effect emerges if the average attendance rate is more 
than 90% in the three seasons prior to the decision to renovate and upgrade the current stadium, or to 
build a new one. Within our balanced panel, we can identify eleven substantial expansions in stadium 
capacity, i.e. expansions with more than 500 seats, for which the average attendance rate for the last 
three seasons is available. In only one case, the value is below the threshold level of 90% (i.e. FC 
Utrecht in the season 2004/05, with a value of 87%) while ten cases would be defined as capacity 
effect. Thus, in general, most expansions seem to have been triggered by excess demand for (season) 
tickets. 
An alternative explanation is that the new, enlarged and renovated stadiums attracted new attendants 
that were not interested to go to the stadium before the improvement of facilities. Thus, attendance 
increases, because of the new or renovated stadium. This phenomenon is known as the novelty effect 
(or honeymoon effect) and has been studied numerous times. For example, Coates and Humphreys 
(2005) study the novelty effect for three major US sports leagues. They find quite substantial effects, 
with the largest effect for the MLB, then for the NBA and finally, the NFL. They also find that 
durations of the effect differ for the different leagues. Within the NFL, the novelty effects only lasts 
for about five years, while respectively eight and nine years for the other leagues. Feddersen, 
Maenning and Borcherding (2006) study the novelty effect for German football stadiums. They find 
a rather small effect (compared to US sports) within the first five seasons after the opening of a new 
(or renovated) stadium. Finally, Love et al. (2013) study the novelty effects in US Major League 
Soccer (MLS). In particular, they look for shifts in average attendance for teams that move from 
multipurpose venues to soccer-specific stadiums. Although they do not control for other elements that 
may affect attendance, they find substantial novelty effects for at least the first three seasons. 
Generally, given the rather robust results from previous studies, it seems likely that our sample also 
exhibits at least some novelty effects. However, the jumps in attendance following an expansion of 
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capacity suggest that the explanation of excess demand is more likely. Still, both explanations seem 
reasonable and might be complementary. Therefore, we should be cautious with causal conclusions. 
 
Table 3.5: Parameter estimates club-season variation in attendances 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log Stadium capacity 0.987*** 0.971*** 0.961*** 
 (0.026) (0.047) (0.043) 
Ranking end-of-season   -0.062*** 
   (0.023) 
    
Club FE (9) Yes Yes Yes 
Season FE (16) No Yes Yes 
Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of attendance per club-season. All estimates contain 144 observations.  Robust standard errors 
in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
 
To quantify the relationship between capacity and attendance, we estimate a simple model with the 
logarithm of attendance per club-season as the dependent variable and the logarithm of capacity as 
one of the explanatory variables. The relevant parameter estimates are presented in Table 3.5. 
The first column shows, that if we only include club fixed effects, then the effect of Log Stadium 
capacity is 0.99, which is not significantly different from unity. A one percent increase in stadium 
capacity also increases attendance by one percent. The second column shows that this parameter 
estimate hardly changes, if we also include season fixed effects. In the third column, we add the 
ranking at the end of the season. This has a significantly negative effect on attendance, but the 
relationship between stadium capacity and attendance is hardly affected.21 Again, these very high 
correlations suggest that attendance directly increases, in about equal portions, after the enlargement 
of the stadium. As discussed, this may follow from the supply of new seats and facilities, i.e. the 
novelty effect. Alternatively, this could result from the excess demand for (season) tickets. It is 
unclear to what extent supply and demand contribute to the result. We suggest that the latter 
explanation seems plausible. However, since our analysis lacks causality, this remains a question 
open for future research. 
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
We investigate the relation between outcome uncertainty and within-season variation in stadium 
attendance for sixteen seasons of the highest tier of Dutch professional football. Using different 
measures of match uncertainty, we find evidence that contradicts with the UOH. Instead, results 
suggest that fans have reference-dependent preferences with loss aversion. Although we cannot rule 
                                                 
21 Note that a higher value of the ranking at the end of the season means that a team did worse compared to a lower value. 
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out any preference for uncertain outcomes, the results suggest that loss aversion dominates. However, 
no home win preference is found. Furthermore, the influence of match uncertainty disappears after 
controlling for opponent fixed effects in our baseline model. In general, we conclude that team 
characteristics are more important for the determination of stadium attendance, than behavioural 
economic explanations regarding the outcome of the match (i.e. a preference for outcome uncertainty, 
loss aversion and a home win preference). In particular, the in-season performance as well as the 
quality of both the home team and the away team have a positive effect on the attendance rate. We 
introduced a new indicator to proxy for the quality of teams, based on bookmaker odds, that works 
quite well within the attendance demand model. A sensitivity analysis shows that our results are 
robust for specifications with separate club and season fixed effects instead of our preferred 
specification with club-season effects. Furthermore, this analysis reveals that our variable for match-
expectations outperforms the home win probability as indicator of match uncertainty. This stresses 
the importance to account for the probability for a draw in attendance demand models within football. 
As to seasonal uncertainty, we find significant results for uncertainty related to the qualification for 
the UEFA Europa League and seasonal significance related to relegation. Both are in line with the 
UOH. The insignificant findings for the other seasonal uncertainty variables might result from the 
fact that, in general, only a few teams perform well enough to remain a serious contestant for the title 
or to qualify for the UEFA Champions League until the very final stages of the season. Both of these 
variables, as well as the variable for UEFA Europa League, are significant for a balanced panel of 
nine teams that were active at the highest level in all seasons considered. This result is in line with 
the fact that these teams generally perform rather well and, thus, experience seasonal uncertainty with 
regard to the top of table rankings and the corresponding options for qualification. 
Our preferred model is used to obtain an impression of the magnitude of several effects. In general, 
the marginal effects are small. However, in relation to the variable part of the attendance rate, being 
small itself, we find some rather substantial results. Furthermore, we investigate the impact on regular 
league match-attendance of the introduction of the play-offs in the season 2005/06. We find that the 
UEFA Europa league play-offs have a positive effect on stadium attendance during regular league 
matches. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effect is small. Furthermore, our final part of analysis 
reveals that the play-offs did not drive the increase in average attendance figures over seasons. 
Between-season variation in attendance is correlated with stadium capacity. The jumps in attendance 
after an increase of the capacity suggest that these expansions were necessary to meet excess demand. 
Given some other drawbacks of the play-offs, it seems reasonable to question their overall 
effectiveness. 
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In general, we find that stadium attendance rates are high within the Dutch Eredivisie. Thus, 
suggesting that the current policy of clubs and the sports body does not need to be changed. 
Furthermore, given the small marginal effects, one might question the effectiveness of any policy 
measure related to the aspects investigated in this study. There seems to be a vast majority of fans 
that simply attends any match, irrespective of the conditions, competing teams and the season. As 
long as this majority keeps returning to the stadium, there does not seem to be any problem. However, 
both figures 3.1 and 3.2 show some reduction in the average attendance rate for the recent seasons. If 
this continues over the following seasons, clubs may feel the need to do something. Then, it is useful 
to understand why people (do not) attend the stadium, so that one can formulate clear policy advice. 
Our results may serve as a basis. Future research could explain why people might be interested to 
attend matches against certain opponents, i.e. the opponent effect.  




Appendix B: Information about our data 
 
 
Our data on match date, competing teams, match results, stadium capacities and attendance figures 
are collected from various internet sources, sports magazines and newspaper archives. The attendance 
figures are typically a reported number, from which it is not possible to separate season-ticket holders 
and pay-at-the-gate attendance. Furthermore, the reported data might be rounded to e.g. 100, which 
is likely to hold true as we observe several spikes of frequencies at those numbers. Data on the general 
weather conditions are obtained from the KNMI, the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute. The 
betting odds are from bookmaker agencies William Hill (97 percent), Ladbrokes (2 percent) and 
others (1 percent). Still, no data was available for two matches. From the data collected, we create 
the set of variables listed in Table B1. 
In Table B2, some descriptive statistics are presented. Since we need previous seasons bookmaker 
odds for the construction of the quality variables, and we lack odds prior to the season 2000/01, this 
season is left out of the analyses. Thus, we are left with 15 seasons with 18 clubs and 17 home matches 
per club, resulting in 4,590 observations. For 186 observations, we found a reported number of 
attendance that was (slightly) higher than our documented stadium capacity. For these cases, we 
assumed attendance to be the same as capacity. During two matches, no fans were allowed to attend 
as a punishment by the Dutch football association. These two matches are left out of the analyses. 
Furthermore, bookmaker odds are missing for two matches, which results in 4,586 observations for 
the match uncertainty measures that are based on these bookmaker odds. A total of 1,980 observations 
is censored at the upper limit of 95 percent of capacity (41 percent of observations is censored). The 
right hand panel of Table B2 contains descriptive statistics for a subsample of 9 teams that were active 
in the Eredivisie throughout the sample period. This balanced panel contains 2,294 observations, with 
975 censored observations at 95 percent of capacity (43 percent of the observations). We find a rather 
high standard deviation and difference between the minimum and maximum value for attendance, 
which can easily be explained by the fact that all clubs are grouped together for these values. After 
controlling for capacity in the attendance rate variable, the deviations are less severe. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Odd-Surprise variables are slightly positive on average and 
fluctuate in both directions. The quality variables cannot become negative, by definition, and the 
mean values are approximately 47. This is about the number of points that teams typically obtain if 
they finish in the middle of the league, thus representing average quality. We also find that the mean 
values for the Theil-index and PPG are rather high (low) in comparison to their minimum and 
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maximum values, which is less the case for the Home win probability and Match-expectation. Finally, 
the mean values for seasonal uncertainty are rather low, which can be explained by the fact that 
seasonal uncertainty develops exponentially. For the first match the value is equal to 0.03 in all cases. 
For a given match later in the season, the value is equal to 0.5 when only two matches should be won, 
while it only reaches unity in case only one match needs to be won to obtain some end-of-season 
achievement. 
In Figure B1 we plot the relevant number of points necessary to obtain an end-of-season achievement, 
i.e. 𝑝𝑡𝑘 in equation (3). The vertical reference-line marks the introduction of the end-of-season play-
off scheme. The line for relegation remains flat for the entire sample period. For the UEFA Europa 
League, a stable number of points is necessary to qualify until the introduction of the play-offs. After 
the introduction, again a stable number of points is necessary for qualification, now for the end-of-
season play-offs. The line representing ‘championship’ exhibits a higher degree of variability, 
although it remains somewhere around 80 points. No stable pattern is found for the UEFA Champions 
League. This can be explained by changes in the number of direct tickets for this tournament, as well 
as the introduction of the play-offs during the sample period. Only one extra team, besides the 
champion, was allowed to qualify from the season 2001/02 onwards, as a result of the rather poor 
performances of the Dutch teams in Europe in the preceding seasons. However, the introduction of 
the play-off scheme in the 2005/06 season made it possible for multiple teams to obtain this 
qualification in an end-of-season competition. Teams ranked second up to fifth were competing for 
this second entry ticket during the 2005/06 – 2007/08 seasons. The playoffs were abandoned after the 
2007/08 season, after which the runner up in the league directly qualified for the Champions League.1 
Again, we observe a rather flat line from that moment onwards, with two exceptions, in which both 
the champion as well as the runner-up obtained more than 80 points, which is rather high. In general, 
taking the changes in rules and regulations regarding qualifications into account, we find that the 
necessary number of points, i.e. 𝑝𝑡𝑘, is rather stable over seasons. Especially for relegation and the 
UEFA Europa League (before and after the introduction of play-offs), which suggests that the 
assumption of a known final table is comparable to expectations being based on previous years’ 
results. 
                                                 
1 Only once out of three times, the runner-up won the play-offs for the lucrative Champions League (Ajax in the 2006/07 
season). In the other two seasons, the club ranked fourth in the regular league won the ticket. Many commentators 
considered this as a result that would not enhance the position of Dutch clubs in competitions organized by the UEFA. 
Furthermore, note that, when the play-offs for the UEFA Champions League were canceled, the runner-up in the league 
qualifies for a start-of-season preliminary round of the UEFA Champions League, but for convenience, we do not make 
such a distinction here. 
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Table B3 provides pairwise correlations. Without going into detail, we find many variables that are 
significantly correlated to the attendance variables. Those measuring uncertainty of outcome are of 
main interest. The match variables all significant, but the sign of the coefficients is different from the 
a priori hypotheses. For seasonal uncertainty, we find positive correlations for top-of-the-table 
rankings, i.e. Championship and UEFA Champions League, while negative correlations for 
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Table B1: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
Attendance (dependent variable) 
 
Attendance Rate Occupancy rate of the stadium, calculated as the ratio of attendance divided by stadium capacity 
Log Attendance Logarithm of attendance 
Opponent 
 
Derby Dummy with value 1 if teams are from the same province (+) 
Match day 
 





Daily mean temperature measured in 0.1 degrees Celsius in De Bilt on match-day (+) 
Daily precipitation, amount in 0.1 mm in De Bilt on match-day (-) 
Performance 
 
Odd-Surprise Team Cumulative-Surprise based on bookmaker odds, calculated as the in-season sum of surprises. A single match surprise is calculated as the actual number of points obtained minus the expected number of points, 
where the expected number of points is based on the probabilities set by bookmakers for a home win, a draw and an away win (+) 
Odd-Surprise Opponent Cumulative-Surprise of the opponent, calculated in the same way as cumulative surprise for the Team (+) 
Quality  
Quality Team Expected quality of the team, measured by the sum of the expected number of points in the previous 34 matches. Expectations are based on bookmaker odds. In case a team was promoted, and, thus, no 
information about previous season is available, we take the expected number of points of the team that relegated and was replaced by the promoted team (+) 
Quality Opponent Expected quality of the opponent, calculated in the same way as the expected quality for the Team (+) 
Ranking Team Pre-match rank of the team (-) 
Ranking Opponent Pre-match rank of the opponent (-) 
Match-UO 
 





) with 𝑝𝑖 being either the home win probability, the probability for a draw or the away win probability. The index is increasing when probabilities become more equal, 
with a value close to zero in case of a high probability for one of the outcomes and ln(3) in case of equal probabilities (+) 
PPG Points-per-game measure, calculated as: 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑘 = |𝐻𝐴𝑘 + 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑘 − 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑘| in which, 𝑖 denotes the home team, 𝑗 indicates the away team and 𝑘 refers to the season. The points-per-game match uncertainty 
measure 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the absolute value of home advantage (𝐻𝐴𝑘) plus the number of points per game of the home team (𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑖𝑘) minus the number of point per game of the away team (𝑃𝑃𝐺𝑗𝑘). Home advantage 
is measured as the difference between the points per game won by all home teams and all away teams in previous season. The point per game values of the home and away team are measured as the number of 
points per game obtained in the current season. With this measure, match uncertainty increases with decreasing values (-) 
Home win probability Home win probability based on bookmaker odds (-) 
Home win probability^2 Home win probability squared (+) 
Match-Expectation Expected number of points for the home team, calculated as: 𝑝𝑤𝑖𝑛 ∗ 3 +  𝑝𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑤 ∗ 1 +  𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 ∗ 0, where probabilities are based on bookmaker odds. (-)  
Match-Expectation^2 Match-Expectation squared (+) 
Seasonal-UO 
Either being “Championship Significance”, 
“UEFA Champions League Significance”, 
“UEFA Europa League Significance” or “ 
Relegation Significance”  
Significance is defined as: 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 =
1
𝑚𝑗𝑘− 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑘
 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑝𝑡𝑘 > 𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘;  𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 < 𝑝𝑡𝑘;  𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑝𝑡𝑘 in which 𝑖 denotes the match, 𝑗 indicates the club and 𝑘 refers to the season. Then, 
significance 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 is given by the reciprocal of the total number of matches in the season (𝑚𝑗𝑘) minus the number of matches already played (𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑘) prior to match 𝑖. This is only the case if the potential number of 
points for a specific team (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘) is larger or equal to the total number of points needed to obtain the predefined total number of points. This total is constant throughout the season and represented by 𝑝𝑡𝑘 , which 
should be larger than the current number of points (𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘) prior to a match. In case the potential number of points is smaller than the total number of points, significance becomes zero (+) 
Note: National holidays include Easter, Queen’s Birth Day / King’s Birth Day, Ascension Day, Pentecost and Christmas. In the Netherlands, there is national holiday on Sunday and Monday during Eater 
and on Sunday and Monday during Pentecost. Furthermore, there is a national holiday on the 26th of December, the second day of Christmas. De Bilt is a municipality centrally located in the Netherlands 
where the KNMI (Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute) is located. Precipitation was measured as being -1 for values <0.05, but was set to zero in our sample. Both temperature and precipitation measures 
were divided by 10 to make interpretation easier. The sign (+ or -) in parentheses indicates the expected sign of the coefficient. 
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Table B2: Descriptive statistics 
  All teams Balanced panel of 9 teams 
  N Mean SD Min Max N Mean SD Min Max 
Attendance 4,588 18,191.12 12,086.46 2,258 53,052 2,295 26,128.41 12,306.86 6,057 53,052 
Attendance Rate 4,588 0.88 0.12 0.30 1 2,295 0.89 0.11 0.42 1 
Log Attendance 4,588 9.61 0.65 7.72 10.88 2,295 10.06 0.48 8.71 10.88 
Derby 4,588 0.09 0.29 0 1 2,295 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Weekday 4,588 0.07 0.25 0 1 2,295 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Temperature 4,588 0.89 0.56 -1.21 2.64 2,295 0.89 0.56 -1.21 2.64 
Precipitation 4,588 0.23 0.42 0 4.00 2,295 0.23 0.43 0 4.00 
Odd-Surprise Team 4,588 0.06 4.80 -17.36 19.98 2,295 1.21 4.96 -17.36 19.98 
Odd-Surprise Opponent 4,588 0.09 4.82 -18.31 19.29 2,295 0.10 4.80 -17.09 18.93 
Quality Team 4,588 46.96 11.76 23.52 76.95 2,295 55.25 10.40 35.71 76.95 
Quality Opponent 4,588 46.71 11.80 23.17 76.38 2,295 46.14 11.67 23.17 76.28 
Ranking Team 4,588 9.37 5.30 1 18 2,295 6.60 4.51 1 18 
Ranking Opponent 4,588 9.13 5.32 1 18 2,295 9.21 5.29 1 18 
Theil 4,586 0.98 0.13 0.44 1.1 2,294 0.93 0.15 0.44 1.1 
PPG 4,588 0.83 0.63 0 3.94 2,295 1.01 0.68 0 3.94 
Home win probability 4,586 0.46 0.18 0.06 0.88 2,294 0.55 0.17 0.11 0.88 
Home win probability^2 4,586 0.24 0.17 0 0.78 2,294 0.33 0.18 0.01 0.78 
Match-Expectation 4,586 1.63 0.50 0.31 2.73 2,294 1.87 0.46 0.53 2.73 
Match-Expectation^2 4,586 2.91 1.63 0.10 7.44 2,294 3.73 1.65 0.28 7.44 
Championship 4,588 0.03 0.05 0 1 2,295 0.04 0.07 0 1 
Champions League 4,588 0.04 0.07 0 1 2,295 0.05 0.09 0 1 
UEFA Europa League 4,588 0.06 0.08 0 1 2,295 0.06 0.09 0 1 
Relegation 4,588 0.05 0.09 0 1 2,295 0.03 0.05 0 1 
Note: the balanced panel consist of nine clubs that are active in the Eredivisie in all seasons considered. Since bookmaker odds are 
missing for two matches (one for the balanced panel), Theil, Home win probability and Match-Expectation contain two (one) less 




Figure B1: Points needed to obtain some end-of-season achievement. 
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Table B3: Pairwise correlations 







  All Teams 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Attendance 1            
2 Attendance Rate 0.1429* 1           
3 Log Attendance 0.9329* 0.1418* 1          
4 Derby -0.0234 0.0689* -0.0412* 1         
5 Weekday -0.0097 -0.0544* -0.0129 -0.0207 1        
6 Temperature -0.0115 -0.0303* -0.0145 -0.0039 -0.0769* 1       
7 Precipitation -0.0029 -0.0176 0.0013 0.0193 -0.0115 0.0502* 1      
8 Odd-Surprise Team 0.2153* 0.1121* 0.2467* -0.0295* 0.0010 -0.0104 0.0043 1     
9 Odd-Surprise Opponent 0.0040 0.0664* 0.0030 -0.0131 0.0007 0.0106 -0.0015 -0.0341* 1    
10 Quality Team 0.8163* 0.1394* 0.7938* -0.0206 -0.0082 -0.0011 0.0050 0.2940* -0.0139 1   
11 Quality Opponent -0.0212 0.1779* -0.0136 -0.0152 0.0045 0.0114 -0.0021 -0.0361* 0.2894* -0.0813* 1  
12 Ranking Team -0.5774* -0.1388* -0.5816* 0.0155 0.0059 -0.0663* -0.0086 -0.6686* 0.0102 -0.7061* 0.0208 1 
13 Ranking Opponent -0.0082 -0.1249* -0.0113 0.0197 0.0044 -0.1031* -0.0035 0.0310* -0.6724* 0.0363* -0.7177* 0.0615* 
14 Theil -0.5178* -0.1262* -0.4660* -0.0455* -0.0055 0.0151 -0.0136 -0.2309* 0.1819* -0.5901* 0.2364* 0.4441* 
15 PPG 0.3403* 0.0194 0.3140* 0.0254 -0.0094 0.0844* 0.0130 0.3800* -0.3370* 0.4332* -0.3173* -0.4671* 
16 Home win probability 0.5371* -0.0138 0.5225* -0.0069 -0.0085 -0.0157 0.0074 0.3330* -0.3246* 0.6840* -0.7020* -0.5419* 
17 Home win probability^2 0.5778* 0.0236 0.5513* 0.0072 -0.0058 -0.0174 0.0092 0.3335* -0.3116* 0.7171* -0.6322* -0.5616* 
18 Match-Expectation 0.5230* -0.0234 0.5116* -0.0101 -0.0090 -0.0154 0.0074 0.3317* -0.3258* 0.6714* -0.7154* -0.5341* 
19 Match-Expectation^2 0.5636* 0.0081 0.5424* 0.0016 -0.0066 -0.0167 0.0095 0.3361* -0.3192* 0.7070* -0.6646* -0.5572* 
20 Championship 0.2906* 0.0712* 0.2594* -0.0253 -0.0016 0.0966* -0.0064 0.2928* -0.0257 0.3549* -0.017 -0.3309* 
21 Champions League 0.3031* 0.0729* 0.2725* -0.0285 0.0161 0.002 -0.0029 0.2734* -0.0068 0.3080* -0.0295* -0.2998* 
22 UEFA Europa League -0.0298* 0.023 0.0152 -0.0138 0.0129 -0.0838* 0.0024 0.0701* 0.0266 -0.0286 0.0196 -0.0274 
23 Relegation -0.2048* 0.0153 -0.2039* 0.0202 -0.0141 -0.0328* -0.0216 -0.2705* 0.0059 -0.2580* 0.0085 0.3133* 
    13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23   
13 Ranking Opponent 1            
14 Theil -0.2522* 1           
15 PPG 0.4418* -0.6225* 1          
16 Home win probability 0.5770* -0.6175* 0.5740* 1         
17 Home win probability^2 0.5342* -0.7678* 0.6311* 0.9774* 1        
18 Match-Expectation 0.5842* -0.5711* 0.5555* 0.9981* 0.9635* 1       
19 Match-Expectation^2 0.5557* -0.7102* 0.6138* 0.9920* 0.9957* 0.9834* 1      
20 Championship 0.0055 -0.2665* 0.2431* 0.2539* 0.2802* 0.2455* 0.2694* 1     
21 Champions League 0.0239 -0.2215* 0.1829* 0.2321* 0.2500* 0.2262* 0.2431* 0.2852* 1    
22 UEFA Europa League -0.0002 0.0587* -0.0774* -0.0168 -0.0307* -0.0134 -0.0245 -0.1420* -0.0950* 1   
23 Relegation 0.0161 0.1510* -0.1836* -0.1791* -0.1860* -0.1752* -0.1837* -0.1600* -0.1799* -0.0851* 1   
              
  
Balanced panel of 9 
teams 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Attendance 1            
2 Attendance Rate 0.1580* 1           
3 Log Attendance 0.9694* 0.1528* 1          
4 Derby 0.1016* 0.0129 0.1044* 1         
5 Weekday 0.0039 -0.0259 -0.0016 0.0047 1        
6 Temperature -0.0177 -0.0525* -0.0254 -0.0392 -0.0688* 1       
7 Precipitation -0.0154 -0.0154 -0.0118 -0.0078 -0.0255 0.0632* 1      
8 Odd-Surprise Team 0.0524* 0.0959* 0.0399 -0.0045 0.0159 -0.0785* -0.0004 1     
9 Odd-Surprise Opponent 0.0037 0.0692* 0.0025 -0.0178 -0.0169 0.0173 -0.0295 -0.0285 1    
10 Quality Team 0.7138* 0.2734* 0.6963* 0.1395* 0.0111 0.0013 0.009 0.1355* -0.0261 1   
11 Quality Opponent -0.0021 0.1477* 0.0016 -0.0756* -0.0098 -0.0097 -0.0066 -0.0267 0.2923* -0.0714* 1  
12 Ranking Team -0.4604* -0.2242* -0.4439* -0.0821* -0.0342 0.0286 0.0000 -0.6034* 0.0233 -0.6378* 0.0081 1 
13 Ranking Opponent -0.021 -0.1133* -0.0222 0.0569* 0.0257 -0.0948* 0.0031 0.0462* -0.6831* 0.0357 -0.7109* 0.0299 
14 Theil -0.4416* -0.1064* -0.4310* -0.1443* -0.0228 0.0205 -0.0083 -0.2321* 0.3128* -0.6344* 0.5425* 0.4892* 
15 PPG 0.2646* 0.0390 0.2491* 0.0875* 0.021 0.0315 0.0081 0.3912* -0.4521* 0.4109* -0.4353* -0.4745* 
16 Home win probability 0.4121* 0.0552* 0.3963* 0.1236* 0.0119 -0.0123 0.0156 0.2297* -0.3430* 0.6242* -0.7375* -0.4766* 
17 Home win probability^2 0.4366* 0.0752* 0.4217* 0.1350* 0.0149 -0.0159 0.0133 0.2380* -0.3442* 0.6498* -0.6971* -0.4974* 
18 Match-Expectation 0.4034* 0.0502* 0.3867* 0.1198* 0.0125 -0.0112 0.0168 0.2271* -0.3412* 0.6142* -0.7463* -0.4687* 
19 Match-Expectation^2 0.4271* 0.0665* 0.4113* 0.1301* 0.0157 -0.014 0.0153 0.2364* -0.3451* 0.6403* -0.7186* -0.4902* 
20 Championship 0.2120* 0.1122* 0.1990* -0.0049 0.0127 0.0388 -0.0183 0.2809* -0.0382 0.3273* -0.0126 -0.3032* 
21 Champions League 0.2238* 0.1128* 0.2093* -0.0036 0.0363 -0.0195 -0.0172 0.2387* -0.0166 0.2320* -0.0325 -0.2547* 
22 UEFA Europa League -0.1041* -0.0092 -0.0860* -0.0182 -0.0021 -0.0695* -0.0025 -0.0628* 0.0218 -0.1638* 0.0392 0.0978* 
23 Relegation -0.1888* -0.1063* -0.1937* -0.0162 -0.0187 -0.0098 0.0116 -0.3193* 0.0369 -0.2671* 0.0138 0.3362* 
    13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23   
13 Ranking Opponent 1            
14 Theil -0.4925* 1           
15 PPG 0.5913* -0.6766* 1          
16 Home win probability 0.6041* -0.8556* 0.6483* 1         
17 Home win probability^2 0.5866* -0.9310* 0.6788* 0.9853* 1        
18 Match-Expectation 0.6070* -0.8284* 0.6382* 0.9985* 0.9751* 1       
19 Match-Expectation^2 0.5976* -0.9004* 0.6698* 0.9953* 0.9966* 0.9895* 1      
20 Championship 0.0194 -0.2413* 0.2097* 0.2176* 0.2336* 0.2122* 0.2265* 1     
21 Champions League 0.0401 -0.1805* 0.1442* 0.1730* 0.1825* 0.1702* 0.1786* 0.2312* 1    
22 UEFA Europa League -0.0160 0.1307* -0.1404* -0.1190* -0.1271* -0.1164* -0.1240* -0.1627* -0.1236* 1   
23 Relegation -0.0068 0.1747* -0.1807* -0.1898* -0.1911* -0.1861* -0.1890* -0.1447* -0.1799* -0.0416* 1   




Appendix C: Overview of previous studies 
 
 
This appendix provides a summary overview of studies presented and discussed in section 3.2. Table 
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Table C1: Overview of studies with match uncertainty 
Match uncertainty Country-
Division 
Seasons Dependent Variable Match uncertainty UOH Comment 
Hart, Hutton and 
Sharot (1975) 
England-1 1969/70 – 
1971/72 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Log of home team rank 
2) Log of away team rank 




Separate analyses for a selection of four teams 




1) Home team rank 
2) Away team rank 
1) Yes* 
2) Yes* 
Separate analyses for a selection of three teams; also 
includes seasonal uncertainty 
Janssens and Késenne 
(1987) 
Belgium-1 1982/83 Match-day stadium 
attendance 
1) Average goals home team 
2) Average goals away team 
3) Average points home team 





Also includes seasonal uncertainty; these measures are 
included here as match uncertainty, but the authors do not 
discuss them as such 
Peel and Thomas 
(1988) 
England-1/4 1981/82 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Home team rank 
2) Away team rank 




Separate analyses for the different divisions 
Dobson and Goddard 
(1992) 
England-1/4 1989/90 – 
1990/91 




1) Log of home team rank 




Analyses based on a set of clubs that (were able to) provide 
survey information; also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Peel and Thomas 
(1992) 
England-1/4 1986/87 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Home team rank 
2) Away team rank 
3) Home team win 




Separate analyses for the different divisions; formulate the 
Theil-index, but use home win probability 
Wilson and Sim 
(1995) 
Malysia-1/2 1989/90 – 
1991/92 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Absolute point difference 
between teams, also squared 
1) No Non-paying spectators and season ticket holders are 
excluded from the analyses; also includes seasonal 
uncertainty 
Baimbridge, Cameron 
and Dawson (1996) 
England-1 1993/94 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Difference in league rank, 
also squared 
1) No Also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Peel and Thomas 
(1996) 
Scotland-1/3 1991/92 Difference in stadium  
attendance figures in 
repeat fixtures 
1) Difference in home team 
rank 
2) Difference in level of 
home win probability, also 
squared 







The Scottish league contains repeat fixtures between the 
same home and away teams during a season 
Baimbridge (1997) EURO-96 1996 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
Log of stadium capacity 
utilization 
1) Dummy indicating whether 






Also includes seasonal uncertainty 
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2) Dummy indicating a match 
belongs to the knock-out 
stage 
2) No 
Kuypers (1997) England-1 1993/94 Match-day stadium 
attendance 
Proportion of Sky 
subscribers 
1) Difference in maximum 
and minimum probabilities of 
home team win or draw and 
away team win 
1) No Also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Falter and Perignon 
(2000) 
France-1 1997/98 – 
1998/99 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Home team rank 
2) Away team rank 





Also includes seasonal uncertainty, measured as season 
dummies summer, autumn and winter, spring being the 
reference, these dummies measure more than uncertainty 
Czarnitzki and 
Stadtmann (2002) 




1) Home team rank 
2) Away team rank 
3) Home team win 




Also includes seasonal uncertainty; formulate the Theil-
index, but use home win probability 
Forrest and Simmons 
(2002) 
England-2/4 1997/98 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Ratio of home win 
probability and away win 
probability, also squared 
1) Yes Early season matches (in August and September) are 
excluded, as well all Premier League matches, correction 
for biases in bookmaker odds 
García and Rodírguez 
(2002) 
Spain-1 1992/93 – 
1995/96 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Difference in rank 
measured home-away, also 
squared 
2) Dummy indicating home 
team between +3 or -5 league 





Attendance is measured as tickets sold, excluding children 
and season tickets; also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Forrest, Simmons and 
Buraimo (2005) 
England-1 1993/94 – 
2001/02 
Log of TV audience 1) Difference in in-season 
points per game between 
opponents corrected for home 
advantage  
1) Yes First round of season is excluded; use pre- and post-Boxing 
Day period, also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Forrest, Beaumont, 
Goddard and Simmons 
(2005) 
England-2/4 1997/98 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Ratio of home win 
probability and away win 
probability. Controlling for 
home advantage 
2) Points per game of the 
home team 









Early season matches (in August and September) are 
excluded, as well all Premier League matches; only matches 
played on Saturday are considered 
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Forrest and Simmons 
(2006) 
England-2/4 1999/00 – 
2001/02 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Difference in in-season 
points per game between 
opponents corrected for home 
advantage 
2) Points per game of the 
home team 









The first three home fixtures for each team are excluded, 
separate results for the three divisions, also includes 
seasonal uncertainty 
Bojke (2007) England-2 2000/01 Match-day stadium 
attendance 
1) Theil-index 1) Yes Also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Buraimo (2008) England-2 1997/98 – 
2003/04 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
Log of TV audience 
1) Difference in in-season 
points per game between 
opponents corrected for home 
advantage 
2) Points per game of the 
home team; only with 
stadium attendance 
3) Points per game of the 










The first match of each season is excluded, furthermore, 
missing data on wages reduced the sample size 
Benz, Brandes and 
Franck (2009) 
Germany-1 1999/00 – 
2003/04 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Difference in league 
standings 
2) Difference in in-season 
points per game between 
opponents corrected for home 
advantage 
3) Theil-index 
4) Relative win probability 
based on Theil, without 
incorporation of the 
probability for a draw 
5) Home team win 













Stadium attendance figures are adjusted by subtraction of 
season tickets sold; observations with Bayern Munich being 
the away team and Derbies are excluded, because of too 
little variation in the dependent variable; partial support for 
UOH here indicates that it was found for high demand 
games only 
Madalozzo and Villar 
(2009) 
Brazil-1 2003-2006 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Home team rank 
2) Away team rank 





Due to various reasons, some matches are excluded, 
reducing the dataset form a potential of 1946 to 1851; 
attendance only contains paying visitors; also includes 
seasonal uncertainty 
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Pawlowski and Anders 
(2012) 
Germany-1 2005/06 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Theil-index 
2) Home favorite, dummy 
indicating if home team win 
probability is greater than 
away team win probability 
1) No 
2) No 
Also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Pawlowski (2013) Germany-1 Survey in 
2011/2012 
Degree of CB 
(Competitive Balance) 
1) Final outcome is unclear 
and home and away team 
have equal winning 
probabilities 
1) Yes Use of survey data; results suggest that UO matters, but 
improving competitive balance would not increase demand; 
also includes seasonal uncertainty 
Buraimo and Simmons 
(2015) 
England-1 2000/01 – 
2007/08 
Log of TV audience 1) Combined points per game 
2) Difference in teams’ 






Match uncertainty is also measured for single seasons; 
partial indicates that it is only significant for the first two 









2012/13 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Theil-index, also squared 1) Partial Quantile regression technique is used on a pooled dataset; 
partial support for UOH here indicates that it was found for 
high demand games only 
Cox (2015) England-1 2004/05 – 
2011/12 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
Log of TV audience 
 
1) Home win probability, also 
squared 
2) Eight different dummies 
that represent home win 
probabilities 
3) Probability of a draw 
4) Absolute difference in 
home team win probability 










Both ‘yes’ are based on the results for TV audience 












2) Home favourite, dummy 
indicating if home team win 
probability is greater than 
away team win probability 









Also includes seasonal uncertainty 







Attendance and time of 
entrance 
 
1) Theil-index, also squared 






13,892 STH (season ticket holders) 
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3) Home favorite, dummy 
indicating if home team win 
probability is greater than 
away team win probability 
4) ROY; Theil-index without 
probability for a draw 
5) Absolute difference in 
home team win probability 
and away team win 
probability 
6) Absolute difference in 
league rank 
7) Difference in in-season 
points per game between 






























Survey took place prior to the 10th and 27th Bundesliga 
matches; perceived game uncertainty coincides with match 
uncertainty measures commonly used 
Note: * indicates this indicator actually measures team quality instead of uncertainty  
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Table C2: Overview of studies with seasonal uncertainty 
Seasonal uncertainty Country-
Division 
Seasons Dependent Variable Seasonal Uncertainty UOH Comment 
Jennett (1984) Scotland-1 1975/76 – 
1980/81 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Championship significance home team, still able to 
win, increasing throughout season 
2) Championship significance away team, still able to 
win, increasing throughout season 
3) Relegation significance, still able to avoid, 






Jennett describes these significance 
variables as measures of short term 
uncertainty 




1) Championship contention measured by dummy 
variable, still able to win 
1) Yes Separate analyses for a selection of three 
teams; also included match uncertainty 
Janssens and Késenne 
(1987) 
Belgium-1 1982/83 Match-day stadium 
attendance 
1) Championship significance home team; own 
measure 





Also includes match uncertainty; 
measure of seasonal uncertainty is a 
variant to Jennett’s measure 
Dobson and Goddard 
(1992) 
England-1/4 1989/90 – 
1990/91 




1) Championship/promotion significance home team, 
still able to win, increasing throughout season 
(logarithm) 
2) Championship/promotion significance away team, 






Analyses based on a set of clubs that 
(were able to) provide survey 
information; also includes match 
uncertainty; Jennett’s measures adapted 
Wilson and Sim (1995) Malysia-1/2 1989/90 – 
1991/92 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Championship significance home team, still able to 
win, increasing throughout season 
2) Championship significance away team, still able to 




Non-paying spectators and season ticket 
holders are excluded from the analyses; 
also includes match uncertainty; Jennett’s 
measure 
Baimbridge, Cameron 
and Dawson (1996) 
England-1 1993/94 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Championship significance indicated by dummy if 
both teams are ranked in the top four 
2) Relegation significance indicated by dummy if 
both teams are ranked in the bottom four 






Also includes match uncertainty; the 
trend variables are argued to capture 
seasonal uncertainty, but also some other 
aspects such as seasonal weather 
conditions  
Baimbridge (1997) EURO 96 1996 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
Log of stadium 
capacity utilization 
1) Match significance measured by the mean of 
winning probabilities 




Also includes match uncertainty 
Kuypers (1997) England-1 1993/94 Match-day stadium 
attendance 
Proportion of Sky 
subscribers 
1) Championship significance; measured by own 
indicator 





Also includes match uncertainty; 
measure of seasonal uncertainty includes 
components of the number of points 
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behind the leader and the remaining 
number of matches 
Falter and Perignon 
(2000) 
France-1 1997/98 – 
1998/99 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 





Also includes match uncertainty; 
seasonal uncertainty measured as 
dummies for summer, autumn and 
winter, spring being the reference, these 
dummies measure more than uncertainty 
Czarnitzki and Stadtmann 
(2002) 




1) Championship significance home team, still able to 
win 






Also includes match uncertainty; 
seasonal uncertainty as measured by 
Janssens and Késenne (1987) 
García and Rodírguez 
(2002) 
Spain-1 1992/93 – 
1995/96 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Championship significance of home team, 
measured as the product of the number of points 
behind the leader and the number of games left before 
championship is decided, being zero in case the 
championship is decided 
1) Yes Attendance is measured as tickets sold, 
excluding children and season tickets; 
also includes match uncertainty; seasonal 
uncertainty is measured by an indicator 
of Kuypers (1997) 
Forrest, Simmons and 
Buraimo (2005) 
England-1 1993/94 – 
2001/02 
Log of TV audience 1) Set of dummies indicating whether a match is 
important for some end-of-season achievement  
1) Yes First round of season is excluded; use 
pre- and post-Boxing Day period, also 
includes match uncertainty 
Forrest and Simmons 
(2006) 
England-2/4 1999/00 – 
2001/02 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Promotion contention dummies interacted with 
month dummies  
1) Yes 
 
The first three home fixtures for each 
team are excluded, separate results for 
the three divisions, this measure is not 
documented as seasonal uncertainty by 
the authors, also includes match 
uncertainty 
Bojke (2007) England-2 2000/01 Match-day stadium 
attendance 
1) Promotion probability; own measure 1) Yes Also includes match uncertainty; own 
measure of promotion probabilities 
simulated with match level bookmaker 
odds 
Madalozzo and Villar 
(2009) 
Brazil-1 2003-2006 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Chance of being league leader 
2) Chance of going to the Libertadores Cup 
3) Chance of leaving relegation zone 






Due to various reasons, some matches 
are excluded, reducing the dataset form a 
potential of 1946 to 1851; attendance 
only contains paying visitors; also 
includes match uncertainty 
       
Pawlowski and Anders 
(2012) 
Germany-1 2005/06 Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Championship significance home team, still able to 




Also includes match uncertainty; 
seasonal uncertainty as measured by 
Jannens and Késenne (1987)  
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2) Championship significance away team, still able to 
win, increasing throughout season 
3) Champions League significance home team, still 
able to qualify, increasing throughout season 
4) Champions League significance away team, still 






Pawlowski (2013) Germany-1 Survey in 
2011/2012 
Degree of CB 
(Competitive Balance) 
1) Championship, Champions League, Europa 
League and relegation contentions are exiting 
1) Yes Use of survey data; results suggest that 
UO matters, but improving balance 
would not increase demand; also includes 
match uncertainty 
Buraimo and Simmons 
(2015) 
England-1 2000/01 – 
2007/08 
Log of TV audience 1) Championship contention, good opportunity to win 
2) Contention for qualification for European football, 
good opportunity to qualify 





Contention is measured as: dummy 
indicating that in order to achieve result, 
all remaining games are won and all 
other teams draw, for relegation if all 
other teams win and the selected team 
draw; also includes match uncertainty 
Martins and Cró (2016) Portugal-1 2010/11 – 
2014/15 
Log of match-day 
stadium attendance 
1) Championship significance home team, still able to 
win, increasing throughout season 
2) Championship significance away team, still able to 
win, increasing throughout season 
3) Champions League significance home team, still 
able to qualify, increasing throughout season 
4) Champions League significance away team, still 
able to qualify, increasing throughout season 
5) Cumulative changes in rank order 
6) Rank order changes 













Also includes match uncertainty 
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Appendix D: Alternative baseline result 
 
 
Table D1: Baseline results with Theil and PPG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Derby 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Weekday -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Temperature -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.005* -0.009*** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Precipitation -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Odd-Surprise Team/100 0.281*** 0.232*** 0.250*** 0.377*** 0.284*** 0.297*** 
 (0.076) (0.073) (0.073) (0.077) (0.075) (0.074) 
Odd-Surprise Opponent/100  0.082** 0.084***  0.033 0.045 
  (0.033) (0.030)  (0.035) (0.032) 
Quality Team/100 0.059 0.270* 0.248* 0.068 0.265* 0.238* 
 (0.147) (0.138) (0.136) (0.143) (0.139) (0.136) 
Quality Opponent/100  0.303*** 0.077***  0.284*** 0.055** 
  (0.017) (0.027)  (0.016) (0.026) 
Theil 0.010 -0.096*** -0.038**    
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.018)    
PPG    -0.026*** -0.004 -0.008*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Championship 0.037 0.018 0.008 0.036 0.011 0.005 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) 
UEFA Champions League 0.059 0.054 0.067* 0.054 0.057 0.067* 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) 
UEFA Europa League 0.102*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
Relegation 0.161*** 0.171*** 0.165*** 0.158*** 0.170*** 0.163*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
       
Opponent FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Note: Tobit regression with attendance rate as dependent variable and with the upper limit set at 0.95. All estimates in models (1)-(3) 
contain 4,586 observations (1,890 censored), all estimates in models (4)-(6) contain 4,588 observations (1,891 censored). All models 
contain 270 club-season fixed effects and robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by club-season. Odd-Surprise Team, Odd-
Surprise Opponent, Quality Team and Quality Opponent are divided by 100; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
      
  




      
  




Selection of top-level talent and the relative age effect: a study 




The labour market for top-level talents is characterized by a high degree of competition between the 
candidates. On the one hand, positions where highly talented people are needed are scarce. On the 
other hand, it is reasonable to assume that many people want to be in such a position, since rewards 
are high. In business, this holds for the position of, for example, a CEO. In sports, one can think of 
professional players. Since it is in the interest of organizations to find the most talented people for 
these key positions, it is important that the selection system for talent functions properly. However, 
evidence exists that selection of talent can be far from optimal. One phenomenon that points at a 
distortion of the selection system for talent is the Relative Age Effect (RAE). Relative age differences 
between people arise, because they are grouped together based on birth dates and groups, in general, 
cover a full year. Furthermore, the groups are separated by a cut-off date such as in school grades and 
sports teams. The RAE implies, that the relative age differences between people result in the 
overrepresentation of peers that are born close to the cut-off date and, therefore, experience a relative 
age-advantage. Someone who has been born just posterior to the cut-off date is early-born and 
relatively old compared to someone in the same group, who has been born just prior to the cut-off 
date. Especially at young ages, the relative age differences can be quite substantial. In many 
situations, there is an advantage of being relatively old, for example, because of superior physical and 
cognitive development. This advantage generally results in superior current performances. If 
selection systems for talent are unable to incorporate good predictions of future or potential 
performances, the focus lies on these current performances. Then, an overrepresentation of the age-
advantaged peers (i.e. an RAE) is likely to occur. 
In sports, such an overrepresentation could be the result of rational choices made by coaches. They 
are often former (professional) players themselves and motivated and trained to win matches. 
Furthermore, extensions of employment contracts may depend on team performances. This serves as 
an external motivational factor for winning. It seems reasonable that winning can best be achieved 
by picking the best current players, who are not necessarily the most talented ones. Assuming that 
coaches also care about the development of talent, they experience a conflict in goals. As far as 
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winning is the dominant driver, the occurrence of the RAE may be the result of rational choices. 
However, club officials generally state that talent selection and development matter most within youth 
academies and should have the focus of coaches. Still, in the press, journalists and pundits often use 
the focus on winning matches as an argument why youth talent does not develop as it should be. 
A few problems are related to relative age effects. First, talent is generally assumed to be uniformly 
distributed across birth dates. An overrepresentation of age-advantaged people means that some less 
talented persons are selected in favour of more talented, but age-disadvantaged, peers. Furthermore, 
many selection systems already start at young ages, when relative age differences are large. This is 
typically the case in sports. Consequently, the age-advantaged peers that have been selected, are 
provided with better facilities and support to practice and to develop skills. For example, by 
participation in talent development programs in sports, or specifically in football, by participation in 
the youth academies of professional clubs. Since the age-disadvantaged, but equally talented, people 
are not selected, they will never receive equal opportunities to develop, compared to their age-
advantaged peers. No extra support is given and, as a consequence, they might never reach superior 
performance levels at older ages. However, this might have been possible with such extra support and 
given their initial talent. Thus, this talent is lost, because the selection system is not able to correctly 
incorporate relative age differences. 
Many previous studies have looked at the RAE. This literature will be discussed in the next sections. 
In general, it is found to be persistent across different domains, such as school systems and sports. 
The area of sports is popular among scholars, because data is rather easily available and rules and 
regulations regarding group compositions and cut-off dates are clearly defined. Furthermore, since 
professional sports is an interesting industry in itself, it is important to understand how talent selection 
works and how this can be improved. 
In this study, I use data from elite youth football. More specifically, I use data from the youth academy 
of PSV Eindhoven (PSV), which is one of the top clubs in Dutch professional football. The main aim 
of the academy is to develop individual talent, as can be found in the mission statement of the youth 
academy.1 The dataset contains all players who have been born in 1988 or later and were active in 
the academy for at least one season. In Dutch football, the relevant cut-off date is January 1, thus 
children are grouped together by calendar year. First, I use some descriptive statistics and a χ2-
Goodness-of-fit-test to show the persistence of the overrepresentation of players who are born in the 
first part of the year, i.e. the presence of an RAE. I use birth quarters as well as birth semesters for 
                                                 
1 http://www.psv.nl/jeugd/opleiding/missie.htm; Dutch only. Retrieved November 2017.  
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this. Then, I make a distinction between external selection and internal selection. External selection 
deals with the recruitment of players from outside of the academy. Internal selection is focused on 
the annual decision whether players can stay within the academy or have to leave the academy. Since 
I have data on the full playing histories within the academy of all players, I can study these decisions 
quite accurately. The main difference between the types of selection, is the intensity with which 
players are observed prior to the decision to select. External selection is based on scouting reports 
and a rather low number of observations. In particular, these observations include current 
performances. Internal selection is based on a high number of (almost daily) observations. This high 
number of observations reduces the variation that makes the prediction of (potential) talent more 
accurate. In general, one may assume that external selection contributes to the RAE, while internal 
selection does not contribute, or even reduces the severity of the RAE. Descriptive statistics are in 
line with both assumptions. Furthermore, a linear probability model reveals that early-born players 
have a higher probability to leave the academy, compared to their late-born peers. However, the 
reduction of the number of these early-born players that results from this internal selection, is not 
large enough to overcome the biased birth-date distribution that results from external selection. 
Finally, I investigate whether there is a difference in the probability of becoming a professional 
football player between early-born players and their late-born peers. Based on a linear probability 
model, I find that, for players aged 19, the late-born players have a higher probability to become a 
professional. Furthermore, it also follows that the majority of professionals is born in the first part of 
the year. Combined, these results suggest that the selection system only picks the highly talented late-
born players. It also suggests that some late-born players are not selected, although they are more 
talented than some of their early-born peers, who have been selected. 
Although a study on the RAE within elite youth football is not necessarily new, the dataset that I use 
is rather unique. It allows me to investigate the persistence of the RAE within the youth academy of 
a top club within the Netherlands. Furthermore, since the playing histories within the academy are 
included, it makes the distinction between external and internal selection possible. The results for 
internal selection provide new insights, which have not been discussed by previous studies. Finally, 
my analysis on the difference in probability to become a professional football player between early-
born players and late-born peers, reveals the consequence of the biased selection system in elite youth 
football. This adds to the discussion on the loss of talent. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief discussion on talent 
selection, identification and development. Next, in section 4.3, some previous literature on the RAE 
is discussed, while section 4.4 describes the data that is used. Section 4.5 presents the results on the 
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RAE. Section 4.6 shows the results on the difference between external and internal selection 
mechanisms. In section 4.7, the relation between birth semester and the probability to become a 
professional football player is discussed. Section 4.8 presents a discussion, with separate subsections 
on some assumptions made and on the generalizability of results. Finally, section 4.9 concludes. 
 
4.2 Talent selection, identification and development 
Talent selection, identification and development covers a wide range of aspects. Rees et al. (2016) 
provide a recent overview of almost 300 studies in which they distinguish between three main 
elements. These are the performer, the environment and practice and training. For each element, 
several topics are discussed. One of these topics is birthdate, which relates to the RAE. Their 
recommendation for practitioners and policy makers is that RAEs should not be used in talent 
selection. Furthermore, the environment should be structured such that the negative effects of relative 
age are limited. Overall, based on their evaluation of all topics, they conclude that many aspects 
matter for talent selection, identification and development, probably in an interactive way. In this 
section, I will briefly discuss only a limited number of these aspects and studies. In doing so, I follow 
the development over time of the way in which scholars have been thinking about talent. For a 
comprehensive discussion, I refer to an academic review by Abbott et al. (2002) and the review article 
by Rees et al. (2016). 
For a long time, talent was assumed to be innate and genetically determined. This nature-based view 
suggests that nurture (i.e. things like practice and the environment) is of little importance for obtaining 
expertise. This changed after the seminal work by Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Römer (1993) on the 
role of deliberate practice (DP) for the acquisition of elite levels of performance. Deliberate practice 
is effortful, but not necessarily enjoyable. Someone should be motivated to conduct a lot this practice 
to become an expert. Based on data for musicians, the authors show that the amount of DP determines 
whether someone becomes an elite performer. In general, it will take about ten years of such practice 
to achieve expert levels (Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Römer, 1993). Since this coincides with about 
10,000 hours, this has become known as the ‘10,000 hour rule’, which, amongst others, is also found 
for chess (Simon and Chase, 1973) and is referred to in more popular books as well (e.g. Gladwell, 
2008). In line with the results of Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Römer (1993), Howe, Davidson and 
Sloboda (1998) question the role of innate talent and argue that early signs of expertise result from 
early experiences and opportunities to learn. Furthermore, they conclude that a sufficient amount of 
practice is needed to achieve expert performance levels. 
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There is evidence that suggests that genetics play a role in obtaining elite performances (Rees et al., 
2016). However, nowadays, most people are convinced of the importance of practice as well. 
Therefore, scholars have been applying the concept of deliberate practice to sports. For example, 
Ward et al. (2007) investigate the role of DP in English youth football, while Helsen et al. (2000) 
specifically discuss the role of DP in youth football, acknowledging that an RAE is present there. In 
general, the results are similar to those of Ericsson, Krampe and Tesch-Römer (1993). However, in 
contrast, practice in sports, and more specifically, in team sports, is often enjoyed by the participants. 
Furthermore, the development of abilities and skills may take place during playful activities that are 
not necessarily structured as practice (Rees et al., 2016). Over time, it has been argued that several 
additional elements are relevant within the framework of DP. For example, Cumming and Hall (2002) 
discuss the role of deliberate imagery practice and find this to be important for elite performances. 
Although the DP framework has appealing elements and deliberate practice is found to be relevant 
for expertise, some concerns are raised. The framework assumes domain-specific and monotonic 
benefits. Simonton (1999), amongst others, suggests that this is not necessarily the case and 
formulates a model in which (innate) talent is multidimensional, multiplicative and dynamic. 
Although he acknowledges the importance of environmental factors and deliberate practice, his model 
assumes that talent is also relevant for the development of expertise. In contrast to the DP framework, 
the dynamic component in Simonton’s model allows for early bloomers and late bloomers, as well as 
for the loss of talent. Furthermore, since talent develops in a person- and domain-specific way, an 
individual’s optimal domain may change over time. In that respect, scholars have started to think of 
talent in a more multidimensional, multiplicative and dynamic way. Examples include Williams and 
Reilly (2000) and Abbott and Collins (2004). Williams and Reilly (2000) formulate a theoretical 
model for talent identification and development in (male) football. They distinguish between talent 
detection (of potential performers), talent identification (of elite performers), talent development (via 
suitable opportunities and learning environments) and talent selection (which is an ongoing process 
of picking the best players). Furthermore, the authors argue that multiple elements are relevant for 
the prediction of talent, which include sociological, physical, physiological and psychological 
aspects. Abbott and Collins (2004) stress the importance of the psychological elements. They suggest 
that talent identification and development should be focused on an individual’s progression instead 
of early identification that is based on a low number of observations (as is the case with scouting in 
football). If sufficient opportunities are provided, motivation and self-regulatory learning strategies 
will guide the development of performances (Abbott and Collins, 2004). Empirical evidence from 
elite Dutch youth football supports the idea that self-regulatory strategies and performance levels are 
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positively related (Toering et al., 2009). Furthermore, Toering et al. (2011) use relative age as a 
moderator variable, which does not affect the positive relation and, therefore, may serve as a useful 
measure in talent identification. 
Although the previous paragraph shows that, over time, talent has been viewed as dynamic and 
multidimensional, Vaeyens et al. (2008) argue that a theoretical framework was missing. They 
criticize cross-sectional models of talent identification and development, since these do not correctly 
incorporate the dynamic and multidimensional aspects. A skewed birth-date distribution and the 
missing of late bloomers are problems that result from these models. Improvements could be made 
through a distinction between potential and performance, while accounting for all possible 
determinants of talent. Vaeyens et al. (2008) suggest that the Differentiated Model of Giftedness and 
Talent (DMGT) may be useful in that respect. This model was initially formulated by Gagné (1993) 
in the domain of education and has been adapted multiple times (e.g. Gagné, 2004; Gagné, 2010). In 
general, the model distinguishes between natural gifts (giftedness) and an end-product of 
development (talent) and is used as such in a sports context by Vaeyens et al. (2008). Many aspects 
are included in an interactive way, so that it accounts for the multidimensional and dynamic elements 
of talent. As such, it allows for the evaluation of progression instead of performance. A full discussion 
of the model is beyond the scope of this paper. My conclusion is that it seems to be a useful theoretical 
tool to think about talent identification and talent development. 
 
4.3 Related literature on the RAE 
As mentioned in the introduction, many different topics have been related to RAEs. These include 
school systems and academic achievements (e.g. Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Plug, 2001) and high 
school leadership (Dhuey and Lipscomb, 2008). Furthermore, the RAE is studied in relation to the 
development of self-esteem (Thompson, Barnsley and Battle, 2004) and youth suicide rates 
(Thompson, Barnsley and Dyck, 1999). The focus in this section will be on previous studies that 
investigate the RAE in a sports context. An overview is given by Musch and Grondin (2001), while 
Cobley et al. (2009) provide a meta-analytical review. Furthermore, Wattie, Schorer and Baker (2015) 
review previous studies and propose a constrained-based theoretical framework that relates to the 
RAE. In general, a skewed birth-date distribution is found in favour of the relative age-advantaged 
peers. This result is not necessarily the same for both genders, but I neglect this difference in this 
section and do not separately discuss males and females. 
The first to study the RAE in sports are Grondin et al. (1984) and Barnsley, Thompson and Barnsley 
(1985). Grondin et al. (1984) find an overrepresentation of age-advantaged players for different levels 
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of Canadian ice hockey. For volleyball, this is only visible for the elite level. Barnsley, Thompson 
and Barnsley (1985) only investigate the elite adolescent and elite senior levels of Canadian ice 
hockey and find and overrepresentation of the early-born players. Furthermore, in a follow-up study, 
Barnsley and Thompson (1988) reveal that this is also the case for junior divisions. After these initial 
studies, many contributions followed that use data on ice hockey and find an RAE (e.g. Sherar et al., 
2007; Addona and Yates, 2010 and Nolan and Howell, 2010). Furthermore, an RAE is found in 
baseball (Barnsley, Thompson and Stebelsky, 1991), basketball (Hoare, 2000), swimming and tennis 
(Baxter-Jones et al., 1995), rugby (McCarthy and Collins, 2014; McCarthy, Collins and Court, 2016), 
cricket (McCarthy, Collins and Court, 2016) and in combat sports (Albuquerque et al., 2016). 
However, no RAE was found for gymnastics (Baxter-Jones et al., 1995) and dancing (Van Rossum, 
2006), while an RAE is only found for a few male age categories in the shooting sport (Delorme and 
Raspaud, 2009). Of main interest to the present study, is the vast amount of research that has been 
conducted in football (e.g. Verhulst, 1992; Dudink, 1994; Baxter-Jones et al., 1995; Helsen, Starkes 
and Van Winckel, 1998; Musch and Hay, 1999; Helsen, Starks and Van Winckel, 2000; Helsen et 
al., 2000; Simmons and Paull, 2001; Helsen, Van Winckel and Williams, 2005; Vaeyens, Philippaerts 
and Malina, 2005; Vincent and Glamser, 2006; Ashworth and Heyndels, 2007; Jiménez and Pain, 
2008; Delorme, Boiché and Raspaud, 2010; Augste and Lames, 2011; Krikendall, 2014; Doyle, 
Bottomley and Angell, 2017; Mann and Van Ginneken, 2017). An RAE is generally found to be 
present. Furthermore, Helsen et al. (2012) document that ten years of research have not changed the 
occurrence or severity of the RAE in European professional football. 
Besides studying the existence of RAEs, scholars have been interested in the reasons and mechanisms 
for it to arise. In general, the organisational structure of competitive sports and the use of a cut-off 
date for age groups, are seen as main elements in that respect. There is direct evidence that suggests 
that the cut-off date indeed is important for the RAE to occur. This evidence is based on the shift in 
cut-off date in 1997 in football. Musch and Hay (1999) show, for Australian football, that the 
overrepresentation of players changes in line with the change in cut-off date, from August 1 to January 
1. A similar result is found for Belgian football by Helsen, Starks and Van Winckel (2000) and Helsen 
et al. (2000). Furthermore, Simmons and Paull (2001) show that the difference in birth-date 
distributions between samples for English and UEFA youth selections, corresponds with the 
difference in cut-off date. For the sample of English players, this is September 1, while for the sample 
of UEFA selections, this is January 1. 
Although the cut-off date is an important organisational element for the occurrence of the RAE, at 
least within football, it has no direct effect on the selection of players. Therefore, it seems likely that 
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the grouping of players by age that results from the use of a cut-off date, provides the early-born 
players with an advantage. In particular, this advantage might be a physical advantage that early-born 
players have over their relatively younger peers (e.g. Musch and Grondin, 2001; Cobley et al. 2009). 
Sherar et al. (2007) provide evidence, based on Canadian junior ice hockey selections, in support of 
this assumption. Other, more indirect evidence of the importance of physical development, comes 
from sports in which such development is not necessarily an advantage. For example, Baxter-Jones 
et al. (1995) do not find an RAE in gymnastics. Furthermore, Van Rossum (2006) does not find an 
RAE for dancing and argues that this is not surprising, since technical skills are more important than 
physical development. Finally, Delorme and Raspaud (2009) only find an RAE for a few male age 
categories in the French shooting sport. They argue that in this sport, concentration is more important 
than physical development. Although direct evidence is missing for football, it is comparable to ice 
hockey in terms of physical intensity. Thus, the above suggests that, within football, physical 
development (i.e. early maturation) results in an advantage at early ages. Over time, this physical 
advantage will reduce, since almost everyone will mature. For that reason, one may expect a decrease 
of the overrepresentation of age-advantaged players over time. However, Cobley et al. (2009), for 
example, find an increase up to the ages of adolescence, while a decrease at adult ages. The increase 
at junior ages is in line with higher drop-out rates of late-born players in football (Helsen, Starkes and 
Van Winckel, 1998). For the decrease of the overrepresentation at adult ages, Cobley et al. (2009) 
give three potential reasons. First, players may change their sport. Second, early-born players will 
resign from the sport at an earlier age, because of an injury as a result of overtraining in talent 
development programs. Third, as discussed, the physical advantage of early-born players may 
disappear. 
A further element that is related to the occurrence of an RAE is the amount of competition within a 
given sport. Musch and Grondin (2001) argue that RAEs are expected to be larger within sports where 
competition is large. With a simple example they explain that, if the number of available spots in a 
team is equal to the number of applicants, no selection takes place and, thus, there is no reason for an 
RAE to occur. In general, the amount of competition is measured by playing level (i.e. non-elite vs. 
elite) and the popularity of the sport. Since football is very popular (at least in Europe) and given the 
severe RAEs that are found within football, Musch and Grondin (2001) see this as evidence in favour 
of the assumption that the degree of competition matters. 
So far, the discussion of previous studies reveals that talent selection and the organisational structure 
of competitive sports, favours age-advantaged players. In addition, Augste and Lames (2011) suggest 
that playing with an, on average, older team, is beneficial for team success in elite German youth 
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football. However, their results reveal a rather high amount of variation and heterogeneity between 
teams, from which they conclude that a high relative age is not a necessity to compete in the top of 
these youth competitions. Furthermore, Kirkendall (2014) suggests that the RAE has no influence on 
match outcomes in US youth football. This means that there is no reason not to play with late-born 
players. Although still limited, there is also evidence of a reversal of the RAE, i.e. late-born players 
are better off than their early-born peers at adult ages. Recent examples are McCarty and Collins 
(2014) for rugby and McCarty, Collins and Court (2016) for rugby and cricket. Both studies find an 
overrepresentation of early-born players at elite junior levels. However, at senior ages, the conversion 
rate into professionalism is higher for the age-disadvantaged players. Moreover, Ashworth and 
Heyndels (2007) find that the salaries within German Bundesliga football are higher for the late-born 
players. Although Furley, Memmert and Weigelt (2016) find that the market values are higher for 
early-born players (based on a sample of the 100 most valuable football players according to CIES 
2015) there seem to be benefits for the age-disadvantaged players who enter the talent selection and 
development process at junior levels. Of course, this may reflect their initial high potential and talent. 
Without this, they may never have been selected in the first place. 
Despite the positive outcome for the few highly talented late-born players, the RAE generally results 
in a waste of talent. Doyle, Bottomley and Angell (2017) show that the waste of talent is substantial 
and they estimate it to be 57 percent for English Premier League youth teams. Thus, this suggests that 
there is plenty of reason to think of remedies to this problem. Musch and Grondin (2001) discuss the 
possibility of classifications that are based on biological age, such as weights. Furthermore, they 
propose a classification that is based on chronical age and a rotation of the relative age advantage. 
This may result from an annual shift in the cut-off date, by, for example, three months. A different 
solution they discuss is to use multiple squads that are based on multiple standards. In this situation, 
players may stay on a lower level if they do not yet meet certain criteria, while their age prescribes to 
continue. Finally, they point out the importance to warn practitioners for the RAE. Except for this 
last suggestion, which seems to be a good idea anyway, these solutions are rather difficult to 
implement, especially for team sports. Furthermore, they may have unwanted consequences outside 
of the sports. For example, at a young age, it may be better for the development of children not to 
separate them from their friends. Implementing age quotas is an easy solution to the RAE as well 
(e.g. Barnsley and Thompson, 1988) but is never tested and contradicts with the idea that experts (i.e. 
scouts and coaches) are able to detect potential and talent. In that respect, a recent experiment by 
Mann and Van Ginneken (2017) provides some interesting results. They show that scouts are able to 
incorporate relative age differences in their evaluations of playing talent, if the information on relative 
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age is presented to them appropriately. No improvement was found when birth dates of players were 
given. However, in the situation that the shirt numbering represented the relative age differences 
between players, the RAE was reduced. Of particular interest is that the scouts that participated in the 
experiment, were all active at PSV. Out of 25 scouts, 22 said to be familiar with the RAE prior to the 
experiment (Mann and Van Ginneken, 2017). Furthermore, Art Langeler, the head of the youth 
academy between July 2013 and June 2017, said in an interview with a local newspaper2 that PSV is 
familiar with the problems that arise as a result of the RAE. Therefore, they specifically take it into 
account within their selection system. Thus, PSV seems interested in improvements of their talent 
selection. In the rest of this paper, we will see how well the scouts did over the past two decades. 
Given that the RAE and the consequence of a loss of talent is a known phenomenon, one would think 
that the RAE is small within the academy. However, although familiarity exists, their might always 
be an implicit focus on current performances. 
 
4.4 Data 
The data comes from the youth academy of PSV and is available on the internet via 
www.psv.nl/jeugd.3 The youth archive contains all players who have been active in the youth 
academy as of the 1996/97 season up to and including the 2016/17 season. In total, the dataset 
contains 860 players. Since information for players who were active in the earlier seasons is 
incomplete, in particular concerning the time that someone entered the academy, I will only consider 
the players who were born in 1988 or later. In doing so, I leave out all selections that might have been 
influenced by the shift in cut-off date in the season 1997.4 In total, the dataset contains 553 player-
observations.5 For all these players, a birthdate is available as well as their whole playing history 
within the youth academy of PSV. Thus, I have data on the time that someone entered the academy, 
when he left the academy (if applicable) and, for each season, in which team he played. Furthermore, 
I know the nationality of the player and whether someone is a goalkeeper (unknown for 6 players 
who are born in 1988). 
                                                 
2 Eindhovens Dagblad, 15 July 2015; in Dutch. 
3 In fact, all data used to be available on www.psvjeugd.nl until the beginning of 2017. Since the data was collected prior 
to the change in website, this actually is the main source. Although some differences exist, especially in the way things 
are presented, most information has remained unchanged. 
4 During that season, the cut-off date changed from August 1 to January 1, as described in more detail in the previous 
section. 
5 One player left the academy at some point in time, but returned a few years later. This player is considered as a new 
player-observation when he returned. 
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The rules regarding age categories and the corresponding cut-off dates are set by the FIFA and the 
KNVB and prescribe in which team someone is allowed to play. Someone is not allowed to play in a 
lower age category, i.e. with younger players, while there is no problem to play in a higher age 
category, i.e. with older peers.6 In general, players can be active within the youth academy between 
ages eight and 19. However, this differs between seasons, depending on the number of teams and age 
categories that are covered within the academy. Especially for the younger age groups, some changes 
were made in the number of teams throughout the sample period. Over time, some teams were added 
to the academy for players aged nine and 10. For the older age categories, some changes were made 
as well. For example, in some seasons there were two teams with players aged between 15 and 17, 
while in other seasons there was only one team. Naturally, these changes result in differences in the 
number of players that enter and leave the academy. However, these differences do not affect the 
analysis. 
 
Table 4.1: Overview of heads of the youth academy of PSV 
Name Nationality Start End 
Huub Stevens Dutch July 1986 March 1993 
Hans Westerhof Dutch July 1993 June 1994 
Frank Arnesen Danish July 1994 June 1996 
Tonny Bruins Slot Dutch July 1996 June 1998 
Remy Reijnierse Dutch July 1998 June 2001 
Fred Rutten Dutch July 2001 June 2002 
Pim Verbeek Dutch July 2002 June 2003 
Joop Brand Dutch July 2003 June 2006 
Edward Sturing Dutch July 2006 June 2008 
Wiljan Vloet Dutch July 2008 November 2009 
Jelle Goes Dutch December 2009 September 2012 
Art Langeler Dutch July 2013 June 2017 
Pascal Jansen Dutch July 2017  
 
Over time, several people have been in charge of the youth academy of PSV. An overview is given 
in Table 4.1. Most of them are former Dutch professional football players. In periods without an 
official head, the tasks were taken over by the management of the club. It seems reasonable that all 
had their own policy and preference for a certain organizational structure. However, I lack 
information on changes in policy during the sample period. In general, the youth academy has become 
more important for the club over time, given her ambitions and the financial differences between the 
Netherlands and other Europeans countries. Therefore, PSV states that she improved their youth 
                                                 
6 Age categories typically cover two calendar years and used to be denoted with the letters A (age 18 and 19; oldest group) 
through F (age eight and nine; youngest group). Furthermore, it is common to distinguish between first year players who 
play in a second team (e.g. C2) and second year players who play in a first team (e.g. C1). Currently, the categories are 
denoted with O19 (under nineteen) through O9 (under nine) and a difference can be made between every single calendar 
year.  
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policy as of July 2013, with a specific goal to increase the number of players that make it into the first 
team.7 In relation to the present study, I will provide some statistics in the next section that suggest 
that any policy change did not affect the persistence of the RAE within the academy. 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the number of players within the academy by team, age category 
and age. It follows that most players are active within their correct team, i.e. in the team that 
corresponds with their age. Note that these ages indicate that a player becomes this age in a given 
calendar year. Thus, the age of 16 indicates that the player turns 16 in the calendar year and is not 
aged like that at the start of the year. Only in three situations, a player was active in a lower team. 
Two times, a player was selected for the D2 instead of the D1, while once a player was active within 
the C2 instead of the C1. Furthermore, it appears to be rather uncommon to play in an older team, 
while it is even more uncommon for junior players to play for one of the senior teams. Finally, on a 
few occasions a player went on loan to a another club. Note that a single player is counted for each 
season that he is active within the academy. In total, the 553 player-observations, result in 2,410 
player-team observations. Since the players who are promoted to one of the senior teams, in fact leave 
the academy, I exclude the 49 observations for Young PSV and First team PSV in (most of) the 
analysis. 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of players between team and age 
Age category F E D C B A  
Team/Age 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total 
Younger team      2  1     3 
Correct team  140 211 259 282 274 258 237 195 144 126 84 2,210 
Older team 14 7 10 14 12 10 12 8 13 29  1 130 
Young PSV          1 8 28 37 
First team PSV           4 8 12 
On Loan   2   3 1 3 7 1  1 18 
Total 14 147 223 273 294 289 271 249 215 175 138 122 2,410 
Note: Most players play in their correct team, i.e. the team that corresponds with their age. Younger team means that someone is playing 
in a lower that than would be expected given his age (e.g. C2 instead of C1). Older team means that someone is paying in an older-age 
team within the academy. Youth means that someone has an age to play in the academy, but is part of ‘Young PSV’ (senior). First 
means that someone has an age to play in the academy, but is part of the First team of PSV (senior). On loan means that someone is on 
loan to another club. 
 
Leaving out these observations results in 530 players. Table 4.3 shows to which age cohort (i.e. birth 
year) these players belong. In total, 21 different age cohorts are covered. The final column gives, for 
each cohort, the total number of players that have been active in the academy. Thus, 30 in the first 
row indicates that 30 different players, all born in 1988, have been active for at least one season in 
the academy. Furthermore, the table provides information, per age cohort, on the number of players 
                                                 
7 Mission statement on the website of the youth academy (http://www.psv.nl/jeugd/opleiding/missie.htm; Dutch only). 
Retrieved November 2017.  
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that were playing for PSV at a certain age. For example, for the 1988 cohort, the value 13 for age 17 
indicates that, at this age, there were 13 players active in the academy that were born in 1988. It 
follows that the majority of observations concentrates around the ages 11 up to and including the age 
of 15. This results from the number of teams within these age groups, since for (almost all cohorts 
of) these age groups, a single team was available. In comparison, for the age category A only one 
team is available. Finally, Table 4.3 shows, given a certain birth year, the final age group that is 
included in the sample. Thus, for cohort 1999, no players have reached the age (group) of 19 yet. 
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of players between cohort and age 
Age category F E D C B A  
Cohort/Age 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 N. Player 
1988   2 7 18 18 16 17 18 13 9 7 30 
1989    15 19 17 17 19 13 13 7 8 33 
1990   2 13 14 18 18 16 15 11 8 6 34 
1991   1 13 13 16 16 16 12 10 8 8 26 
1992   10 15 17 16 17 13 14 12 8 8 29 
1993  1 11 14 16 17 14 14 9 9 7 3 24 
1994  1 12 15 17 20 19 15 13 14 13 8 29 
1995  1 10 15 15 18 17 18 19 16 12 10 27 
1996  10 16 16 16 16 17 18 21 15 11 8 36 
1997  10 16 17 17 16 19 20 21 17 15 12 36 
1998  9 17 16 16 18 17 15 10 12 11 8 27 
1999 2 8 14 15 14 15 14 16 19 18 17  29 
2000 3 13 17 18 19 18 17 15 14 14   30 
2001  16 20 17 17 16 17 17 17    27 
2002  15 16 16 16 17 19 20     27 
2003 2 17 18 17 17 17 17      29 
2004 1 15 17 16 15 16       21 
2005 2 15 15 18 18        19 
2006 1 9 9          9 
2007 2 7           7 
2008 1            1 
Total 14 147 223 273 294 289 271 249 215 174 126 86 530 
Note: N. Player gives the total number of players that belong to a cohort. In total, there are 530 players and 2,361 observations for 
which players are not in Young PSV and First team PSV. Players can only belong to one cohort, but can stay within the youth academy 
for multiple years. 
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Figure 4.1A: Birth-date distribution by quarter 
 
 
Figure 4.1B: Birth-date distribution by semester 
 
4.5 The RAE 
The RAE often is related to the biased selection of players at early ages. The recruitment of new 
players into the academy is necessary for the youngest age group, since a whole new team of players 
needs to be found. For the other youth teams, external selection is less urgent, but takes place in order 
to improve playing talent within the academy. Then, if playing talent is uniformly distributed across 
birth dates, one would expect a rather uniform distribution of birth dates within the academy as well. 
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The birth-date distributions are presented in Figures 4.1A, for birth quarters, and 4.1B, for birth 
semesters. The figures are comprised of the observations in Table 4.3. For both figures, a clear 
overrepresentation of early-born players is visible, i.e. players born relatively close to the cut-off date 
of January 1 are overrepresented. Although it follows from Figure 4.1A that the difference between 
the third and fourth quarter is rather small, we generally observe a declining pattern throughout the 
year. This typically points at an RAE that results from a selection system in favour of early-born 
players. 
 
Table 4.4: Birth-date distribution by quarter 
Quarter/Age 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total 
Q1 5 65 113 126 141 137 127 117 101 80 56 37 1,105 
Q2 6 50 61 81 81 85 77 67 65 55 38 25 691 
Q3 3 22 30 33 32 33 33 34 27 24 18 13 302 
Q4 0 10 19 33 40 34 34 31 22 15 14 11 263 
Total 14 147 223 273 294 289 271 249 215 174 126 86 2,361 
χ2 6 51.9 95 88 101 102 88 77 76 61 36 20 788 
p-value 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
To find out whether the RAE is persistent across ages, Table 4.4 gives the distribution of birth quarters 
for the different age groups. For all of them, an overrepresentation of early-born players is visible. 
With a χ2-Goodness-of-fit-test, I test whether the observed distribution is different from what may be 
expected in case selection is based on (perceived) talent and talent is uniformly distributed across 
birth-dates.8 Take the age of 17 as an example. The observed distribution by quarter is 80, 55, 24 and 
15, which sum up to 174. Under the assumption that talent is independent from birth-date and if the 
youth academy aims to attract and develop talent, we would expect an equal number of players from 
each birth quarter, i.e. 43.5.9 Taking the differences between observed numbers and expectations, 
results in the distribution 36.5, 11.5, -19.5 and -28.5. This indicates that more players than expected 
are born in the first two quarters of the year, while less than expected are born in the final two quarters. 
The χ2-test is able to reveal whether these differences are statistically significant. It follows from the 
last two rows of Table 4.3 that the differences are significant, except for age category 8, which suffers 
                                                 
8 For simplicity, I assumed that actual birth-rates are uniformly distributed (or more specifically, supply of players is 
uniformly distributed across birth-dates) which is common in this type of studies where multiple years are grouped 
together. As a check, I searched for actual birth-rates at Statistics Netherlands. They provide data on bird-rates per quarter 
as of the year 1995. Taking into account all births in the period 1995-2008, a total of 2,716,876 (including both boys and 
girls), I find the following birth-rates per quarter: 0.244 (Q1), 0.247 (Q2), 0.263 (Q3) and 0.246 (Q4). For semesters the 
rates are: 0.491 (H1) and 0.509 (H2). It follows that the differences are small, with a slightly higher share of births in the 
second part of the year. If any, this suggests that, under the assumption that talent is exogenous to birth dates and selection 
is based on talent, we would expect a slight overrepresentation of late born players. Thus, I think it is safe to assume a 
uniform birth-date distribution in my analysis. 
9 Naturally, a half person is impossible, but this mathematical result has no consequence for the statistical inferences. 
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from a low number of observations. In general, Table 4.4 reveals that the RAE is statistically 
significant and persistent across ages. 
 
Table 4.5: Birth-date distribution by semester 
Semester/Age 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total 
H1 11 115 174 207 222 222 204 184 166 135 94 62 1,796 
H2 3 32 49 66 72 67 67 65 49 39 32 24 565 
Total 14 147 223 273 294 289 271 249 215 174 126 86 2,361 
χ2 4.6 46.9 70 73 77 83 69 57 64 53 31 17 642 
p-value 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ratio 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.5 2.9 2.6 3.2 
 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the results in Table 4.5, where semesters are used instead of 
quarters. Again, the differences between the observed distributions and the expected number of 
players are significant, as follows from the results of the χ2-test statistic. Furthermore, the last row of 
Table 4.5 gives the ratio of the number of players born in the first semester and the number of players 
born in the second semester (i.e. H1/H2). This ratio serves as an indicator of the overrepresentation 
of early-born players. A value of one indicates an equal number of players. However, the ratios are 
all close to three, which suggest that the academy contains three times more early-born players than 
late-born peers. Figure 4.2 shows the development of the ratio for the different age groups. Rather 
high values are followed by a gradual decline. At the age of 16, the ratio increases again and remains 
rather high for the age of 17. Finally, it reaches the value of 2.6 for the players aged 19. In general, 
the pattern follows a downward trend. This points at a reduction of the overrepresentation of early-
born players and is in line with the deprecation of the physical advantage of these relative older peers. 
However, there is also a steep increase visible at the age of 16. This spike is at odds with the reduction 
of relative age differences over time, and therefore, does not fit within the framework of the RAE. It 
suggests an increased preference for early born players at the ages of 16 and 17 compared to both the 
age of 15 and 18. In search for an explanation, I find in Table 4.3 that the fluctuation in the number 
of players per age is rather high for the ages 16/17. This, at least partly, results from the changes in 
the number of teams within the academy over time (i.e. B1 and B2 vs. B1 only). Different selection 
procedures might arise with only one team compared to two. A further investigation reveals that at 
the age of 16, the fraction of early born players for the age cohorts 1988/1994 is 0.74 and does not 
differ much from the fraction for the other cohorts (0.79). For the age of 17 these fractions are 0.77 
and 0.78 respectively. Furthermore, they do not differ much from those for the age of 15 (0.70 and 
0.77) and the age of 18 (0.74 and 0.76). The difference in selection procedures, thus, does not seem 
to drive the spike and since I cannot think of an alternative explanation that fits with the data, the 
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increased preference for early born players remains unexplained in this study and something that 
might be clarified in discussion with staff members of the youth academy. In such discussions, one 
should note that the vertical axis in Figure 4.2 ranges between 2.5 and 4. The jump in the graph from 
age 15 (ratio of 2.8) to the age 16 (ratio of 3.4) is 0.6. This is an increase of about 21 percent. This 
might be quite substantial, but not as huge as the spike may suggest. In general, it should be noted 
that the overrepresentation of early born players, measured by the ratio H1/H2, remains well above 
unity. Thus, although the RAE decreases, it is persistent. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Ratio of players born in the first and second semester by age categories 
 
4.6 External and internal selection 
In the previous section, I showed that the RAE is persistent within the youth academy of PSV. 
Obviously, this results from the selection system that is applied. In general, and as discussed in the 
introduction, we can distinguish between two types of selection mechanisms. First, external selection 
deals with the recruitment of players from outside. Second, internal selection focusses on the players 
who are already active in the academy. In each season, the club can decide whether a player may stay 
or has to leave the club. In this section, I investigate how both types of selection relate to the 
occurrence and persistence of the RAE. 
Assume that talent is uniformly distributed. Then, an overrepresentation of early-born players suggest 
that some relatively untalented age-advantaged players are selected in favour of some more talented 
age-disadvantaged peers. This may result from external selection, where talent has to be inferred, 
based on a rather low number of observations. In contrast, for internal selection, daily observations 
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should result in a rather accurate idea of a player’s talent, since the development of skills and 
performances can be monitored more easily. In that sense, it may be expected that the 
overrepresentation of early-born players, as results from external selection, is reduced by the internal 
selection mechanism. 
 
Table 4.6: Overview of players who enter and leave the academy by birth semester 
New-Out/Age 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total 
New H1 11 105 72 55 30 35 21 22 21 13 7 4 396 
New H2 3 29 21 24 12 8 10 11 5 3 5 3 134 
Ratio 3.7 3.6 3.4 2.3 2.5 4.4 2.1 2.0 4.2 4.3 1.4 1.3 3.0 
Out H1 1 13 22 15 35 39 42 39 43 42 23  314 
Out H2 0 4 7 6 13 10 13 21 13 10 7  104 
Ratio  3.3 3.1 2.5 2.7 3.9 3.2 1.9 3.3 4.2 3.3  3.0 
Note: New players enter the academy at the start of the season in the given age category. The reported numbers of players that leave 
the academy, represent the number of players that are forced to leave at the end of the season for the given age category. Players who 
are promoted to Young PSV or to the First team of PSV are not included. Since all players have to leave the academy after the age of 
19, we do not report numbers for this group. It follows that 530 players enter the academy. 418 have to leave at some point in time. For 
the remaining 112 players, 28 are promoted to one of the senior teams of PSV, while 84 leave the academy after the age of 19, when 
the academy ends. They either go to a senior team of PSV or move somewhere else. 
 
First, I investigate whether the external selection mechanism indeed results in a biased birth-date 
distribution. The first part of Table 4.6 shows the number of players that enter the academy for 
different age groups, split by birth semester. It follows that, for all ages, the majority of players that 
enter the academy is born in the first half of the year, i.e. New H1 is larger than New H2 for all ages. 
This is also reflected in the value for the ratio, defined as New H1/New H2. A value of one indicates 
that the number of entrants that is born in the first half of the year is equal to the number of players 
that is born in the second half of the year. Only at the ages of 18 and 19, the value becomes close to 
one. However, for the ages of 16 and 17, the ratio is well above four. This, thus, means that the 
relatively older players are more than four times overrepresented in the group of new players. In 
general, the findings suggest that the external selection system indeed favours the age-advantaged 
players over their age-disadvantaged peers. 
The second part of Table 4.6 shows the number of players that leave the academy as a result of internal 
selection. Note the players leave at the end of the season for a given age group. Furthermore, since 
all players have to leave the academy after the age of 19, I do not report any numbers for this age. 
For all the other age groups, the number for Out H1 is larger than Out H2. This means that the majority 
of players that leaves the academy is born in the first semester. The values for the ratio Out H1/Out 
H2 reveal that the number of early-born players who exit the academy is about three times as high as 
the number of late-born players. Interestingly, the overall ratio for entrants is three as well. This 
suggest that the share of early-born players that enters the academy is about equal to the share of 
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Figure 4.3: Ratios of players born in the first and second semester for new players and players 
who leave the academy 
 
Based on the previous findings, I conclude that the internal selection system does not contribute to 
the overrepresentation of the age-advantaged players. However, it does not result in a (severe) 
reduction of the biased birth-date distribution either. The equal proportions of early-born players that 
enter and leave the academy, suggest that the selection bias that results from external selection is not 
overcome by the internal selection mechanism. To further investigate the influence of internal 
selection, I look at the probability of being in the academy for one additional year, two additional 
years and three additional years after the year that someone started. In particular, I investigate whether 
the probabilities are different for players who are born in the first semester and players who are born 
in the second semester. Since I want to cover the full range of ages, I restrict the sample to the cohorts 
of players who are born in or prior to the year 1998. Furthermore, I use restrictions on the starting 
ages of players, so that the final age of 19, at which the academy ends, does not serve as a boundary. 
Goalkeepers are excluded, because they do not compete with the other (field) players for a position 
in next season’s squad. In general, each youth squad contains two goalkeepers. Finally, a few 
observations are excluded, since these players were promoted to one of the senior teams of PSV in 
either the first, second or third year after they entered the academy. Table 4.7 provides some 
descriptive statistics. The variable +1 year represents a binary variable that indicates whether a player 
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remains at least one additional year in the academy after his first year. Similarly, the variables +2 
years and +3 years are binary variables with the value of one if the player at least stays two additional 
years or even three years, respectively. It follows that 91 percent of the players stays at least one 
additional year, while this value drops to 70 percent for three additional years. Furthermore, the table 
shows the mean values for three other variables, split by the players who continue in the academy 
and those that leave the academy. Of main interest are the values for H1, a dummy variable that 
indicates that the player is born in the first half of the year. The value 0.75 for +1 year means that 75 
percent of the players who remain for at least one additional year, is born in the first semester. In 
comparison, 88 percent of the players who leave the academy is early-born. The difference between 
the two values suggests that internal selection favours the late-born players. Although the difference 
is reduced for the other two variables that measure the number of additional years, it is rather stable. 
In a similar way, the differences for Dutch, a dummy with value one if a player has the Dutch 
nationality, suggest that Dutch players remain longer in the academy, compared to their non-Dutch 
peers. Finally, the results for starting age suggest that someone, generally, stays longer if he starts at 
an early age. 
 
Table 4.7: Mean values for additional years in the academy 
 +1 year +2 years +3 years 
Observations 271 265 253 
Starting Age ≤18 ≤17 ≤16 
Mean 0.91 0.09 0.80 0.20 0.70 0.30 
 Yes (N=246) No (N=25) Yes (N=213) No (N=52) Yes (N=177) No (N=76) 
Dutch 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.65 0.74 0.62 
Starting Age 11.93 13.84 11.79 12.71 11.55 12.18 
H1 0.75 0.88 0.75 0.83 0.74 0.80 
Note: Samples include players who are born in or before 1998 and do not include goalkeepers and players who are promoted to senior 
teams during junior ages. Furthermore, +1 year, +2 years and +3 years are dummies with value one if someone is in the academy at 
least one additional year, at least two additional years or at least three additional years after the first year, respectively. 
 
To test whether the differences are statistically significant, I estimate a linear probability model of 
the form: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝜂𝑐 + 𝜆𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖𝑐        (1) 
 
in which 𝑌𝑖 is the dependent variable. It is a binary variable for either one, two, or three additional 
year(s) in the academy for individual 𝑖. Furthermore, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of variables that includes dummies 
for a player being Dutch and whether the player is born in the first semester. In one of the model 
specifications, it also includes dummy variables for the starting age of the individual player. The 
 
SELECTION OF TOP-LEVEL TALENT AND THE RELATIVE AGE EFFECT 97 
    
      
vector of coefficients is given by 𝜆, while 𝑖𝑐 is the error term. Finally, 𝜂𝑐 represents fixed cohort 
effects that control for unobserved heterogeneity between the cohorts, such as quality differences. As 
an alternative, I also use cohort * starting age fixed effects (i.e. an interaction between cohort effects 
and starting age effects). With this type of fixed effects, I explain the variation in the dependent 
variable by variation between peers from the same cohort, who started at the same age in the academy. 
For these players, the club has had an equal amount of observations and time to track the development 
of skills and to evaluate whether someone may stay within the academy or must leave. 
 
Table 4.8: Parameter estimates internal selection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 +1 year +2 years +3 years +1 year +2 years +3 years +1 year +2 years +3 years 
          
Dutch 0.035 0.063 0.127 0.007 0.059 0.140* 0.023 0.095 0.082 
 (0.037) (0.067) (0.077) (0.037) (0.059) (0.065) (0.050) (0.067) (0.074) 
Starting Age 10    -0.103* -0.024 0.013    
    (0.051) (0.062) (0.041)    
Starting Age 11    -0.066 0.009 0.074    
    (0.039) (0.082) (0.068)    
Starting Age 12    -0.055 0.103 0.141    
    (0.051) (0.070) (0.102)    
Starting Age 13    -0.091 0.093 0.152    
    (0.057) (0.072) (0.085)    
Starting Age 14    -0.107* -0.156 -0.008    
    (0.054) (0.110) (0.114)    
Starting Age 15    -0.194** -0.052 -0.287***    
    (0.078) (0.131) (0.078)    
Starting Age 16    -0.114 -0.049 -0.018    
    (0.090) (0.089) (0.098)    
Starting Age 17    -0.543*** -0.397**     
    (0.130) (0.151)     
Starting Age 18    -0.200      
    (0.153)      
H1 -0.067*** -0.071* -0.089 -0.064** -0.071* -0.100 -0.075* -0.118** -0.171** 
 (0.014) (0.038) (0.066) (0.023) (0.039) (0.075) (0.038) (0.058) (0.075) 
Constant 0.935*** 0.814*** 0.677*** 1.056*** 0.834*** 0.650*** 0.949*** 0.828*** 0.772*** 
 (0.022) (0.056) (0.079) (0.037) (0.068) (0.060) (0.038) (0.067) (0.080) 
          
Observations 271 265 253 271 265 253 271 265 253 
Starting Age ≤18 ≤17 ≤16 ≤18 ≤17 ≤16 ≤18 ≤17 ≤16 
Cohort effect 11 11 11 11 11 11    
Cohort*Starting Age effect       84 80 73 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All estimates are based on player that are born in 1998, 
not including goalkeepers and players who are promoted instead of left. Dependent variable is a dummy that indicates whether a player 
is still in the academy +1, +2 or +3 years after his first year. Models (1)-(6) contain standard errors clustered by cohort, models (7)-(9) 
contain standard errors clustered by cohort*starting age. 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.8. In the models (1)-(3), I control for Dutch players (coefficient 
is insignificant in almost all specifications) as well as cohort effects. The result for H1 is negative and 
highly significant in model (1). Furthermore, in model (2) the coefficient is negative and significant 
only at the 10%-level, whereas the coefficient is negative and insignificant in model (3). Adding 
dummies for the starting age of a player in specifications (4)-(6) does not change the results for the 
coefficients of H1. However, some differences arise if cohort * Starting Age interaction effects are 
used instead of cohort fixed effects. Then, the coefficient for H1 in the model with +3 years as 
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dependent variable becomes significant as well. Furthermore, the estimated values are all more 
negative. In general, these results suggest that players born in the first half of the year, have a higher 
probability of about seven percent to leave the academy in the first year after the year of entering, 
compared to their late-born peers. For a two-year time span, the probability is about the same, but 
higher if the cohort * starting age interaction effects are used. Then, I also find a significant 
probability for the three-year period. The result means that the players who are born in the first half 
of the year, have a higher probability of about 17 percent to leave the academy within three years 
after their start, compared to players from the same cohort and starting age, that are born in the second 
semester. 
Although the estimated values of the coefficients for H1 are not very high, it has some meaning. 
Overall, is reveals that the internal selection system works as predicted, i.e. reduces the 
overrepresentation of early-born players. However, the effect is modest and not strong enough to 
overcome the biased birth-date distribution. The external selection mechanism attracts too many age-
advantaged players to make a difference in that respect. 
 
4.7 Professional football 
As a final part of analysis, I look at the players’ career at the senior age level. More specifically, I 
focus on the distinction between players who have become a professional football player and those 
that have not been a professional. For most players, it is quite easy to determine whether he achieved 
a career as a professional. Some of them sign contracts at European top teams, such as Memphis 
Depay, who left PSV for the English Premier League giant Manchester United FC and later moved 
to Olympique Lyonnais in the French Ligue1. Other players end up at the lower levels of Dutch 
amateur football. Clearly, the former group contains professionals, the latter contains the non-
professional players. However, in some cases it is more difficult to determine. For example, when 
someone is part of the squad of a professional football team, but only plays a small number of 
matches. I tried to tackle this issue and construct a measure for professional football that is based on 
information obtained from various internet sources such as transfermarkt.de, vi.nl and many club 
websites. Furthermore, newspaper archives are used. In general, I decide to consider a player as a 
professional in case he belonged to the squad of a club that played on the first or second highest level 
in their domestic league. Since Young PSV is playing at the second level in the Netherlands as of the 
2013/14 season (before that season, Young teams were not allowed to participate in the professional 
leagues) many players who belong to Young PSV obtain some experience in professional football. 
However, within this study, I do not consider this as professional football. First, because the players 
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who belong to Young PSV are, in some sense, extending the academy in anticipation of promotion 
to the first team. Furthermore, Young PSV only plays on the second level as of the 2013/14 season, 
which is a second reason not to consider this as professional football. The players who are born in the 
earlier seasons of the sample and played for Young PSV, did not have the opportunity to play on the 
professional level, because this was not possible yet. 
Since players may enter professional (senior) football at different ages, I distinguish between the ages 
19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. For each age, I construct a binary variable that indicates whether the person 
was a professional player. In doing so, I take account of those players who play professional football 
early in their career, but leave the professional level after only a few years, prior to the age of 24. The 
variables are used in an analysis that is quite similar to the one applied in the previous section. Table 
4.9 provides mean values for the five different ages. Note that for each age, a restriction is used on 
the age cohorts that are included. The restrictions assure that the samples only contain players who at 
least reached the age as given in the dependent variable during the 2016/17 season. Furthermore, 
goalkeepers are excluded again. The first columns show that about 1/6 of the players were a 
professional at the age of nineteen. For the age of twenty, this is approximately 1/4, while about 1/3 
for the other ages. Furthermore, in the last row, the share of players that is born in the first semester 
is given. It follows that, for all ages, this share of early-born players is above 0.5. Unsurprisingly, and 
in line with the overrepresentation of the age-advantaged players in the academy, most professionals 
are born in the first semester. This is, however, also true for the ones who did not become a 
professional player. For the ages 19, 20 and 21, the share of early-born players is lower for the 
professionals than the non-professionals. This suggest that the early-born players do relatively worse, 
in terms of achieving professional football, compared to their late-born peers. The opposite is true for 
the ages 22 and 23. For these samples, the share of early-born players is higher for the professionals 
than for the non-professionals. 
 
Table 4.9: Mean values for players who have become a professional 
 Professional age 19 Professional age 20 Professional age 21 Professional age 22 Professional age 23 
Observations 284 260 227 197 173 
Birth year ≤1998 ≤1997 ≤1996 ≤1995 ≤1994 
Mean 0.15 0.85 0.24 0.76 0.33 0.67 0.35 0.65 0.31 0.69 
 Yes (N=42) No (N=242) Yes (N=62) No (N=198) Yes (N=76) No (N=151) Yes (N=68) No (N=129) Yes (N=54) No (N=119) 
Dutch 0.57 0.71 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.67 
H1 0.62 0.78 0.68 0.76 0.70 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.78 0.70 
Note: Samples do not include goalkeepers. Professional age 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 are dummies with value one if someone is a 
professional football player at that age. 
 
To test whether the differences are statistically significant, I use a similar linear probability model as 
given by Equation (1). As the dependent variable, I use the five variables for the different ages. These 
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have the value of one in case a person was a professional player at that age. Furthermore, I include a 
dummy for Dutch players and cohort fixed effects. The variable of interest is the dummy H1 that 
indicates whether the player was born in the first half of the year. Table 4.10 shows the results. The 
dummy for Dutch is insignificant in all specifications. For H1, the coefficient is significant in 
specification (1) that models the probability of being a professional football player at the age of 19. 
The negative coefficient means that early-born players, compared to their late-born peers, have a 
lower probability of about 11 percent to be a professional at this age. Although the coefficients in 
models (2) and (3) are negative as well, they are insignificant. For the ages 22 and 23, the coefficient 
becomes positive, but remains insignificant. Thus, only at the age of 19, when players actually still 
are youth players, I find a statistically significant difference. The difference is in favour of the late-
born players and points at a reversal of the RAE. A possible explanation may be that, at early ages, 
those late-born players learn how to deal with more developed older aged peers. This may be 
beneficial later on in their career and is an experience that early-born players, generally, do not obtain. 
Furthermore, it may be that the late-born players within the academy, on average, are highly talented, 
compared to less talented players who are in the academy. Otherwise, they would not have managed 
to survive up to the senior teams. In that respect, the system only selects the high potentials from the 
group of late-born players. At the same time, the early-born players are overrepresented in the group 
of professionals. Combined, this suggests that it would be beneficial to select some more modest 
talents from the group of late-born players, who are currently not selected. These then can replace the 
worst early-born players. The result will be a more uniform birth-date distribution.  
 
Table 4.10: Parameter estimates professional football 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Professional age 19 Professional age 20 Professional age 21 Professional age 22 Professional age 23 
      
Dutch -0.110 -0.044 -0.056 -0.007 -0.033 
 (0.067) (0.079) (0.067) (0.062) (0.053) 
H1 -0.108** -0.085 -0.056 0.047 0.084 
 (0.035) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.064) 
Constant 0.305*** 0.332*** 0.414*** 0.316*** 0.273*** 
 (0.050) (0.063) (0.063) (0.056) (0.069) 
      
Observations 284 260 227 197 173 
Birth year ≤1998 ≤1997 ≤1996 ≤1995 ≤1994 
Cohort effects 11 10 9 8 7 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Estimates are based on player observations that are born 
in or before the year 1998 (1), 1997 (2), 1996 (3), 1995 (4) and 1994 (5), not including goalkeepers. Dependent variable is a dummy 
that indicates whether a player is a professional at the age of 19, 20, 21, 22 or 23. All estimates contain cohort effects.  
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4.8 Discussion 
This section will provide a discussion. First, I will deal with some assumptions that were made, in 
particular on the supply of potential talent. Second, the generalizability of results is discussed. Here, 
I address the sport-dependence of the selection system, with a special interest in women’s football. 
Furthermore, I discuss how my results may apply in the setting of an educational system. 
 
4.8.1 Assumptions 
The introduction started with a simplified characterization of the labour market for top-level talents, 
with low demand for high potentials and high supply of people. Although this in general could be 
true and applicable to the situation of youth professional football, I made some more explicit 
assumptions in my analyses. First, I assumed that the supply of players is uniformly distributed across 
birth dates (see also footnote 8). We saw that birth-rates are about uniformly distributed, but it might 
be that supply is not. For example, because late born and disadvantaged players do not play football 
in equal portions as their early born peers. Potentially because they are not able to obtain (sufficient) 
access to training facilities as a result of selection that takes place at amateur teams. Related, they 
might also lack the ambition to reach their potential level of performance. I cannot rule out that this 
is happening and lack data (i.e. birth-date distributions) on the supply side of the market for players. 
However, football is very popular within the Netherlands, with a high density of football clubs across 
the country, especially compared to other sports clubs. Many young boys start to play football at some 
age and all have comparable access to facilities. Then, if supply consist of all players who are active 
at a football club, there will be plenty of players available for the professional teams, with birth dates 
throughout the year. And, as far as this birth-date distribution is skewed in favour of early born 
players, which means the supply of players for PSV is skewed, we can say that the selections system 
of the academy is not able to correct for the relative age difference that generally exists within youth 
football. 
We saw that some correction of the RAE takes place via the internal selection system. I made an 
implicit assumption about this internal selection system. I assumed that PSV selects such that they 
are left with the most talented players. Thus, each decision is made carefully, given the available 
options. A careful decision means that each player is evaluated on a yearly basis and the decision to 
keep someone within the academy is based on the idea that this person might be able to reach until 
the first team. However, both coaches and players know that not all players will reach that level. 
Primarily, because only few are needed each year. And if it is clear at young ages who those will be, 
it might not be necessary to be strict about the selection process, since then it does not matter who is 
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playing together with these high potentials. There would be no need to find an outside replacement 
for someone who already plays within the academy. This could be easier, and I cannot rule out that 
this is happening. However, since it will be difficult to evaluate who will be the high potentials and 
since this may change over time, especially at young ages, it seems advisable to remain strict. 
Therefore, I suggest my assumption seems plausible, at least on average. 
The final assumption to be discussed, relates to constraints that PSV faces within their selection 
procedures. I assumed that the decision to play for PSV or leave the academy was always made by 
the club. However, players may prefer to play for other teams and might also leave for other reasons. 
For example, because of an injury, upward mobility, or simply because someone is not willing to play 
for PSV anymore. I have some information about upward mobility (e.g. Patrick van Aanholt who 
moves to the youth academy of Chelsea FC) but it seems likely that information on (voluntary) quits 
is far from complete. Especially for players who left PSV at early ages and did not become famous. 
It seems quite difficult to obtain such information. My guess would be that, within the group of 
players who left the academy, more did so on their own initiative and not because they were forced 
by PSV. In that respect I have incomplete data on those who left. My assumption that the decision to 
leave the academy was always made by PSV, therefore seems to be the second-best option. As far as 
the own-initiative-quits are random and unrelated to their birth dates, I suggest that this is not too 
much of a problem for my results, as far as the number of these quits is rather low. 
 
4.8.2  Generalizability 
The setup of this study is quite narrow in the sense that data is used of only one youth academy in 
male professional football. An advantage of this narrow scope is that it allows for an in-depth analysis 
of the selection process, including a distinction between external selection and internal selection. 
Although the results are obtained through a case study, i.e. the youth academy of PSV, it provides 
some interesting insights for youth football in general and future research in that field, covering other 
teams and leagues. 
Besides that, I suggest that my findings are also of interest for other selection systems within sports. 
The RAE results from selection systems that do not correctly incorporate relative age differences. 
Therefore, my suggestion would be to select at an age, when relative differences, mainly related to 
physical aspects, are small. For gymnastics, in which late maturation is an advantage, this would be 
early in life (taking into account ethical issues), while for football around the age of 15. In sports 
where differences in maturation are less likely to influence performances, it does not seem to matter 
much (e.g. shooting). 
 
SELECTION OF TOP-LEVEL TALENT AND THE RELATIVE AGE EFFECT 103 
    
      
Furthermore, the results for the internal selection process revealed that an increased number of 
observations of individual performances, compared to few external observations, seems to result in a 
better prediction of potential talent of young players. This means that, at young ages, one should not 
focus too much on a small group of individuals. Instead, one preferably monitors the development of 
a rather large group of athletes, before selection takes place. For this to work, two other aspects seem 
relevant. First, the amount of competition for talent and, thus, the need to outperform your 
competitors. For example, football clubs that compete for a promising player. Second, and related, 
the organization that performs the selection. Selection may primarily happen at (private) professional 
clubs as is the case in football. Selection may also happen at the sports body, as with ice skating and 
track and field. Differences between these types of organizations are the availability of funds and the 
availability and spread of training facilities within the country. Private clubs generally have more 
funds available to select earlier in life and have to compete against each other. Sports bodies have 
less funds to finance their talent selection, identification and development programs. But, they have 
a monopoly and may help local clubs (i.e. their members) with the provision of facilities. In that way, 
a rather large group of athletes may receive similar support until an older age at which selection takes 
place. 
The selection process may also differ in the relevance of certain components for certain sports. Within 
football, one has to rely on subjective evaluations of scouts and coaches. Especially with external 
selection, this may result in a rough approximation of talent. With internal selection, more information 
is available and might be gathered objectively, e.g. physical development and even mental status. 
Development in other aspects, such as tactical and technical skills, can only be subjectively evaluated 
within the context of a team effort. This differs for sports such as ice skating and track and field, in 
which each individual obtains an objective measure of performance. This can be a time, a distance or 
a height. These performances are used in the selection process and make it easy to find the best 
performers. Individuals that are not yet selected for additional training and support can qualify quite 
easily, since a clear comparison between performances of peers is available. However, as with 
football, too much focus on these performances may result in an overrepresentation of early born 
players. For all sports, coaches should incorporate relative age differences and adjust performances 
based on birth dates. This might be easier with objective performance measures than with subjective 
evaluations. In both cases, there remains a role for the coach within the selection process. And if they 
have sufficient observations of individuals, as with internal selections, I suggest they do rather well 
in their evaluation of potential talent. 
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It seems likely that the same reasoning applies to female sports. In the following, I focus on women’s 
football, which is rapidly growing in the Netherlands. Most female players who are active in the 
highest tier of Dutch football are semi-professionals. A further difference with male football, and 
related to this study, is that the professional clubs do not have an academy for females. Thus, the 
selection of female players takes place at a relative old age, i.e. not at very young ages such as with 
boys. For this selection, they have to rely on amateur teams and, of course, the other professional 
clubs. Since selection by the professional teams takes place at an older age, in general, after 
maturation, the relative age differences might be less severe. However, it could of course be the case 
that the RAE exists at the amateur teams. Supply of players comes from these amateur teams. As far 
as the number of these teams is rather high, the talent pool remains large until adolescence (i.e. ages 
16-19), while all players may receive equal opportunities to develop. This in contrast to male football, 
where the talent pool at the ages 16-19 mainly consists of the players within the youth academies of 
the professional clubs. For males, it is unlikely to obtain a professional career if you are not playing 
in one of the youth academies at these ages. For females, no academies exist and, thus, this is not an 
issue. In that respect and related to the RAE, my suggestion is that the selection process within 
women’s football is doing better, since the talent pool remains rather large until adolescence. A 
drawback of this selection method might be that additional facilities, practice and support are missing, 
because there is no professional youth academy. Amateur teams may provide this support, and in 
some way serve as regional training centres that closely cooperate with the professional clubs. 
As a test for the RAE, I looked at two female adult selections and the distribution of birth dates. First, 
the 2017/18 female team of PSV consists of 22 players. Eight are born in the first quarter of the year, 
7 in the second quarter, 6 in the third quarter and only 1 player in the fourth quarter. In terms of birth 
semesters, the distribution is 15 in the first half of the year and 7 in the second half of the year. Thus, 
there is an overrepresentation of early born players, but less severe compared to the male academy. 
Second, I also looked at the female Dutch national football team that became European Champions 
in the summer of 2017. Here, out of 23 players, 3 are born in the first quarter, 6 in the second quarter, 
4 in the third quarter and 10 in the fourth quarter. In terms of birth semesters, this is 9 in the first half 
of the year and 14 in the second half of the year. Thus, the distribution of birth dates contradicts with 
the RAE and the main results of this study. Without drawing to many conclusions based on these 
single observations, something seems to work well with respect to the RAE within in the selection 
system of women’s football. 
Although this paper is focused on the RAE in elite youth football, I suggest that some results are 
interesting outside of this domain as well. In particular, I think that the distinction between external 
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and internal selection systems, shows resemblance to the way in which children on primary school 
are evaluated. In the Netherlands, the children in the final grade all have to take an external test. The 
result that is based on this single observation prescribes the potential abilities and what level of 
secondary school should fit for the child. Secondary schools may base their admissions on these test 
scores. Besides this external test, teachers, as coaches in football, continuously evaluate the 
development of skills and abilities, which serves as an indicator of potential as well. Since relative 
age differences matter in school systems, I suggest that these internal evaluations of teachers should 
not be underestimated. Perhaps it would be good to integrate the external test score in the advice to 
the secondary school. Then, this school cannot differentiate between external and internal evaluations 
of potential and one can be sure that both are used. How this should work in practice, is something 
for future research. One could also think of the optimal age to move from primary school to secondary 
school. Currently this happens at about the age of 12. Based on the discussion above, I suggest to take 
maturation into account within this selection system and perhaps delay selection a little. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
Previous studies find that selection systems for talent suffer from a bias in the selection of relative 
age-advantaged players. As a result, this group of peers is overrepresented, which is called an RAE. 
Under the assumption that talent is uniformly distributed across birth dates, the RAE suggests a loss 
of talent. In this paper, I investigate how this works for elite youth football, with data from the youth 
academy of PSV. The dataset contains all players who are born in 1988 or later and were active in 
the academy for at least one season. A birth-date distribution that combines all birth cohorts and ages, 
reveals that the academy consisted of about three times as many players who are born in the first half 
of the year, than players who are born in the second half of the year. Separate distributions by age 
reveal that the overrepresentation of these early-born players is persistent across ages. Despite that 
the phenomenon of an RAE is known for a few decades now, this result suggests that, in general, 
selection systems of top-level talent are still not able to correctly incorporate relative age differences. 
However, the analysis on the internal selection mechanism suggest that this functions rather well in 
that respect. Compared to external selection, the number of observations prior to the selection 
decision is high for internal selection. This makes the evaluation of talent more accurate. As expected, 
the results show that internal selection reduces the severity of the RAE. However, the reduction is not 
large enough to overcome the bias in birth-date distribution that results from external selection. Thus, 
an overrepresentation of early-born players remains within the academy. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the majority of professional players is born in the first semester of the year. Interestingly, 
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however, at the age of 19, late-born players have a higher probability to become a professional player. 
This suggests that the group of late-born players, on average, contains highly talented peers. Thus, an 
improvement could be made by selecting some additional late-born players instead of some of the 
early-born players. Furthermore, as a remedy to the RAE, I suggest that external talent selection 
should incorporate more tracing of development prior to the decision of recruitment. As is the case 
with internal selection. This may be difficult for individual clubs, since they have to compete with 
other professional teams for potential talented players and, thus, need to decide quickly. A solution 
could be to install several regional training centres, in which multiple professional clubs participate. 
This system contains similarities with the current situation of Dutch women’s football. Players can 
start in these regional centres at early ages. The development of skills and abilities is monitored 
closely, but recruitment by the participating teams is only allowed after several years. For example, 
it may not be allowed before the age of fifteen. Clearly, this idea is not very concrete yet, but at least 
includes the element of tracing development, before the decision to select. 
 
      
  




Team heterogeneity and performance 




Teamwork is common in everyday life. Both in working life as well as during leisure activities such 
as sports, people cooperate in teams, while aiming for a common goal. This goal may take on many 
different shapes, such as the completion of a project, the publication of an academic paper, or a match 
victory. Naturally, the outcome depends on various factors. Some of these factors are exogenous, for 
example, a budget constraint or luck, which is often claimed to be important in sports. Other factors 
can be influenced by individual team members and teams as a whole. Here, one can think of individual 
effort levels and team cooperation, team coordination and team composition. The eventual outcome, 
i.e. the team performance, results from a combination of all relevant elements. If all exogenous factors 
are given and human input is relevant, team performance is determined by the individual inputs of 
team members and the way in which these are combined. In general, team performance improves, if 
individual inputs increase. Furthermore, improving the way in which these inputs are combined 
results in better performances. Of course, both aspects can work simultaneously and/or in an 
interactive way. Take, for example, a change in the heterogeneity of a football team, which is the 
topic of the present study. Suppose a player is replaced by another player, who is more experienced. 
This may have an impact on the individual performances of their teammates. For example, because 
this more experienced player knows how to handle in certain difficult situations. Furthermore, it may 
impact team performance, because the individual input of this experienced player is weighted 
differently than other inputs.  
Scholars have been interested in teams, team members and performances for a few decades now. 
Studies relate to incentives, contracts and payments, such as, incentives and discrimination in pay 
(e.g. Winter, 2004), the pay-performance relationship (e.g. Torgler and Schmidt, 2007; Bryson, 
Buraimo and Simmons, 2011) contract duration (e.g. Buraimo, Frick, Hickfang and Simmons, 2015) 
expectations as reference points (e.g. Bartling, Brandes and Schunk, 2015) and career prospects (e.g. 
Miklós-Thal and Ullrich, 2016). Others looked at the role of experience within teams (e.g. Huckman, 
Staats and Upton, 2009) and productivity, age and aging of teams and team members (e.g. Van Ours 
and Stoeldraijer, 2011; Börsch-Supan and Weiss, 2016). Furthermore, the concepts of free-riding, 
peer effects and effort levels are related to teams and their performances (e.g. Kandel and Lazear, 
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1992; Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003; Gould and Winter, 2009). Of particular interest for the 
present study are those studies that investigate the impact of team heterogeneity on performance. This 
heterogeneity is measured in different ways, such as team heterogeneity in ability (e.g. Hamilton, 
Nickerson and Owan, 2003; Franck and Nüesch, 2010; Papps, Bryson and Gomez, 2011; Gerhards 
and Mutz, 2017; Muehlheusser, Scheemann and Sliwka, 2016), team heterogeneity in nationality (e.g. 
Lazear, 1999; Brandes, Franck and Theiler, 2009; Haas and Nüesch, 2012; Kahane, Longley and 
Simmons, 2013; Maderer, Holtbrügge and Schuster, 2014; Gerhards and Mutz, 2017) and team 
heterogeneity as a combination of factors (e.g. Beck and Meyer, 2012). 
Most theoretical work on teams and performances is based on general economic concepts (e.g. Kandel 
and Lazear, 1992; Lazear, 1999; Winter, 2004). In line with Kahn (2000), who acknowledges that 
(professional) sports are useful to study labour market phenomena, the use of sports data is popular 
for empirical verification of the theoretical predictions. In the present study, we investigate the impact 
of team heterogeneity on performance. We use data from professional football. Of course, differences 
exist between teamwork within football teams and teamwork in daily work operations. For example, 
a professional football team receives a large amount of (media) attention. However, there is also 
plenty of similarity, such as the interactions between team members and the division of tasks. 
Therefore, we argue that empirical studies on the relationship between team heterogeneity and 
performance in sports are useful outside of the domain of sports as well. 
The work of Lazear (1999) can be seen as a theoretical foundation for this relationship. His model is 
based on the concept of a ‘global firm’ that contains team members of different cultures or countries. 
Lazear describes three conditions that should be met for a global firm to operate in a superior way. 
First, information or skill-sets should be disjoint across team members. Second, these sets should be 
relevant for the other group. Third, communication should be possible, i.e. the costs of 
communication should not be prohibitive. Within the global firm, teams exhibit a diversity of cultures 
or nationalities with disjoint information and skill-sets that are relevant to one another. The costs of 
integration and communication should be lower than the benefits of working in an international and 
diverse setting. According to Lazear’s model, this is regularly the case. Therefore, we derive the 
hypothesis that team heterogeneity concerning nationality is beneficial for performance. However, 
previous studies using sports data, only find limited support for this hypothesis. Brandes, Franck and 
Theiler (2009) use data from the German Bundesliga for the seasons 2001/02 – 2005/06 and find a 
negative effect of team diversity within defensive players on team performance, while no effect for 
other positions. Kahane, Longley and Simmons (2013) use data from the National Hockey League 
for the seasons 2001/02 – 2007/08, excluding the season 2004/05 due to a player lockout. They find 
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that benefits accrue from diversity in nationality and that these benefits are the greatest if the group 
of foreign players is rather homogeneous, i.e. if they stem from the same country. Haas and Nüesch 
(2012) find a negative effect of diversity in nationality on team performance within German 
Bundesliga football (seasons 1999/00 – 2005/06). Maderer, Holtbrügge and Schuster (2014) come to 
a similar conclusion from data of the season 2008/09 of the highest level of professional football for 
the five largest European leagues (England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain). Gerhards and Mutz 
(2017) use data from the highest level of the twelve best European football leagues according to the 
UEFA Team Ranking in 2011/12. Their dataset covers the seasons 2011/12 – 2015/16. They 
investigate, amongst others, the influence of diversity in nationality on team performance using club-
season observations. They find this relation to be non-linear and conclude that heterogeneity is 
beneficial up to a certain level. 
Although Lazear (1999) bases his model on diversity in nationalities, it seems applicable to other 
types of heterogeneity as well. In particular, the elements disjoint, relevant and communication seem 
important for teams with different levels of age/experience as well as for teams with heterogeneity in 
abilities.1 Think for example of the potential problems in communication between younger and older 
workers, or between co-workers with certain specific skill-sets. Although the relationship between 
age/experience and performance (productivity) has been studied numerous times (e.g. Huckman, 
Staats and Upton, 2009; Van Ours and Stoeldraijer, 2011; Börsch-Supan and Weiss, 2016), the 
number of empirical studies that focuses on the diversity in age/experience and performance is rather 
small, in particular when sports data is used. In their study on team diversity within the five largest 
European football competitions, Maderer, Holtbügge and Schuster (2014) include a diversity measure 
for age. They find a negative effect on team performance. Beck and Meyer (2012) use a heterogeneity 
measure in which variables for tenure, overall tenure, age, nationality, experience and success are 
combined into one value per club-match observation for German Bundesliga matches. Their sample 
covers the eleven seasons 1992/93 – 2002/03. They find a negative effect of team heterogeneity on 
team performance. However, because variables are grouped into one measure, it is unclear which 
separate element drives this result. 
Measures of heterogeneity in ability are generally constructed from output related values. This can 
be objective measures, such as production rates in manufacturing or (individual) match details on, for 
                                                 
1 Naturally, other theoretical frameworks may relate to these different types of heterogeneity, such as a human capital 
framework (e.g. Franck, Nüesch and Pieper, 2011). Since our aim is to empirically investigate the relationship between 
team heterogeneity and performance, we focus on the empirical findings of previous studies, without an in-depth 
discussion of these alternative theories. 
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example, passing, running and scoring in sports. Furthermore, in sports, one can rely on subjective 
expert evaluations of individual performances. In their study on team production in a garment plant, 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) investigate the effect of heterogeneity in ability (measured as 
an individual output rate) on team production and find a positive effect. They relate this positive effect 
to benefits that result from mutual learning as well as peer pressure and norm-setting by high ability 
peers (see also Kandel and Lazear (1992) for a discussion on how peer pressure and norm-setting 
might work). The process of mutual learning assumes that there is some degree of information sharing 
possible between agents, which increases substitutability between one another. Other studies indeed 
show that benefits of team heterogeneity arise in the situation where inputs (i.e. actions or tasks) are 
substitutes and not complements (e.g. Prat, 2002; Gould and Winter, 2009). Franck and Nüesch 
(2010) exploit this distinction between complements and substitutes in an analyses of team 
productivity in German Bundesliga football for the seasons 2001/02 – 2006/07. They proxy talent 
with objective individual performances and expert evaluations. Furthermore, they define a 
competition team, i.e. those players who participate in competition matches, which consists of 
complementary talents. For the sake of comparison, they define the entire squad, which also includes 
all players who do not participate in competition matches and where substitutability is larger. The 
authors argue, that the outcomes of competition matches are the result of complementary skills, while 
end-of-season outcomes result from the composition of the entire squad, in which learning takes place 
and team members are substitutes. Their hypotheses are that talent disparity within the competition 
team has a negative effect on team performance, while talent disparity within the entire squad has a 
positive effect on team performance. In general, their empirical analyses provide support for both. 
Papps, Bryson and Gomez (2011) find support for a non-linear relation between skill dispersion and 
team performance. They use a large dataset from the Major League Baseball covering the seasons 
1920 - 2009. Skill is measured by conventional performance indicators for batting and pitching. They 
find that there is an optimum concerning heterogeneity for both batters and pitchers, implying that 
diversity in playing talent ought to be moderate. Gerhards and Mutz (2017) also investigate a non-
linear relationship between the inequalities of playing talent (measured by market values retrieved 
from transfermarkt.de) and team performance. They use club-season observations and find 
insignificant results for both a linear specification as well as a quadratic form. The study by 
Muehlheusser, Scheemann and Sliwka (2016) is somewhat different and provides indirect evidence 
against the hypothesis of benefits of team heterogeneity. They investigate the differences in 
performance effects of coach-changes for homogeneous and heterogeneous teams. Notably, they 
measure heterogeneity by differences in expert evaluations. Their results suggest that benefits of 
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coach-changes arise for homogeneous teams, in which competition between team members is large, 
but less so for heterogeneous teams, in which competition is rather modest. 
From the above it follows that empirical evidence for the relationship of team heterogeneity and 
performance moves into different directions. This might have to do with the level of analysis 
(individual vs. team) as well as with the way in which heterogeneity and performances are measured. 
Performance measures, in particular in sports, might suffer from the fact that they are rather discrete. 
For individuals, this is the case for expert evaluations as well as crude performance indicators, such 
as goals scored and minutes played. On a team level, this holds for the number of points, goal 
difference, victory or defeat and (final) rankings. This is generally less of a problem in business, 
where there is, most likely, always some production rate or project performance. Within consultancy, 
for example, there is a continuum (of quality) of advice. However, these performances are often hard 
to relate to individual contributions. Furthermore, it might be difficult to construct proper 
heterogeneity measures, since bibliographical data and background information on individuals is 
missing (e.g. of past experience). This, in turn, is less of a problem for professional sports. 
In our study we use such sports data, specifically from the highest tier of Dutch professional football. 
Our dataset covers the 2014/15 season. It includes detailed data on players and their playing histories 
as well as on matches and performance.2 For individual performance we use data provided by ORTEC 
Sports. This is a company that collects detailed data on individual player actions during matches. 
Furthermore, these actions are classified in terms of successful/unsuccessful. We thus have a Success 
Ratio of actions for each individual player per match that serves as a performance indicator. As an 
alternative we also have the ratio of successful passes (Passing%). Using information retrieved from 
other sources, we construct four different types of heterogeneity measures. First, we construct a 
measure of heterogeneity in ability (skill) measured by market values. Second, we obtain a 
heterogeneity measure based on nationality. Third, based on the height of players, we also construct 
a heterogeneity measure of physical attributes of players. Finally, we use age and playing history to 
construct a heterogeneity measure of age/experience. 
Our analysis consists of three parts. First, we start with the relationship between heterogeneity of 
team members and individual performances. We find a statistically significant effect for heterogeneity 
in nationality that suggests that diversity is beneficial. Also, we find a statistically significant effect 
for heterogeneity in experience, which suggests that diversity has a negative effect on performance. 
We show that this result depends on the use of club fixed effects. Furthermore, we use sensitivity 
                                                 
2 A detailed description of our data is provided in the next section and in Appendix E. 
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analyses to investigate whether these results are stronger for certain subgroups and subsets of players. 
In general, we find robust results for all types of measures of heterogeneity. 
In part two of our analyses, we relate the types of team diversity to team performance using club-
match observations. For team performance, we use crude and discrete match-outcomes (i.e. the 
number of points, goals difference and winning) as well as continuous performance measures based 
on a team average Success Ratio and a team average Passing%. For team diversity in nationality and 
team diversity in experience, the results are similar to our findings for individual performance. 
Interestingly, the former is only significant for our more subtle measures of team performance that 
are based on average individual performances. Therefore, we conclude that team diversity can be 
related to team performance in a direct way, observable in match-outcomes, but might also indirectly 
relate to team performance via an improved average Success Ratio. 
Based on the results from the first two parts, in part three of the analysis, we use simulations to 
investigate the estimated impact of certain changes in team heterogeneity. In general, we find that the 
statistically significant results are of limited economic importance in terms of differences in 
performances. For both the individual performance analysis as well as for the team level analysis, we 
find that a one standard deviation difference from the mean value, only results in performance 
differences well below one percent. This means that team heterogeneity is not very relevant for 
performance, at least within Dutch professional football. 
Although the set-up of our analyses is not particularly new, our study adds to the existing literature 
in multiple ways. First, we use a different way of measuring performance, both at the individual level 
as well as at the team level. The use of objective player-match specific data is not innovative in itself 
within this stream of research. For example, Franck and Nüesch (2010) use this type of data to obtain 
a player fixed effect (talent measure) that should be constant over time. This value is then used as an 
input for the calculation of a coefficient of variation of team ability, which, in turn, is used in a club-
match analysis of the relation between diversity and team performance. However, using a continuous 
Success Ratio of actions as a performance measure is new. This holds for both, the individual level 
as well as on an aggregated level for team performance. Besides that, our results provide new insights 
in the relationship between team heterogeneity and performance. It also adds to the discussion of how 
these variables should be measured. Furthermore, most studies only focus on a single type of 
heterogeneity. However, there is no a priori reason why different types should be studied separately. 
Therefore, we include four of them. Finally, our simulations reveal the economic impact of changes 
in heterogeneity. This is something hardly ever done in previous studies. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides more details on the data and the 
set-up of the analysis. Next, section 5.3 presents and discusses the parameter estimates. We present 
and discuss the results of our simulations in section 5.4. Finally, section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2 Data and set-up of the analysis 
We use data from the season 2014/15 of the highest tier of Dutch professional football. In this season, 
eighteen clubs were competing in a double round-robin competition, resulting in a total of 306 
matches. At the end of the season, four clubs participated in play-off matches for qualification for 
UEFA Europa League football and two clubs participated in play-off matches for 
promotion/relegation. These matches are not included in our data. More detailed information on 
Dutch professional football is presented in Besters, Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2017). In total, the 
dataset contains 8,320 individual player-match observations for which playing time is more than zero 
and, accordingly, a performance measure is available. Furthermore, our dataset contains match-day 
related information. This includes the date and location of the match, the final outcome, the competing 
teams and their home provinces, whether the home team is playing on artificial grass, the attendance, 
general weather conditions during the match-day, fixed bookmaker odds and the pre-match rank of 
the competing teams. For each individual player, we have information on the date of birth, market 
value, height (not available for nine of the 8,320 player-match observations), nationality, the number 
of caps and previous playing experience in domestic leagues. Furthermore, for each player-match 
observation, we have playing position, playing-time, including the minute of a substitution, and 
whether and when someone received a first caution (i.e. a yellow card) or was expelled (i.e. a second 
yellow and, or red card). 
From this information, we construct the set of variables as listed in panel A of Table E1 in the 
appendix. The variables can be subdivided in measures of match characteristics, player characteristics 
and team characteristics. Furthermore, we use Success Ratio as the measure of individual 
performance (dependent variable). This is the ratio of all successful actions by an individual player 
and all actions during a match of this individual player. The measure is appealing since it combines 
all sorts of actions, such as passing and duels, which makes it comparable between individuals and 
across playing positions. A potential downside is that no distinction is made between the importance 
of certain actions, i.e. all actions are equally weighted. As an alternative measure of individual 
performance, we use Passing%. This is the passing accuracy, measured by the number of successful 
passes of a certain player divided by all passes of this player during a match. In general, the remarks 
on the Success Ratio also apply for this performance measure. Descriptive statistics are provided in 
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panel A of Table E2 in the appendix, while pairwise correlations between the dependent variables 
and all other variables are given in panel A of Table E3. Furthermore, Figure 5.1 plots two Kernel 
Densities. It follows that for both dependent variables, there is a high concentration of observations 
towards the upper bound of the scale. Although both graphs indicate a continuous pattern, the one for 
Passing% reveals a higher spread. Note that the statistics in the abovementioned panels as well as the 
graphs in Figure 5.1 are based on all player-match observations with at least 45 minutes of playing 
time. With this restriction, the number of observations reduces to 6,723. Since Height is missing for 
four observations within this subset of player-match records, the number of observations that is used 
in our baseline analysis is 6,719. We restrict the sample in this way, since individual player 
performances suffer from a lot of variation when the number of playing minutes is low. As a 
sensitivity analysis, we also use subsamples of players that at least played more than 0 minutes, at 
least played more than 15 minutes, at least played more than 30 minutes and appeared on the field as 
a player for 90 minutes (i.e. the whole match). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Kernel Density of individual performance measures; playing time ≥ 45 minutes 
 
To find out the relation between individual performance and team heterogeneity, we test the following 
linear model with the individual player performance as the dependent variable: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑚 = 𝜂𝑐  +  𝜆𝑋𝑐𝑚 +  𝜃𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑚  +  𝜏𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑚 + 𝑖𝑐𝑚    (1) 
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in which 𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑚 is the performance of individual 𝑖, playing for club 𝑐 in match 𝑚. The vector 𝑋𝑐𝑚 
represents match characteristics, 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑚 contains player characteristics, while 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑚 is the vector of team 
variables. Furthermore, 𝜆, 𝜃 and 𝜏 are vectors of coefficients, 𝜂𝑐 represents club fixed effects, while 
𝑖𝑐𝑚 is the error term. The vector 𝑋𝑐𝑚 contains the match characteristics. This includes a set of 
dummies for home matches, whether the match is played on artificial grass, whether the opponent is 
a local rival (i.e. a derby) and whether the match is played on a weekday (with Friday belonging to 
the weekend). Furthermore, we include as control variables the logarithm of stadium attendance and 
general weather conditions, measured by the temperature and by the amount of precipitation. It seems 
reasonable that performance also depend on the quality of the opponent. Therefore, we include a 
measure that captures this strength. We use relative strength measured by the expected number of 
points for a club (with probabilities based on bookmaker odds). A higher number of expected points 
suggests a weaker opponent. One could argue that this measures quality in a crude way, in particular, 
since it contains an average indication of the opponent. A preferred quality indicator contains an 
assessment of individual players that can be matched to players of the other team, for example based 
on playing position. Unfortunately, such information is not available. Thus, the expected number of 
points seems a useful approximation of the ex-ante relative quality of a team. Since probabilities are 
based on bookmaker odds, we assume that the relative strength incorporates factors such as home 
advantage. Furthermore, it means that quality is measured in a continuous way, thus accounting for a 
continuum of quality differences between clubs. As an alternative measure of relative strength, we 
also calculate the difference in pre-match league ranks between clubs. Finally, we use a dummy that 
defines whether the team is being coached by a new manager, identified as not being the one that 
started the season. Note that we do not include the coach, and all other (support) staff members, in 
our team characteristics and the heterogeneity measures. We suggest that on-field performance highly 
depends on the players on the pitch, while the influence of coaches is limited during the match. The 
coach can have an impact on the general team tactics, which we assume to be constant during the 
season and are included in the club fixed effect. The dummy for in-season coach changes captures 
any change in these general team-specific tactics. With respect to the differences between coaches, 
note that only one foreign coach has been active during the 2014/15 season.3 Furthermore, although 
the experience as players can be quite different between the coaches, their experience as a club coach 
generally does no differ much. 
                                                 
3 The Serb Nebojsa Gudelj, who already lived for more than fifteen years in the Netherlands, started the season as head 
coach of NAC Breda. He was replaced during the season by a Dutch coach. 
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The player characteristics are included in the vector 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑚 and relate to the individual 𝑖. We use 
controls for playing time, playing position dummies for goalkeeper, defender and midfielder, with 
attacker as the reference category, and a dummy that indicates whether someone has ever played for 
his national team.4 To proxy for the quality of an individual, we use the market value of the player as 
given by transfermarkt.de. Furthermore, we could control for age with a continuous variable. 
However, we will use dummies that represent age categories for players who are aged under 21, are 
aged between 21 and 24, are aged between 24 and 27 and are aged over 27 (being the reference 
category). The cut-off ages 21, 24 and 27 are (approximately) equal to the respective 25th percentile, 
50th percentile and 75th percentile of the age distribution. We also control, with a dummy, for players 
with a Dutch nationality and the height of the player. Finally, we include the experience of the player 
by the total number of matches played in domestic professional leagues. Data on matches in domestic 
leagues are the only reliable information on a player’s entire career that we could find (this data is 
based on soccerway.com). Although this way of measuring match experience does not value any 
experience in a qualitative way, it correlates with age and seems to proxy experience quite well. In 
that respect, we use it as an alternative for experience measured by age.5 
The team characteristics are included in the vector 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑚. This vector contains a dummy that indicates 
whether a team member was sent off by the referee, controlling for the effect of playing with one less 
player.6 Furthermore, the vector includes the weighted average values (AV) for Market Value, Height, 
Age and Match Experience. Weights are based on the number of playing minutes that players are 
together on the field. Thus, these averages (and more in general, all team variables) are calculated 
from values of team members. Note that the value for individual 𝑖 is not included in the calculation 
of the values for these team characteristics. The AV variables capture any ‘first moment’ effect. For 
the effect of team heterogeneity we use, in line with previous studies, the coefficient of variation 
(CV). This measures diversity in Market Value, Height, Age and Match Experience. It is calculated 
                                                 
4 Note that playing position for an individual is fixed within a match, but not between matches. Thus, for a certain match, 
if someone starts as a defender, he remains a defender in our analyses. However, in the next match, the same person may 
play as a midfielder and is counted as such for that entire match. 
5 There are multiple reasons why our measure of match experience may incorrectly measure ‘true experience’. First, it 
does not distinguish between the level (or quality) of the league in which a match was played. Second, it does not include 
domestic cup and international club competition matches (e.g. Champions League). Unfortunately, reliable historical data 
on these types of matches is hard to find. Third, caps are not included. Fourth, international experience is valued in the 
same way as domestic experience. This relates to the experience of Dutch players playing domestic league matches 
outside of the Netherlands and similarly for other nationalities. All four aspects result in a measurement error of ‘true 
experience’. Taking this into account, we think that, as long as we use it as an alternative for age, this should not be too 
much of a problem within our analyses. 
6 There is one match in which two players of the same team were sent off. However, the second player was sent off in the 
last minute of the match, thus it does not seem to be necessary to specify this in a different way. 
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by the ratio of a weighted standard deviation and a weighted mean. Weights are again based on the 
number of playing minutes that players are together on the field. An CV of a variable can be 
interpreted as the spread given its mean. In our case, a ceteris paribus increase in the spread means 
an increase in diversity. A positive coefficient means that heterogeneity is beneficial for performance, 
while a negative coefficient indicates that heterogeneity is bad for performance. In line with Kahane, 
Longley and Simmons (2013), we measure diversity in nationality with the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). This is the sum of squared shares of nationalities, weighted by playing time that players 
are together on the field. If all team members of an individual 𝑖 have the same nationality, the HHI is 
equal to one. In the other extreme that all ten team members have a different nationality, the HHI is 
equal to 0.1 (assuming no substitutes or sending offs, thus equal weights). An increase in diversity is 
reflected in a lower value of the HHI. Accordingly, a negative coefficient means that team 
heterogeneity is beneficial for performance. Obviously, a positive coefficient indicates the opposite. 
Equation (1) also contains club fixed effects represented by 𝜂𝑐. These fixed effects control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between clubs, such as club-culture, fan base, media attention and certain 
club-specific aspects, such as playing tactics and transfer policies that define the composition of the 
squad. Thus, they control for the fact that certain teams might have younger players than other teams. 
The same applies to experience, market value, height and nationality. The use of these club effects 
means that we are explaining the variation in performance of an individual player by variation in 
variables that only differ between matches of the same club and a small amount of variation that 
results from substitutes during the match. Although one may suspect that this results in too little 
variation to explain differences in performance, Figures E1-E5 and Table E4-E8 in the appendix show 
that, within each club, there is enough variation of the relevant variables. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to include the club fixed effect. Even more so, since results differ if we do not include 
these effects, as we shall see in the next section. 
First, we discuss the set-up of the team level analyses. Since each club plays 34 matches, we are left 
with 612 club-match observations. The empirical approach is quite similar to the one for individuals. 
We now use the linear model: 
 
𝑃𝑐𝑚 =  𝛼𝑐  +  𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑚 + 𝛿𝐵𝑐𝑚 + 𝑐𝑚      (2) 
 
in which 𝑃𝑐𝑚 is the team performance for club 𝑐 in match 𝑚. The vector 𝐴𝑐𝑚 contains match 
characteristics, while 𝐵𝑐𝑚 represents team characteristics. Correspondingly, 𝛽 and 𝛿 are vectors of 
coefficients. Furthermore, 𝛼𝑐 represent club fixed effects and 𝑐𝑚 is the error term. Note that this 
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model does not include any individual player characteristics, since we are focusing on the club level 
now. 
For team performance, we use five different measurements. Two of them are based on the individual 
performance measures Success Ratio and Passing%. We calculate a weighted average, Team AV 
Success Ratio and Team AV Passing%, in which performances of all individual team members are 
weighted by playing minutes. Figure 5.2 provides Kernel Densities for both variables. The graphs 
show continuous distributions with most observations somewhere on the upper end of the scale. 
Furthermore, it reveals that there is more variability for Team AV Passing% than for Team AV 
Success Ratio. Panel B of Table E3 in the appendix shows that the correlation between these two 
variables is approximately 0.61. From that table, it also follows that these unconventional team 
performance measures are significantly correlated with standard measures of team performance, 
namely (the number of) Points, Goal Difference and Victory.7 We discuss the differences in results 
between performance measures in the next section, when we present our results. 
The match characteristics (represented by 𝐴𝑐𝑚) are similar to those for the individual player analysis. 
The team characteristics (𝐵𝑐𝑚) contain the same kind of variables as for the individual players, 
including the team heterogeneity measures. However, these are all constructed in a slightly different 
way, since an average is calculated over all individuals, with weights that are based on individual 
playing minutes. Thus, all players of a team are used for the construction of the average. For the 
individual player variables we excluded the individual player 𝑖. The interpretation of the variables is 
unchanged. As with the individual player analysis, club fixed effects 𝛼𝑐 control for unobserved 
heterogeneity between clubs. A description of the variables, as well as some descriptive statistics and 
the pairwise correlations are presented in the panels B of Tables E1, E2 and E3 in the appendix. 
                                                 
7 Note that for the variable Points, we use two points for a win instead of three, since that makes the interpretation of our 
parameter estimates easier. Furthermore, Victory is a dummy with the value of one in case a team won the match and 
zero otherwise. 
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Figure 5.2: Kernel Density of team performance measured by average values of individual 
performances 
 
5.3 Parameter estimates 
5.3.1 Player level analysis 
The baseline estimates for individual player performances are shown in Table 5.1. We distinguish 
between five different specifications. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the individual 
Success Ratio.8 Furthermore, each specification contains 6,719 player-match observations for which 
playing time is at least 45 minutes. In model (1), we only include the match and player characteristics. 
For the match characteristics, it follows that, on average, individual performances are better in home 
matches, given the positive yet marginally significant result for the dummy. Matches that are played 
on artificial grass and on a weekday are insignificantly related to performance. This is also the case 
for derbies and the number of stadium attendance. In contrast, the general weather conditions do 
matter for players’ successfulness of actions. Success Ratio is positively related to the temperature 
and negatively related to the amount of precipitation. Assuming that the higher the temperature and 
the lower the amount of precipitation, the better general weather conditions are. Then, our results 
suggest that performances are better if the weather is fine. It seems reasonable to assume that both 
variables capture multiple aspects that are related to these weather conditions. Such aspects include, 
for example, the conditions of the playing field, the mindset of the players and the physical abilities 
of the players. The individual performances are positively and significantly related to the expected 
number of points, which reflects the strength of the competing clubs. In case bookmakers expect a 
                                                 
8 Table F1 in the appendix provides the results with Passing% as dependent variable. Our main results are similar. 
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team to do relatively well (i.e. to be stronger) compared to the opponent, players perform better. As 
a final match characteristic, we find an insignificant result for the New Coach dummy. 
 
Table 5.1: Parameter estimates baseline results individual Success Ratio 






      
Home 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 0.005* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Artificial Grass 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Derby 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Weekday -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LogAttendance -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Temperature 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Precipitation -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Expected Points 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
New Coach 0.003 0.004 0.004   





Playing Tim/90 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***   
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)   
Goalkeeper 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Defender 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Midfielder 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Capped 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) 
Market Value -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age under 21 -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age between 21 and 24 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age between 24 and 27 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Dutch -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Height 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.061** 0.064** 0.050*** 





Team Member Red Card  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
AV Market Value  0.007* 0.007** 0.007** 0.005*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
CV Market Value  -0.001    
  (0.010)    
HHI  -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.014** 0.009*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
AV Height  -0.025 -0.013 -0.022 -0.167*** 
  (0.087) (0.083) (0.081) (0.050) 
CV Height  -0.343    
  (0.243)    
AV Match Experience  -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 0.003 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
CV Match Experience  -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.001 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
 Constant 0.643*** 0.732*** 0.696*** 0.747*** 0.975*** 
  (0.052) (0.184) (0.179) (0.178) (0.100) 
       
 Club Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All estimates are based on 6,719 observations with playing 
time ≥ 45 minutes. Dependent variable is individual Success Ratio. Estimates in models (1), (2), (3) and (4) contain 18 club fixed 
effects with standard errors clustered by club, estimate in model (5) does not include any fixed effects. 
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For the player characteristics, we find a positive and significant result for Playing Time, even in the 
subgroup of player-match observations with at least 45 minutes of playing time. We suggest that there 
are multiple reasons for this finding. First, this might result from tactical considerations and, in 
particular, from the riskiness of actions that players undertake. In general, attacking (i.e. trying to 
score goals) is related to risky actions. Defending (i.e. preventing the other team to score), on the 
other hand, is less risky. Towards the end of the match, when the final outcome is quite clear for both 
teams, players might reduce the riskiness of actions, since the expected additional benefits are low. 
A second reason might be that a player’s performance improves during the match, because they get 
used to the circumstances and the opponent. Finally, the positive relation that we find may result from 
poor performers that are substituted. Then, playing time is endogenous and the interpretation of the 
result is more difficult. The results for the position dummies are clear and highly significant. The 
coefficients suggest that goalkeepers perform better than defenders, who perform better that 
midfielders, who in turn perform better than attackers. These results are in line with the 
abovementioned argument of the riskiness of actions. Think, for example, of a simple pass from one 
central defender to the other, which is easy and without much risk. In contrast, an attacking key action 
in the box of the opponent is more difficult, riskier and with a higher probability of failure. The results 
for capped players as well as the individual market value are insignificant. Both provide some 
indication of the quality of the player, which does not seem to matter for individual performance. 
Although one might expect a positive relation between the quality of a player and his performance, 
we have two potential reasons for this insignificant result. First, our proxy for quality is correlated 
with other variables that capture part of the aspect of quality, such as position, age and experience. 
Second, again the riskiness of actions might play a role. If the better players ‘take their responsibility’, 
which may include undertaking certain key actions, then they will probably often fail as well. This 
reduces their Success Ratio. The results for the age-related dummies mean that younger players 
perform worse compared to older players. Furthermore, the coefficients suggest a nonlinear relation 
at ages below 24. The dummy for the age category between 24 and 27 is insignificant, meaning that 
no difference exists between this category and the reference group of players aged above 27. Although 
the coefficient for the dummy Dutch is negative, suggesting that Dutch players perform worse than 
non-Dutch players, it is insignificant. Finally, the variable Height is positive and highly significant, 
meaning that, on average and conditional on certain aspects, taller players perform better. This result 
may reflect some physical superiority in duels and, in particular, headings. 
In model (2), we include the team characteristics. None of the results for the match and player 
variables is affected by this. The results for the team variables reveal that a red card for a team member 
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does not affect an individual’s performance, given the insignificant coefficient. Furthermore, the 
quality of team members, measured by their average market value, has a positive effect and is 
significant, tough only at the 10%-level. However, the variable CV Market Value that measures the 
heterogeneity in ability of teammates, is insignificant. Thus, although we find that an individual’s 
quality does not matter for performance, the quality of team members does. Diversity in ability, 
however, has no effect on individual performances. For the HHI, the variable that measures the 
diversity in nationality of the team, we find a highly significant coefficient. The negative sign 
indicates that diversity is beneficial for performance. Unrelated to an individual’s performance are 
AV Height and CV Height that measure the physical attributes of team members. Thus, we find that 
an individual’s height matters, but the height of teammates does not. To proxy for age/experience we 
have age-related variables and variables that include the past playing history of players. A model 
specification that includes both reveals that Match Experience of teammates is preferred with Success 
Ratio as dependent variable, while for Passing% Age is preferred. Although the variable AV Match 
Experience is insignificant, the coefficient of variation of match experience is highly significant. The 
negative sign suggests that an increase in heterogeneity concerning the experience of team members, 
results in worse individual performances. This means that, related to experience, an optimum would 
be to play together with players that have a similar amount of experience. To sum up, while 
heterogeneity in nationality is good for performance, heterogeneity in experience is bad for individual 
performances. Furthermore, heterogeneity in ability and heterogeneity in height have no significant 
effect on performance. 
This last result is the reason why we leave CV Market Value and CV Height out of the specification 
in model (3). This has no impact on any of the other results. Furthermore, all results remain the same 
if we exclude New Coach and Playing Time in specification (4). Both are potentially endogenous 
and, therefore, we test as a sensitivity analysis what happens if we leave them out. The remaining 
model (4) is our preferred specification and we use it for some additional analyses. First, we re-
estimate the model without club fixed effects. The results are shown in model (5). Although most 
results for match and player characteristics are similar, the results for Capped, Age between 24 and 
27 and Dutch differ and are statistically significant now. Furthermore, we find some differences for 
the team variables. First, AV Height appears to be negative and highly significant. Most interestingly, 
however, the sign for the HHI turns into positive, meaning that diversity in nationality is negative for 
performance, in contrast with the results for the within club analysis. It follows from the descriptive 
statistics presented in Table E5, that the HHI is quite different for the different clubs. For example, 
the maximum value for Willem II is the minimum value for PSV. Apparently, performance responds 
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more to the diversity in nationality within some clubs, than in others. Given the negative coefficient 
as found in our baseline result in model (4), the (positive) response to diversity is larger within the 
clubs that generally play with a lot of different nationalities, than within clubs that only contain a 
small amount of diversity. In model (5) we also exploit the between-club variation in the degree of 
diversity. The positive sign for HHI suggests that players from clubs with little diversity in nationality 
perform better, on average, than players from clubs with a lot of heterogeneity in nationality. 
However, this result is difficult to interpret, since it might follow from unobserved club 
characteristics, such as playing tactics. Without club effects, we do not control for these unobserved 
factors. A similar reasoning applies for the result for CV Match Experience, which is insignificant in 
model (5), suggesting that heterogeneity in experience is unrelated to individual performances. 
In general, we thus find that the use of club fixed effects matters. With these fixed effects included in 
the model, we analyse the variation in performance of players within a certain club. Estimation 
without club effects means that the differences in performances of individuals from all clubs are 
compared. This latter method does not take account of unobserved heterogeneity between clubs, such 
as the club-culture and the playing tactics. Such club-specific elements might result in club-specific 
playing performances. An investigation of the between-club variation might be an interesting topic 
for future research. Within such a design, one should carefully account for club-specific factors that 
may correlate with the observables. 
 
Table 5.2: Sensitivity analysis: selection of team variables for subsets of player-match 
observations based on playing minutes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Team Member Red Card -0.007** -0.007** -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
AV Market Value 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
HHI -0.007 -0.005 -0.015*** -0.013** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
AV Height 0.040 -0.010 -0.008 -0.096 
 (0.118) (0.081) (0.075) (0.091) 
AV Match Experience -0.017** -0.015** -0.011* -0.013* 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
CV Match Experience -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
     
Observations 8,311 7,690 7,038 5,095 
Playing time ≥0 minutes ≥15 minutes ≥30 minutes =90 minutes 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Dependent variable is individual Success Ratio. All 
estimates contain 18 club fixed effects and all other variables from model (4) in Table 5.1. Standard errors are clustered by club. 
 
We proceed with the specification of model (4) in our sensitivity analysis. First we test the sensitivity 
of our results if we use other subsets of player-match observations. In particular, we use different cut-
off values for playing time. Table 5.2 presents the results for the team characteristics for four different 
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subsets. Model (1) contains all player-match observations for which playing time is more than zero. 
The results are very similar to those of model (2), which contains observations for playing time of at 
least 15 minutes. In contrast to our baseline result, we find that the effect of a red card for a team 
member is negative and significant in these models, while the AV Market Value and the HHI are 
insignificant. The result for the CV Match Experience is comparable to our baseline result, but now 
in combination with a significant result for the AV Match Experience. If we restrict our sample to 
observations for which playing time is at least 30 minutes in model (3), most of the results are similar 
to our baseline model (4) in Table 5.1. Furthermore, these results are also comparable to those of 
model (4) in Table 5.2, which contains all observations for which the player was on the field during 
the entire match (i.e. playing time is equal to 90 minutes). Compared to our baseline results, we find 
that the AV Market Value is insignificant, while the AV Match Experience is significant at the 10%-
level. However, for both variables, the coefficient and the standard error do not differ much from our 
preferred specification. Thus, in general, we find some different results if we use different subsets. 
The differences occur for subsets that include player-match observations with only a small number 
of playing minutes. For these observations, the individual performance measure can be quite crude, 
since the Success Ratio is based on a rather low number of actions. This seems a good reason to 
exclude these observations. For subsets with the restriction that playing time has to be at least 30 
minutes, we find robust results. 
As a second sensitivity analysis, we test whether the results for the HHI and the CV Match Experience 
are different for playing position, Dutch and non-Dutch players, players aged younger than 24 and 
players aged older than 24 and during home matches compared to away-matches. Table 5.3 shows 
the results for the HHI, the CV Match Experience and some interaction terms. Interestingly, only the 
interaction effect NL*CV Match Experience is significantly different from zero. The positive 
coefficient means that Dutch players, in comparison to non-Dutch players, benefit from playing in a 
team with a higher diversity in experience. However, the overall effect of CV Match Experience 
remains negative. For playing position, age, and home matches, we do not find any significant 
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Table 5.3: Sensitivity analysis: selection of interaction effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
HHI -0.016* -0.013 -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
CV Match Experience -0.010 -0.041*** -0.028*** -0.015 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
Goalkeeper*HHI 0.013    
 (0.016)    
Defender*HHI -0.005    
 (0.015)    
Midfielder*HHI 0.007    
 (0.011)    
Goalkeeper*CV Match Experience -0.021    
 (0.015)    
Defender*CV Match Experience -0.009    
 (0.011)    
Midfielder*CV Match Experience -0.009    
 (0.014)    
NL*HHI  -0.004   
  (0.012)   
NL*CV Match Experience  0.036**   
  (0.015)   
U24*HHI   0.011  
   (0.009)  
U24*CV Match Experience   0.021  
   (0.014)  
Home*HHI    0.014 
    (0.009) 
Home*CV Match Experience    -0.005 
    (0.009) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All estimates are based on 6,719 observations with playing 
time ≥ 45 minutes. Dependent variable is individual Success Ratio. All estimates contain 18 club fixed effects and all other variables 
from model (4) in Table 5.1. Standard errors are clustered by club. 
 
Finally, we have performed several additional tests for the HHI variable. The significant negative 
coefficient in our baseline model suggests that it is optimal to play with eleven different nationalities. 
This seems unlikely, because such a team composition is quite uncommon, especially given the fact 
that the majority of the players (within the sample) is Dutch. Therefore, we look for non-linearity 
with dummy variables that each represent about 10 percent of the observations. The results are 
presented in the first column of Table F2 in the appendix. For the individual player level, we find that 
all coefficients are negatively signed. However, only few are significant, without a clear pattern (of 
non-linearity). We suggest that the within-club design has an influence on these results. Given the 
differences between the clubs, a dummy may only contain observations of certain specific clubs. This 
also follows from the spread as shown in Figure E2. Furthermore, models (3) and (5) contain 
alternative specifications of the HHI variable. In particular, the variable is calculated for a specific 
group of players that typically interact with each other during the match. Model (3) contains the 
separate variables for defenders, including goalkeepers, midfielders and attackers. Model (5) contains 
separate HHI variables for players with a position on the left-wing, players within the central axis of 
the team and players with a position on the right-wing. Only for the players on the left-wing, we find 
a significant result (at a 10 percent level). In general, we conclude that team diversity with respect to 
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nationality does not differ between separate parts of the team. Although players within these separate 
parts will probably communicate and interact with each other (i.e. players communicate most of all 
with the players quite close to them). However, within our sample of 523 players, 434 speak Dutch, 
while 68 speak English. The remaining 21 players speak other languages.9 Given that the vast 
majority speaks Dutch and/or English, we suggest that language cannot be considered as an important 
element, in particular because Dutch people, in general, speak English quite well. Instead, we think 
that differences in culture, background, and education in football at young ages (i.e. ‘the Dutch 
system’ vs. other playing styles) might be important elements that are related to the nationality of 
players. Furthermore, we suggest three alternative reasons why we think that language is not an issue. 
First, international players who move to the Netherlands are (probably) ambitious and want to move 
to other leagues after several seasons. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that they want to learn 
English, if they not already speak this. Second, clubs will want to invest in their assets, i.e. their 
players. Nowadays, the clubs guide and support the foreign players and provide language courses so 
that communication becomes easier. Finally, we suggest that the difficulty and intensity of the 
language that is used during a match is not very high. Players will easily learn the basics necessary 
to communicate on the pitch, whatever mother language. 
 
5.3.2 Team level analysis 
The setup of our team level analyses is similar to the analyses for individual player performances. 
The results are shown in Table 5.4, where we distinguish between five different dependent variables. 
In the models (1) and (2) we use a team average of Success Ratio and a team average of Passing% as 
team performance indicators, respectively. These are calculated as a weighted average of individual 
performances with weights that are based on playing time. In the models (3), (4) and (5) we use 
common match-outcomes as dependent variables. Points is measured as zero for a loss, one for a draw 
and two for a win to make interpretation of the results easier. Furthermore, Goal Difference is the 
number of goals scored minus the number of goals conceded, while Victory is a dummy with the 
value of one in case a team has won the match. All estimates are based on 612 club-match 
observations and include club fixed effects. The match characteristics are the same as for the 
individual player analyses, except the measure for the relative strength of opponents. Instead of the 
expected number of points, we use the difference in pre-match rank. The relation between the 
expected number of points and actual points might reveal more about the efficiency of bookmakers 
                                                 
9 This data is based on nationality, place of birth, playing history and YouTube video-interviews. 
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than that it measures the quality of teams. We find that team performance is better for home playing 
clubs in all models. Furthermore, in the models (1) and (2) we find a significant and positive result 
for Temperature, which is in line with our results for individual player performances. However, 
Temperature is insignificant in models (3), (4) and (5). In these three models, the difference in rank 
is negative and highly significant. Note that the league leader has the rank one and the team at the 
bottom of the league table has the rank eighteen. Thus, a negative value for the difference in pre-
match rank means that a team is ranked higher than the opponent. The negative coefficient means 
that higher ranked teams perform better. The difference in rank is only marginally significant (at a 10 
percent level) in model (1). Furthermore, the match characteristics are insignificant. 
 
Table 5.4: Team level analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






      
Home 0.007*** 0.009** 0.274*** 0.592*** 0.137*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.050) (0.124) (0.028) 
Artificial Grass 0.004 0.002 0.033 -0.059 0.065 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.106) (0.277) (0.052) 
Derby 0.003 0.007 0.031 0.126 0.059 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.146) (0.255) (0.083) 
Weekday -0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.011 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.218) (0.446) (0.114) 
LogAttendance -0.001 -0.003 0.026 -0.087 0.043 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.067) (0.187) (0.027) 
Temperature 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.033 0.082 0.010 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.060) (0.141) (0.027) 
Precipitation -0.004 -0.011 -0.005 0.011 -0.019 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.077) (0.165) (0.047) 
Difference in Rank -0.000* 0.000 -0.066*** -0.130*** -0.032*** 





Red Card in Team -0.002 -0.013** -0.218*** -0.729*** -0.086 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.074) (0.170) (0.050) 
Team AV Market Value 0.006* 0.014* -0.079 -0.192 -0.058 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.113) (0.435) (0.080) 
Team HHI -0.017** -0.037** 0.388 0.731 0.117 
 (0.006) (0.016) (0.252) (0.691) (0.162) 
Team AV Height 0.032 0.041 -9.295*** -24.893*** -3.936** 
 (0.085) (0.235) (2.546) (6.696) (1.769) 
Team AV Match Experience -0.004 -0.015 -0.254 -0.871** -0.075 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.198) (0.408) (0.125) 
Team CV Match Experience -0.018** -0.033 -0.861*** -1.827*** -0.354** 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.262) (0.612) (0.132) 
 Constant 0.811*** 0.771* 18.319*** 47.989*** 7.389** 
  (0.162) (0.428) (4.721) (12.825) (3.382) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All estimates are based on 612 observations and contain 
18 club fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by club. 
 
For the team characteristics, we find some interesting differences between the results of models (1) 
and (2) and the other three specifications. Although the difference for Red Card in Team is not so 
clear, Team AV Market Value is positive and significant (at the 10%-level) in the first two models, 
while negative and insignificant in the models (3)-(5). Thus, the average quality of a team, measured 
by market values, has no direct effect on match-outcomes, but is positively related to average team 
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performances. A similar conclusion follows from the results for the HHI. An increase in diversity is 
positive for average team performance, while there is no direct effect on match-outcomes.10 In 
contrast, Team AV Height has a direct and negative effect on match-outcomes, while it does not have 
any effect on team average performances. The insignificant result in the models (1) and (2) is not 
surprising and in line with our results for individual player performance. However, the direct and 
highly significant results in models (3)-(5) are more puzzling. This might have to do with match-
specific playing tactics and the use of taller players in ex ante difficult matches. An alternative 
explanation might be that the better clubs have, on average, smaller players, with more technical 
skills, which is beneficial when possessing the ball. We focus on team heterogeneity and find a rather 
robust result for CV Match Experience. Although the coefficient is insignificant in model (2), it is 
negative and significant in the other specifications. This suggests a direct effect of team heterogeneity 
in experience on match-outcomes as well as on average team performance. In line with our result for 




Figure 5.3: Scatterplot of club average Success Ratio and club end-of-season number of points 
(win 3 points, draw 1 point) 
 
                                                 
10 The models (2), (4) and (6) in Table F2 provide the results for some variants of the HHI variable. Comparable to the 
results for the individual player analysis, we do not find evidence of a non-linear relationship. Furthermore, with two 
exceptions, we find insignificant results for the separate groups of players based on playing position. 
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In the above, we referred to direct effects on match-outcomes, which suggests that there might also 
be indirect effects. For example, something might have an effect on team average performance, 
measured by an average Success Ratio, which in turn is related to match-outcomes. In particular, this 
might be the case for the AV Market Value and the HHI. We, therefore, examine the relation between 
average team performances and match-outcomes in more detail. First, Figure 5.3 plots, for all 
eighteen clubs, the average seasonal Success Ratio and the end-of-season number of points.11 This 
shows a positive relation. Furthermore, Table 5.5 shows the results for the team characteristics if 
Team AV Success Ratio is included as an independent variable and match-outcomes are the 
dependent variables. In all three models, the average success ratio is positive and highly significant. 
This indeed suggests that there are indirect effects at work. Furthermore, it also reveals the importance 
of the way in which team performance is measured. A continuous variable might be more accurate 
and able to reveal certain relations than discrete and crude match-outcomes. 
 
Table 5.5: Team level analysis with Team AV Success Ratio as independent variable 
  (1) (2) (3) 





Red Card in Team -0.208** -0.699*** -0.081 
 (0.074) (0.166) (0.050) 
Team AV Market Value -0.107 -0.273 -0.073 
 (0.112) (0.441) (0.081) 
Team HHI 0.462* 0.947 0.157 
 (0.238) (0.671) (0.158) 
Team AV Height -9.437*** -25.310*** -4.012** 
 (2.527) (6.371) (1.760) 
Team AV Match Experience -0.237 -0.821** -0.066 
 (0.190) (0.364) (0.121) 
Team CV Match Experience -0.781*** -1.590** -0.311** 
 (0.251) (0.552) (0.127) 
Team AV Success Ratio 4.372*** 12.876*** 2.364** 
 (1.461) (3.143) (0.912) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All estimates are based on 612 observations and contain 
18 club fixed effects and all match characteristics included in Table 5.4. Standard errors are clustered by club. 
 
5.4 Simulations 
In the previous sections, we discussed a preferred model specification and the statistical significance 
of variables. In this section, we investigate the economic impact and relevance of our main results. 
We use model simulations to see how performance changes for different values of the AV Market 
Value, the HHI, the AV Height and the CV Match Experience. First, we look at the impact for 
individual players and use the results of model (4) in Table 5.1. In all these simulations we set the 
Home dummy at value one, while Artificial Grass, Derby and Weekday are set to zero. Furthermore, 
we assume the player to be a Dutch midfielder aged between 24 and 27. Thus, the dummies 
                                                 
11 Figure G1 in the appendix shows the same relation in case we use two points for a win instead of three. 
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Midfielder, Dutch and Age between 24 and 27 have a value of one, while the other position and age-
related dummies have a value of zero. We also assume that the player has never played for his national 
team, i.e. Capped has a value of zero. Team Member Red Card is set to zero as well. All other 
variables are set at sample mean. First, for the four variables of interest, we add (subtract) one standard 
deviation to (from) its sample mean. Next, we use the minimum and maximum values in our 
simulations. Table 5.6 shows the results. The last column reveals that none of the simulated values 
results in a difference that is (even) close to one percent. 
 
Table 5.6: Simulation of individual player performance 
    Value Success Ratio Absolute difference compared to mean % difference compared to mean 
AV Market Value 
Min 0.14 0.8366 -0.0075 -0.0089 
Mean-SD 0.15 0.8367 -0.0074 -0.0088 
Mean 1.25 0.8441 0 0 
Mean+SD 2.35 0.8515 0.0074 0.0088 
Max 5.18 0.8707 0.0266 0.0315 
HHI 
Min 0.13 0.8494 0.0053 0.0063 
Mean-SD 0.29 0.8471 0.0030 0.0036 
Mean 0.50 0.8441 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.71 0.8411 -0.0030 -0.0036 
Max 1.00 0.8370 -0.0071 -0.0085 
AV Height 
Min 1.77 0.8452 0.0011 0.0013 
Mean-SD 1.80 0.8445 0.0004 0.0005 
Mean 1.82 0.8441 0 0 
Mean+SD 1.84 0.8437 -0.0004 -0.0005 
Max 1.86 0.8432 -0.0009 -0.0010 
CV Match Experience 
Min 0.36 0.8508 0.0067 0.0080 
Mean-SD 0.57 0.8472 0.0031 0.0037 
Mean 0.75 0.8441 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.93 0.8410 -0.0031 -0.0037 
Max 1.48 0.8315 -0.0126 -0.0149 
Note: Simulation based on results of model (4) in Table 5.1. In all these simulations we set the Home dummy at value one, while 
Artificial Grass, Derby and Weekday are set to zero. Furthermore, the dummies Midfielder, Dutch and Age between 24 and 27 were 
set at value one, while the other position and age-related dummies were set at value zero. Also, Capped is set at value zero as well as 
Team Member Red Card. All other variables are set at sample mean. 
 
A similar result appears for simulations for our team level analyses. For the match characteristics, the 
same assumptions are made as described above, while Difference in Rank is set to zero. Table 5.7 
shows the simulated results for Team AV Success Ratio. Table H1 in the appendix provides the results 
for all other dependent variables. Note that we have no simulated value for Mean-SD for AV Market 
Value, since that would be less than the minimum value. Again, it follows that the differences are 
very small. Thus, in general, we conclude that our statistical significant results have hardly any 
economic relevance, at least in the setting of Dutch professional football. 
Finally, related to the experience of a team, we discuss the optimal level of experience that follows 
from our results. Since the coefficients for the AV Match Experience variable are negative, the 
addition of experience to the team reduces the performance. For small changes in match experience, 
this effect is stronger than the effect that results from the value for the CV Match Experience, which 
 
TEAM HETEROGENEITY AND PERFORMANCE  131 
    
       
works in the opposite direction. However, we cannot easily identify an optimal level of experience. 
In particular, because (most of) the coefficients for the AV Match Experience are insignificant. Based 
on the significant negative value for CV Match Experience, we conclude that it is better to have a 
team composed of players with an equal experience than with players who differ in experience. The 
result suggests that this can be of any level of experience. 
 
Table 5.7: Simulation of team performance measured by Team AV Success Ratio 
    Value Team AV Success Ratio Absolute difference compared to mean % difference compared to mean 
AV Market Value 
Min 0.17 0.8482 -0.0068 -0.0080 
Mean-SD     
Mean 1.25 0.8551 0 0 
Mean+SD 2.35 0.8620 0.0070 0.0081 
Max 4.85 0.8779 0.0228 0.0267 
HHI 
Min 0.14 0.8609 0.0059 0.0069 
Mean-SD 0.28 0.8586 0.0035 0.0041 
Mean 0.49 0.8551 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.70 0.8515 -0.0035 -0.0041 
Max 1.00 0.8465 -0.0085 -0.0100 
AV Height 
Min 1.79 0.8541 -0.0010 -0.0011 
Mean-SD 1.81 0.8547 -0.0003 -0.0004 
Mean 1.82 0.8551 0 0 
Mean+SD 1.83 0.8554 0.0003 0.0004 
Max 1.85 0.8560 0.0010 0.0011 
CV Match Experience 
Min 0.42 0.8613 0.0063 0.0073 
Mean-SD 0.59 0.8582 0.0031 0.0037 
Mean 0.76 0.8551 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.93 0.8519 -0.0031 -0.0037 
Max 1.34 0.8444 -0.0107 -0.0125 
Note: Simulation based on results of model (1) in Table 5.4. In all these simulations we set the Home dummy at value one, while 
Artificial Grass, Derby and Weekday are set to zero. Also, Team Member Red Card is set at zero. All other variables are set at sample 
mean. 
 
Table 5.8: Variation in experience 
Club Start Match End Match Difference SD Difference SD Difference between Matches 
ADO Den Haag 138.6 129.1 9.5 14.2 11.7 
AZ 88.3 92.9 -4.7 15.7 12.3 
Ajax 83.6 84.7 -1.1 16.6 18.4 
Excelsior 104.0 93.5 10.5 8.7 12.2 
FC Dordrecht 54.0 59.9 -5.9 13.6 14.8 
FC Groningen 125.3 118.4 6.8 14.4 14.3 
FC Twente 93.4 94.4 -1.0 12.7 13.4 
FC Utrecht 102.1 94.8 7.3 19.5 17.0 
Feyenoord 134.1 116.6 17.5 26.1 23.0 
Go Ahead Eagles 108.1 101.6 6.6 24.0 17.8 
Heracles Almelo 113.4 113.1 0.2 20.1 21.0 
NAC Breda 121.0 116.6 4.4 15.0 16.7 
PEC Zwolle 115.8 117.6 -1.8 20.3 17.0 
PSV 104.7 97.1 7.7 11.5 10.6 
SC Cambuur 120.9 119.8 1.1 12.9 10.7 
SC Heerenveen 75.1 71.3 3.9 8.2 7.8 
Vitesse 118.4 118.6 -0.2 11.0 15.6 
Willem II 124.8 122.1 2.7 19.5 15.0 
Total 107.0 103.5 3.5 15.8 15.0 
 
In any case, the optimal level seems to be club specific, since mean values of match experience differ 
between clubs. The first column of Table 5.8 provides the mean values of experience for the starting 
line-up. Furthermore, the second column provides mean values for the players who end the match, 
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while the third column gives the mean difference. It follows that for some clubs, the in-match 
substitutions result in a reduction of experience, while for other clubs, the experience increases. On 
average, the value is positive, suggesting that the starting eleven are more experienced than the 
players who end the match. The fourth column gives the standard deviation of the differences. This 
can be compared to the differences that result from changes between matches. The last column shows 
the standard deviation of the mean values of experience of the starting line-ups for all the 34 matches. 
In general, the values in columns four and five are quite comparable. Thus, suggesting that coaches 
substitute in a similar way within matches as between matches, at least with respect to experience. 
Note that the differences in column three and the standard deviations in column four are not weighted 
by playing minutes. Thus, it simply reveals what kind of changes are made during the match, without 
showing the eventual impact on the values to be used in our estimations. Since about 95 percent of 
the substitutions take place in the second half of the match, this impact is at least half of the values 
provided. 
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
The primary focus of this paper is to investigate the relationship between team heterogeneity and 
performance. We use data from the highest tier of Dutch professional football in the 2014/15 season 
and construct four types of heterogeneity measures. The first one is based on market values that proxy 
for skill and ability. Second, we construct a measure for diversity in nationality. Next, height is used 
as a measure of heterogeneity of physical ability, while age and past playing histories are used to 
proxy for diversity in experience. First, we test whether team heterogeneity has an effect on individual 
player performances. A linear model with an individual’s Success Ratio as dependent variable is used 
for this. After controlling for numerous match and player characteristics, we find that heterogeneity 
in ability and diversity in height are unrelated to performance. However, team heterogeneity in 
nationality has a positive effect on performance, while team heterogeneity in experience has a 
negative effect. These findings are robust according to numerous sensitivity analyses and depend on 
the use of club fixed effects. 
The result for diversity in nationality suggests that benefits overcome certain cultural barriers, i.e. 
integration costs. Adding non-Dutch players to a squad increases diversity, in particular if those 
players come from different countries. Our results do not reveal what specific elements drive the 
benefits. For example, these elements might be related to different educational systems and talent 
development programs in youth football. However, we do know that the ones that often play in the 
Dutch league have a positive impact on individual’s performance. Assuming that this is important, 
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one should not be pessimistic about the inflow of foreign players, at least up to the level that was 
reached in the 2014/15 season. 
The results for heterogeneity in experience reveal that diversity is bad for performance. Players do 
better in case their teammates have a comparable amount of experience. We suggest two potential 
reasons for this. First, communication (in a broad sense) might be more difficult between players with 
different levels of experience. The players might suggest different solutions to certain situations and 
do not understand why the other players thinks differently. Second, in line with previous studies, this 
results from the complementarity of tasks within football. Mutual learning is of minor importance on 
the field. To perform well is what matters and this is achieved by combining complements in a team. 
In general, our main findings are the same for a team level analyses, when a team average 
performance is used as dependent variable. Results are somewhat different if we use match-outcomes 
instead. These match-outcomes, however, are related to team average performances. Thus, we suggest 
that, there are direct effects as well as indirect effects of team heterogeneity on match-outcomes. 
These indirect effects work through team average performance, in particular for heterogeneity 
concerning nationality. It seems that discrete match-outcomes are not able to capture such influences. 
Continuous measures, such as a (team average) Success Ratio and a (team average) Passing% might 
overcome this problem. Although these measures have drawbacks as well, in particular in assigning 
similar weights to all actions, they seem useful in this type of analysis. We suggest that an 
improvement of the understanding of the relationship between team heterogeneity and performance 
can be made if more detailed (performance) data becomes available. However, it is questionable 
whether this will make a difference in our conclusions on the economic impact. The results of our 
simulations all suggests very little relevance in terms of additional performance. Of course, this result 
is obtained from Dutch professional football and, therefore, not necessarily the same in other 
situations. Future research might extend the analyses to multiple seasons and leagues from 
professional football. It is also interesting to look outside the domain of sports, if clear measures of 
individual performances are available.
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Appendix E: Details on the data 
 
 
The sample contains 306 regular league matches from the highest tier of Dutch professional football 
in the season 2014/15. In every match, the line-up of a team consists of eleven players. Furthermore, 
a maximum of 7 players is allowed to take place on the bench, while each team is allowed to make a 
maximum of three substitutes per match. For each team, there is one goalkeeper. The number of 
defenders, midfielders and forwards depends on the team tactics and can change during a match as a 
result of substitutions. A match is split in two halves, both with an official playing time of 45 minutes. 
This can be extended with some stoppage time, but since we do not have precise data on this, we 
assume playing time to be 90 minutes at maximum. This means that players who entered the match 
in the stoppage time, are assumed to have a playing time equal to zero. In case no individual player 
performance data is available, playing time is also assumed to be zero. In total, we have 8,320 player-
match observations for which playing time is more than zero and, accordingly, an individual 
performance measure is available. 
Data on line-ups (including coaches), substitutes, playing time, cards, playing position, nationalities 
and market values were collected from transfermarkt.de. Furthermore, we also used this source to 
collect data on match-day information, such as the date of the match, the pre-match rank of teams and 
attendance figures. Information on weather conditions comes from the KNMI (Royal Dutch 
Meteorological Institute) which is located in De Bilt (rather central within the Netherlands). Fixed 
bookmaker odds come from the betting agency William Hill and are obtained from football-
data.co.uk. Birth dates of players as well as the number of caps are collected from vi.nl. Height is 
mainly collected from soccerway.com, but in case of missing data, other sources were consulted. We 
still lack information about height for nine of the 8,320 player-match observations. In case height is 
missing, a player is not considered in the construction of the team variables for height. Playing history, 
in particular in domestic league matches, is collected from soccerway.com. The player-specific match 
data, which includes the individual performance measures, is provided by ORTEC Sports. 
From this dataset, we construct the variables as listed in Table E1. Table E2 provides some descriptive 
statistics. Table E3 reports pairwise correlations. In both tables, the values for player level data are 
based on the subsample of players with a playing time of at least 45 minutes. Furthermore, Figures 
E1-E5 provide densities by club for some key variables, while Tables E4-E8 show some descriptive 
statistics of these variables by club. 
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Table E1: Description of variables 
  A. Individual Players   
D
V
 Success Ratio Ratio of the number of successful action and the total number of action 






Home Dummy with value one if club played at home 
Artificial Grass Dummy with value one if match is played on artificial grass 
Weekday Dummy with value one if match was played on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday 
Derby Dummy with value one if clubs are from the same province 
LogAttendance Natural logarithm of stadium attendance 
Temperature Daily mean temperature measured in 0.1 degrees Celsius in De Bilt on match-day / 10 
Precipitation Daily precipitation (precipitation was measured as being -1 for values <0.05, but was set to zero in our sample) amount in 0.1 mm in De Bilt on match-day / 10 
Expected Points Expected number of points for club based on bookmaker odds calculated as win-probability * 3 + draw-probability * 1 + lose-probability * 0 
Rank Pre-match rank of club 
Rank Opponent Pre-match rank of the opponent 





Playing Time Playing time during a match in minutes / 90 (maximum is 90 minutes) 
Goalkeeper Dummy with value one if playing position is goalkeeper 
Defender Dummy with value one if playing positon is defender 
Midfielder Dummy with value one if playing positon is midfielder 
Attacker Dummy with value one if playing positon is attacker 
Capped Dummy with value one if player at least played once for the national team 
Market value Market value (measured the first time a player is in the team during the season; in €1,000,000) 
Age Age at the start of the season (8th of August 2014; in days divided by 365.25) 
Age under 21 Dummy with value one if the age at start of the season <21 
Age between 21 and 24 Dummy with value one if the age at start of the season ≥21 and <24 
Age between 24 and 27 Dummy with value one if the age at start of the season ≥24 and <27 
Age above 27 Dummy with value one if the age at start of the season ≥27 
Dutch Dummy with value one if player has the Dutch nationality (only first nationality taken into account) 
Height Height of player in cm / 100 





Team Member Red Card Dummy with value one if at least one team member was sent off by the referee 
AV Market Value Weighted average market value of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
SD Market value Weighted standard deviation of market value of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
CV Market value Coefficient of variation of market value calculated as SD Market value / AV Market value 
HHI Weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of player nationalities of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
AV Height Weighted average height of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
SD Height Weighted standard deviation of height of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
CV Height Coefficient of variation of height calculated as SD Height / AV Height 
AV Age Weighted average age of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
SD Age Weighted standard deviation of age of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
CV Age Coefficient of variation of match experience calculated as SD Age / AV Age 
AV Match Experience Weighted average match experience of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
SD Match Experience Weighted standard deviation of match experience of team members. Weights are based on playing time that players were together on the field 
CV Match Experience Coefficient of variation of age calculated as SD Match Experience / AV Match Experience 
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Team AV Success Ratio Weighted average Success Ratio. Weights are based on playing time 
Team AV Passing Accuracy Weighted average Passing Accuracy. Weights are based on playing time 
Points Number of points obtained in the match 
Goal difference Goals scored minus goals conceded 





Team AV Market Value Weighted average Market Value of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team SD Market Value Weighted standard deviation of Market Value of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team CV Market Value Coefficient of variation of Market Value of team calculated as Team SD Market Value / Team AV Market Value 
Team HHI Weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of player nationalities of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team AV Height Weighted average height of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team SD Height Weighted standard deviation of height of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team CV Height Coefficient of variation of height of team calculated as Team SD Height / Team AV Height 
Team AV Age Weighted average age of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team SD Age Weighted standard deviation of age of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team CV Age Coefficient of variation of age of team calculated as Team SD Age / Team AV Age 
Team AV Match Experience Weighted average Match Experience of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team SD Match Experience Weighted standard deviation of Match Experience of team. Weights are based on playing time 
Team CV Match Experience Coefficient of variation of Match Experience of team calculated as Team SD Match Experience / Team AV Match Experience 
Note: DV is dependent variable 
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Table E2: Descriptive statistics 
 A. Player Level N Mean SD Median Min Max 
DV 
Success Ratio 6,723 0.85 0.07 0.86 0.47 1.00 






Home 6,723 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 
Artificial Grass 6,723 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
Derby 6,723 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
Weekday 6,723 0.04 0.19 0 0 1 
LogAttendance 6,723 9.60 0.71 9.63 8.05 10.87 
Temperature 6,723 0.91 0.54 0.90 -0.28 1.91 
Precipitation 6,723 0.17 0.31 0.00 0 2.00 
Expected Points 6,723 1.38 0.55 1.35 0.19 2.73 





Playing Time/90 6,723 0.95 0.11 1.00 0.50 1.00 
Goalkeeper 6,723 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 
Defender 6,723 0.36 0.48 0 0 1 
Midfielder 6,723 0.27 0.45 0 0 1 
Attacker 6,723 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 
Capped 6,723 0.25 0.43 0 0 1 
Market Value 6,723 1.26 1.52 0.60 0.00 8.00 
Age 6,723 24.08 3.42 23.74 16.52 36.67 
Age under 21 6,723 0.19 0.39 0 0 1 
Age between 21 and 24 6,723 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
Age between 24 and 27 6,723 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 
Age above 27 6,723 0.20 0.40 0 0 1 
Dutch 6,723 0.64 0.48 1 0 1 
Height 6,719 1.82 0.06 1.82 1.63 1.99 





Team Member Red Card 6,723 0.08 0.27 0.00 0 1 
AV Market Value 6,723 1.25 1.10 0.80 0.14 5.18 
CV Market Value 6,723 0.65 0.18 0.62 0.17 1.47 
HHI 6,723 0.50 0.21 0.50 0.13 1.00 
AV Height 6,723 1.82 0.02 1.82 1.77 1.86 
CV Height 6,723 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.05 
AV Age 6,723 24.07 1.26 24.15 20.34 27.83 
CV Age 6,723 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.24 
AV Match Experience 6,723 1.06 0.26 1.08 0.25 1.83 
CV Match Experience 6,723 0.75 0.18 0.74 0.36 1.48 




Team AV Success Ratio 612 0.85 0.02 0.86 0.74 0.92 
Team AV Passing% 612 0.79 0.05 0.79 0.58 0.89 
Points 612 1 0.87 1 0 2 
Goal Difference 612 0 1.94 0 -5 5 






Home 612 0.50 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Artificial Grass 612 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
Derby 612 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
Weekday 612 0.04 0.19 0 0 1 
LogAttendance 612 9.60 0.71 9.64 8.05 10.87 
Temperature 612 0.91 0.54 0.90 -0.28 1.91 
Precipitation 612 0.17 0.31 0 0 2 
Expected Points 612 1.38 0.55 1.35 0.19 2.73 





Red Card in Team 612 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 
Team AV Market Value 612 1.25 1.10 0.81 0.17 4.85 
Team CV Market Value 612 0.65 0.17 0.62 0.22 1.24 
Team HHI 612 0.49 0.21 0.49 0.14 1 
Team AV Height 612 1.82 0.01 1.82 1.79 1.85 
Team CV Height 612 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 
Team AV Age 612 24.07 1.22 24.14 20.79 27.15 
Team CV Age 612 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.22 
Team AV Match Experience 612 1.06 0.25 1.08 0.32 1.68 
Team CV Match Experience 612 0.76 0.17 0.75 0.42 1.34 
Note: For Player Level, selection of observations with playing time of at least 45 minutes. Four observations are missing for Height 
because of missing data. DV is dependent variable.  
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Table E3: Pairwise correlations 
 A. Player Level Success Ratio Passing%    B. Team Level Team AV Success Ratio Team AV Passing% Points Goal Difference Victory 
DV 




Team AV Success Ratio 1     






Home 0.0565* 0.0499*   Points 0.2946* 0.1118* 1   
Artificial Grass -0.0127 -0.0311*   Goal Difference 0.3376* 0.1420* 0.8786* 1  
Derby 0.0045 -0.0031   Victory 0.2799* 0.1307* 0.8985* 0.7895* 1 






Home 0.1556* 0.1023* 0.1610* 0.1587* 0.1447* 
LogAttendance 0.0324* 0.0550*   Artificial Grass -0.0275 -0.0683 0.0000 0.0000 0.0095 
Temperature 0.0411* 0.0555*   Derby 0.0134 -0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0333 
Precipitation -0.0248* -0.0428*   Weekday -0.0222 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0113 
Expected Points 0.1357* 0.1473*   LogAttendance 0.0947* 0.1326* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0214 





Playing Time/90 0.2236* 0.1037*   Precipitation -0.07 -0.0952* 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0132 
Goalkeeper 0.3410* 0.0258*   Expected Points 0.4002* 0.3306* 0.4484* 0.4808* 0.4048* 
Defender 0.3681* 0.2555*   Difference in Rank -0.3198* -0.2272* -0.5451* -0.5339* -0.4898* 





Red Card in Team -0.0616 -0.0969* -0.1113* -0.1417* -0.0817* 
Attacker -0.5138* -0.3391*   Team AV Market Value 0.3666* 0.3672* 0.3097* 0.3322* 0.3147* 
Capped 0.0757* 0.1074*   Team CV Market Value -0.0147 0.0121 0.0446 0.0457 0.0328 
Market Value 0.0695* 0.1052*   Team HHI 0.0189 -0.018 -0.0184 0.0064 -0.0146 
Age 0.1692* 0.0789*   Team AV Height -0.2048* -0.2155* -0.1906* -0.2059* -0.1738* 
Age under 21 -0.1141* -0.0417*   Team CV Height -0.0280 -0.0337 -0.0066 -0.0289 0.0115 
Age between 21 and 24 -0.0753* -0.0704*   Team AV Age -0.0464 -0.0734 -0.1572* -0.1533* -0.1660* 
Age between 24 and 27 0.0715* 0.0537*   Team CV Age 0.0053 -0.0132 -0.0878* -0.0761 -0.0715 
Age above 27 0.1221* 0.0652*   Team AV Match Experience 0.1423* 0.1073* -0.007 0.0053 -0.0062 
Dutch 0.0482* 0.014   Team CV Match Experience -0.1226* -0.1163* -0.1341* -0.1335* -0.1067* 
Height 0.2373* 0.1286*          





Team Member Red Card -0.018 -0.0377*          
AV Market Value 0.1269* 0.1610*          
CV Market Value 0.0179 0.0203          
HHI -0.0096 -0.015          
AV Height -0.1643* -0.1460*          
CV Height -0.0171 0.0041          
AV Age -0.0620* -0.0577*          
CV Age 0.005 0.0071          
AV Match Experience 0.0139 0.0203          
CV Match Experience -0.0358* -0.0377*                
Note: *p<0.05; pairwise correlations for players with playing time at least 45 minutes; DV is dependent variable
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Figure E1: Density of AV Market Value by club 
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Figure E5: Density of AV Age by club 
 
Table E4: Descriptive statistics by club for AV Market Value and CV Market Value 
      AV Market Value   CV Market Value 
Club N   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
ADO Den Haag 371  0.81 0.13 0.58 1.10  0.53 0.21 0.17 0.94 
AZ 373  1.74 0.27 1.02 2.27  0.77 0.15 0.39 1.18 
Ajax 374  2.91 0.54 1.03 4.30  0.70 0.18 0.33 1.47 
Excelsior 374  0.28 0.05 0.17 0.40  0.64 0.11 0.26 0.96 
FC Dordrecht 374  0.26 0.06 0.14 0.42  0.67 0.13 0.44 1.07 
FC Groningen 374  0.90 0.11 0.60 1.12  0.63 0.10 0.44 0.92 
FC Twente 375  2.02 0.38 1.10 2.71  0.75 0.16 0.40 1.17 
FC Utrecht 373  0.91 0.14 0.54 1.28  0.82 0.11 0.57 1.07 
Feyenoord 374  2.31 0.29 1.36 2.93  0.87 0.15 0.53 1.29 
Go Ahead Eagles 373  0.39 0.06 0.30 0.54  0.51 0.09 0.28 0.70 
Heracles Almelo 375  0.53 0.04 0.43 0.63  0.51 0.06 0.34 0.62 
NAC Breda 373  0.55 0.06 0.41 0.69  0.56 0.09 0.30 0.74 
PEC Zwolle 374  0.74 0.11 0.47 1.03  0.84 0.22 0.26 1.17 
PSV 372  4.39 0.39 3.29 5.18  0.48 0.08 0.31 0.72 
SC Cambuur 374  0.37 0.04 0.27 0.45  0.47 0.07 0.25 0.62 
SC Heerenveen 372  0.94 0.12 0.61 1.21  0.79 0.12 0.47 1.03 
Vitesse 374  2.05 0.26 1.48 2.78  0.62 0.10 0.37 0.82 
Willem II 374   0.46 0.07 0.28 0.55   0.54 0.09 0.26 0.67 
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Table E5: Descriptive statistics by club for HHI 
      HHI 
Club N   Mean SD Min Max 
ADO Den Haag 371  0.54 0.12 0.32 1.00 
AZ 373  0.25 0.06 0.14 0.41 
Ajax 374  0.45 0.12 0.27 0.82 
Excelsior 374  0.72 0.11 0.52 1.00 
FC Dordrecht 374  0.32 0.11 0.14 0.73 
FC Groningen 374  0.62 0.16 0.32 1.00 
FC Twente 375  0.22 0.04 0.14 0.38 
FC Utrecht 373  0.59 0.11 0.40 0.97 
Feyenoord 374  0.66 0.10 0.50 1.00 
Go Ahead Eagles 373  0.84 0.10 0.66 1.00 
Heracles Almelo 375  0.56 0.12 0.36 1.00 
NAC Breda 373  0.41 0.15 0.19 0.82 
PEC Zwolle 374  0.54 0.11 0.31 1.00 
PSV 372  0.70 0.13 0.42 1.00 
SC Cambuur 374  0.63 0.13 0.40 1.00 
SC Heerenveen 372  0.38 0.10 0.18 0.67 
Vitesse 374  0.25 0.08 0.13 0.52 
Willem II 374   0.25 0.05 0.18 0.42 
Total 6,723   0.50 0.21 0.13 1.00 
 
 
Table E6: Descriptive statistics by club for AV Height and CV Height 
      AV Height   CV Height 
Club N   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
ADO Den Haag 371  1.841 0.008 1.821 1.862  0.031 0.004 0.019 0.038 
AZ 373  1.821 0.009 1.794 1.848  0.034 0.002 0.027 0.039 
Ajax 374  1.830 0.008 1.809 1.854  0.023 0.004 0.012 0.031 
Excelsior 374  1.823 0.009 1.795 1.845  0.031 0.005 0.017 0.038 
FC Dordrecht 374  1.829 0.010 1.799 1.861  0.036 0.004 0.026 0.045 
FC Groningen 374  1.803 0.012 1.774 1.836  0.043 0.003 0.032 0.049 
FC Twente 375  1.815 0.012 1.785 1.854  0.037 0.005 0.024 0.050 
FC Utrecht 373  1.825 0.011 1.791 1.853  0.040 0.004 0.028 0.053 
Feyenoord 374  1.805 0.010 1.777 1.836  0.037 0.004 0.026 0.052 
Go Ahead Eagles 373  1.834 0.012 1.804 1.862  0.029 0.004 0.019 0.038 
Heracles Almelo 375  1.822 0.009 1.801 1.844  0.042 0.004 0.028 0.048 
NAC Breda 373  1.820 0.012 1.788 1.846  0.032 0.005 0.021 0.043 
PEC Zwolle 374  1.808 0.011 1.783 1.843  0.037 0.004 0.026 0.046 
PSV 372  1.801 0.011 1.780 1.836  0.036 0.004 0.024 0.044 
SC Cambuur 374  1.813 0.008 1.793 1.840  0.028 0.003 0.018 0.035 
SC Heerenveen 372  1.824 0.009 1.798 1.850  0.038 0.005 0.021 0.051 
Vitesse 374  1.804 0.009 1.787 1.831  0.036 0.005 0.018 0.042 
Willem II 374   1.811 0.009 1.789 1.835   0.032 0.004 0.019 0.040 
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Table E7: Descriptive statistics by club for AV Match Experience and CV Match Experience 
      AV Match Experience   CV Match Experience 
Club N   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
ADO Den Haag 371  1.37 0.14 0.95 1.67  0.59 0.07 0.43 0.85 
AZ 373  0.89 0.13 0.58 1.23  0.75 0.16 0.39 1.13 
Ajax 374  0.84 0.18 0.37 1.17  0.90 0.15 0.58 1.48 
Excelsior 374  1.03 0.13 0.61 1.31  0.64 0.10 0.44 0.90 
FC Dordrecht 374  0.55 0.14 0.25 0.89  0.82 0.13 0.50 1.30 
FC Groningen 374  1.24 0.16 0.87 1.79  0.62 0.14 0.36 0.99 
FC Twente 375  0.93 0.13 0.57 1.23  0.63 0.12 0.41 0.97 
FC Utrecht 373  1.00 0.17 0.51 1.35  0.90 0.15 0.56 1.36 
Feyenoord 374  1.31 0.23 0.72 1.83  0.79 0.11 0.54 1.07 
Go Ahead Eagles 373  1.07 0.19 0.57 1.52  0.99 0.21 0.47 1.45 
Heracles Almelo 375  1.13 0.21 0.60 1.71  0.76 0.10 0.50 1.01 
NAC Breda 373  1.21 0.19 0.63 1.72  1.00 0.16 0.53 1.36 
PEC Zwolle 374  1.16 0.19 0.81 1.62  0.77 0.13 0.51 1.09 
PSV 372  1.04 0.12 0.69 1.28  0.57 0.06 0.37 0.69 
SC Cambuur 374  1.21 0.11 0.91 1.48  0.59 0.07 0.41 0.77 
SC Heerenveen 372  0.74 0.10 0.41 1.00  0.79 0.08 0.58 1.04 
Vitesse 374  1.19 0.17 0.79 1.66  0.65 0.11 0.37 0.87 
Willem II 374   1.23 0.16 0.88 1.73   0.79 0.09 0.57 1.06 
Total 6,723   1.06 0.26 0.25 1.83   0.75 0.18 0.36 1.48 
 
 
Table E8: Descriptive statistics by club for AV Age and CV Age 
      AV Age   CV Age 
Club N   Mean SD Min Max   Mean SD Min Max 
ADO Den Haag 371  25.21 0.57 23.51 26.33  0.11 0.02 0.06 0.15 
AZ 373  23.11 0.55 21.75 24.60  0.13 0.02 0.08 0.18 
Ajax 374  22.92 0.90 20.34 24.75  0.14 0.02 0.09 0.24 
Excelsior 374  25.01 0.57 23.67 26.33  0.12 0.02 0.07 0.15 
FC Dordrecht 374  22.73 0.60 21.26 24.11  0.10 0.02 0.07 0.15 
FC Groningen 374  24.55 0.73 22.95 26.18  0.13 0.03 0.08 0.21 
FC Twente 375  23.28 0.81 21.34 25.31  0.13 0.03 0.06 0.21 
FC Utrecht 373  23.89 0.88 21.72 25.72  0.16 0.02 0.08 0.20 
Feyenoord 374  24.86 0.91 22.72 26.94  0.17 0.02 0.14 0.23 
Go Ahead Eagles 373  23.84 0.60 21.77 24.99  0.13 0.03 0.05 0.18 
Heracles Almelo 375  25.11 0.85 23.01 27.83  0.16 0.01 0.09 0.19 
NAC Breda 373  25.15 0.91 22.88 27.53  0.17 0.02 0.12 0.21 
PEC Zwolle 374  24.40 0.81 22.81 26.58  0.15 0.03 0.10 0.21 
PSV 372  21.86 0.29 21.28 22.95  0.09 0.02 0.06 0.16 
SC Cambuur 374  25.32 0.50 23.80 26.78  0.12 0.01 0.09 0.15 
SC Heerenveen 372  22.75 0.43 21.56 23.98  0.11 0.02 0.05 0.14 
Vitesse 374  24.02 0.71 22.53 25.71  0.13 0.02 0.08 0.16 
Willem II 374   25.23 0.57 23.92 27.13   0.13 0.02 0.07 0.19 
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Appendix F: Baseline result with Passing% 
 
 
Table F1: Parameter estimates baseline results individual Passing% 






      
Home 0.010*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Artificial Grass 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Derby 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Weekday 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) 
LogAttendance -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Temperature 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Precipitation -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.014*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Expected Points 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
New Coach -0.003 -0.002 -0.002   





Playing time 0.019 0.019 0.019   
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)   
Goalkeeper 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) 
Defender 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
Midfielder 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
Capped 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) 
Market Value 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Age under 21 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) 
Age between 21 and 24 -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* -0.014* -0.018*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) 
Age between 24 and 27 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Dutch -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.007** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) 
Height 0.183*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.173*** 0.140*** 





Team Member Red Card  -0.012* -0.013* -0.013* -0.012** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
AV Market Value  0.008 0.006 0.006 0.009*** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) 
CV Market Value  0.009    
  (0.019)    
HHI  -0.036** -0.034** -0.034** 0.009 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.006) 
AV Height  -0.183 -0.149 -0.148 -0.453*** 
  (0.213) (0.205) (0.203) (0.090) 
CV Height  -0.446    
  (0.542)    
AV Age  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
CV Age  -0.109*** -0.109** -0.105** 0.047 
  (0.037) (0.049) (0.049) (0.044) 
 Constant 0.402*** 0.755 0.685 0.699 1.229*** 
  (0.093) (0.449) (0.431) (0.430) (0.186) 
       
 Number of club Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All estimates are based on 6,719 observations with playing 
time ≥ 45 minutes. Dependent variable is individual Passing%. Estimates in models (1), (2), (3) and (4) contain 18 club fixed effects 
with standard errors clustered by club, estimate in model (5) does not include any fixed effect. 
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Table F2: Parameter estimates for different variables of HHI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Player Level Team Level Player Level Team Level  Player Level Team Level 
        
HHI 20th -0.008** -0.002      
 (0.003) (0.002)      
HHI 30th -0.006 -0.004      
 (0.005) (0.004)      
HHI 40th  -0.004 0.001      
 (0.004) (0.004)      
HHI 50th -0.006 -0.004      
 (0.005) (0.005)      
HHI 60th -0.012** -0.007      
 (0.005) (0.005)      
HHI 70th -0.004 -0.006      
 (0.005) (0.004)      
HHI 80th -0.012** -0.005      
 (0.005) (0.005)      
HHI 90th -0.007 -0.007      
 (0.005) (0.005)      
HHI 100th -0.015** -0.007      
 (0.006) (0.005)      
HHI defense   0.003 -0.001    
   (0.008) (0.006)    
HHI midfield   0.000 -0.007*    
   (0.009) (0.004)    
HHI attack   -0.003 -0.007    
   (0.009) (0.007)    
HHI left      -0.013* 0.004 
      (0.007) (0.006) 
HHI central      0.007 -0.001 
      (0.005) (0.005) 
HHI right      -0.011 -0.015*** 
      (0.007) (0.005) 
        
Observations 6,719 612 6,719 612  6,719 612 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All estimates contain 18 club fixed effects. Models (1), 
(3) and (5) are based on a player level analysis with the individual Success Ratio as dependent variable and includes all the other 
variables as included in specification (4) of Table 5.1. Models (2), (4) and (6) are based on a team level analysis with the Team AV 
Success Ratio as dependent variable and includes all the other variables as included in specification (1) of Table 5.4. Standard errors 
are clustered by club. In Models (1) and (2), the number in the variable name represents a percentile. The corresponding upper values 
for the HHI dummies in the player level analysis are approximately 0.22 (HHI 10th; the reference category); 0.27; 0.34; 0.42; 0.50; 
0.54; 0.64; 0.67; 0.81 and 1. The upper values for the HHI dummies in the team level analysis are approximately 0.21 (HHI 10 th; the 
reference category); 0.26; 0.34; 0.43; 0.49; 0.55; 0.63; 0.69; 0.80 and 1. In models (3)-(6) the values for HHI are based on the subgroup 
of players, taking playing time into account, for the respective positions. The goalkeeper belongs to the defense. 
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Appendix G: Scatterplot with alternative number of points 
 
 
Figure G1: Scatterplot of club average Success Ratio and club end-of-season number of points 
(win 2 points, draw 1 point) 
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Appendix H: Results for simulations with alternative 
dependent variable 
Table H1: Simulations of team performance 
    Value Team AV Passing% Absolute difference compared to mean % difference compared to mean 
AV Market Value 
Min 0.17 0.7773 -0.0149 -0.0188 
Mean-SD     
Mean 1.25 0.7922 0 0 
Mean+SD 2.35 0.8073 0.0151 0.0191 
Max 4.85 0.8417 0.0495 0.0625 
HHI 
Min 0.14 0.8053 0.0131 0.0165 
Mean-SD 0.28 0.8000 0.0078 0.0099 
Mean 0.49 0.7922 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.70 0.7844 -0.0078 -0.0099 
Max 1.00 0.7732 -0.0190 -0.0240 
AV Height 
Min 1.79 0.7910 -0.0012 -0.0016 
Mean-SD 1.81 0.7918 -0.0004 -0.0005 
Mean 1.82 0.7922 0 0 
Mean+SD 1.83 0.7926 0.0004 0.0005 
Max 1.85 0.7934 0.0012 0.0016 
CV Match Experience 
Min 0.42 0.8034 0.0112 0.0141 
Mean-SD 0.59 0.7978 0.0056 0.0071 
Mean 0.76 0.7922 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.93 0.7866 -0.0056 -0.0071 
Max 1.34 0.7731 -0.0191 -0.0241 
    Value Points Absolute difference compared to mean % difference compared to mean 
AV Market Value 
Min 0.17 1.2090 0.0855 0.0761 
Mean-SD     
Mean 1.25 1.1235 0 0 
Mean+SD 2.35 1.0364 -0.0871 -0.0775 
Max 4.85 0.8385 -0.2850 -0.2537 
HHI 
Min 0.14 0.9876 -0.1359 -0.1210 
Mean-SD 0.28 1.0420 -0.0815 -0.0726 
Mean 0.49 1.1235 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.70 1.2051 0.0815 0.0726 
Max 1.00 1.3216 0.1980 0.1763 
AV Height 
Min 1.79 1.4024 0.2789 0.2482 
Mean-SD 1.81 1.2165 0.0930 0.0827 
Mean 1.82 1.1235 0 0 
Mean+SD 1.83 1.0306 -0.0930 -0.0827 
Max 1.85 0.8447 -0.2789 -0.2482 
CV Match Experience 
Min 0.42 1.4164 0.2929 0.2607 
Mean-SD 0.59 1.2700 0.1464 0.1303 
Mean 0.76 1.1235 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.93 0.9771 -0.1464 -0.1303 
Max 1.34 0.6239 -0.4996 -0.4447 
    Value Goal Difference Absolute difference compared to mean % difference compared to mean 
AV Market Value 
Min 0.17 0.5284 0.2073 0.6457 
Mean-SD     
Mean 1.25 0.3211 0 0 
Mean+SD 2.35 0.1099 -0.2112 -0.6576 
Max 4.85 -0.3700 -0.6911 -2.1522 
HHI 
Min 0.14 0.0651 -0.2560 -0.7971 
Mean-SD 0.28 0.1675 -0.1536 -0.4783 
Mean 0.49 0.3211 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.70 0.4747 0.1536 0.4783 
Max 1.00 0.6941 0.3730 1.1615 
AV Height 
Min 1.79 1.0679 0.7468 2.3257 
Mean-SD 1.81 0.5700 0.2489 0.7752 
Mean 1.82 0.3211 0 0 
Mean+SD 1.83 0.0722 -0.2489 -0.7752 
Max 1.85 -0.4257 -0.7468 -2.3257 
CV Match Experience 
Min 0.42 0.9421 0.6210 1.9340 
Mean-SD 0.59 0.6316 0.3105 0.9670 
Mean 0.76 0.3211 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.93 0.0106 -0.3105 -0.9670 
Max 1.34 -0.7383 -1.0594 -3.2992 
    Value Victory Absolute difference compared to mean % difference compared to mean 
AV Market Value 
Min 0.17 0.4826 0.0622 0.1479 
Mean-SD     
Mean 1.25 0.4204 0 0 
Mean+SD 2.35 0.3571 -0.0633 -0.1507 
Max 4.85 0.2131 -0.2073 -0.4931 
HHI 
Min 0.14 0.3794 -0.0410 -0.0975 
Mean-SD 0.28 0.3958 -0.0246 -0.0585 
Mean 0.49 0.4204 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.70 0.4450 0.0246 0.0585 
Max 1.00 0.4802 0.0597 0.1421 
AV Height 
Min 1.79 0.5385 0.1181 0.2809 
Mean-SD 1.81 0.4598 0.0394 0.0936 
Mean 1.82 0.4204 0 0 
Mean+SD 1.83 0.3810 -0.0394 -0.0936 
Max 1.85 0.3023 -0.1181 -0.2809 
CV Match Experience 
Min 0.42 0.5409 0.1205 0.2866 
Mean-SD 0.59 0.4806 0.0602 0.1433 
Mean 0.76 0.4204 0 0 
Mean+SD 0.93 0.3602 -0.0602 -0.1433 
Max 1.34 0.2149 -0.2055 -0.4888 
Note: Simulation based on results of models (2)-(4) in Table 5.4. In all these simulations we set the Home dummy at value one, while 
Artificial Grass, Derby and Weekday are set to zero. Also, Team Member Red Card is set at zero. All other variables are set at sample 
mean.
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